Aesthetic Dimensions of Educational Administration and Leadership

**Eugenie A. Samier and Richard J. Bates
with Adam Stanley**

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Aesthetic Dimensions of Educational Administration and Leadership provides an aesthetic critique of educational administration and leadership. It demonstrates the importance of aesthetics in all aspects of the administrative and leadership world: the ways ideas and ideals are created, how their expression is conveyed, the impact they have on interpersonal relationships and the organisational environment that carries and reinforces them, and the moral boundaries or limits that can be established or exceeded.

The book is divided into three parts.

- Part I examines various philosophical traditions in aesthetics as they inform administrative life, focusing on major modern traditions arising from Kant, Romanticism and Nietzsche, Collingwood, the pragmatic school, and critical theory.
- Part II explores four aesthetic sources for administrative critique – architecture, literature, film, and movement – as they serve both to understand the social construction of administration and leadership and provide a critique of values, roles, power and authority.
- Part III examines more topical and applied problems of charisma, heroism, and authority in practice, concluding with a discussion of the aesthetic analysis of politics and power within the context of contemporary educational administration and leadership theory.

While presenting a significant departure from conventional studies in the field, the international contributors reflect a continuity of thought on the creation, use and abuse of administrative and leadership authority from the writings of Plato through to contemporary theory. This book should appeal to school administrators and leaders and those aspiring to these roles.

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Adam G. Stanley hoped as a child one day to become the leader of a small but energetic tribe of tree people in Papua New Guinea. As this dream has yet to blossom, his research and writing centres around the validity of literature as a source for educational leadership and public administration and the need

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Introduction

1 Foundations and history of the social aesthetic

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Educational leadership and administration have been the subject of explosive growth in scholarship over the last two decades as governments, administrators, and educators have struggled to come to terms with the management of a mechanistic and hierarchical system of organisations that is hopelessly archaic, and, in most respects, terminally ill. Doomed as it is, this unwieldy and hoary dinosaur has managed to rouse itself from its inertia only enough to stumble clumsily and wearily into another century. Leadership studies has unluckily been grasped by many as the panacea to redress decades of short-sighted planning, compounded by countless poor decisions in many cases driven by ill-conceived ministerial and departmental mandates. Either out of desperation or denial, those who optimistically jerk the reins of power send thousands of educators and administrators to conferences and seminars around the world in the hope that they will return to the field with renewed vigour, inflamed with passion by whichever failed motivational speaker or shoddy academic addressed them after the de rigueur morning consumption of bran muffins and decaffeinated coffee.

This book, on the other hand, does not maintain that there are 'seven simple steps' to reforming education – there are no such steps that can be applied to a fluid and dynamic environment, and it is risible to suggest that there might be. It will never be reduced to a convenient PowerPoint presentation, nor will it ask you to reflect on your practice and create a 'vision statement' for your educational credo. It will not ask you to 'think only positively' about change and thus condemn yourself to a life of shadowy half-truths. It contains not a single snappy acronym or mnemonic device, and does not suggest that you begin to develop a 'leadership portfolio' with your 'team' and head off on a 'retreat' with an easel and clutching a fistful of whiteboard markers – unless that ostensible retreat is really an excuse to knock back martinis with your colleagues to reach a state of critical enlightenment.

The intent of this book is to provide a series of aesthetic lenses through which to look anew at the many paradigms of leadership in education and administration. Aesthetics is an old and powerful discipline, and through it is developed our sense of who we are, what we can and cannot tolerate, and our experiential understanding of our environment. As with all else, there is attraction, repulsion, beauty and ugliness, and in each is shrouded, without false clarity, a manifestation of the truth.

There are already established areas in organisational and administrative literature that capture creative activity relevant to educational administration and leadership. One is dramaturgy derived from Goffman (1959; see Brissett and Edgley 1975; Burke 1966; Burns 1972; Coombs 1980; Edelman 1971; 1977; Gardner 1992). However, this approach has two constraints: first, it has been attached most often to administrative behaviour rather than to leadership; and second, it has been most often explored in its functionalist form as a sociological phenomenon, instead of a purely aesthetic expression. Additionally, as Borreca points out (1993: 58), dramaturgical studies went into decline in the mid-1980s as it seemed that little new could be attained, effectively ending contributions the dramaturgical could have made just as leadership studies, and its sub-field charisma studies, became fashionable.

An aesthetic approach is also suggested clearly in organisational culture studies, especially in the more symbolic rather than the functionalist schools, although the latter also points to the many constructions in verbal, behavioural and artefactual form that issue from creative organisational activity. For example, Smircich defines organisations symbolically as culture-producing phenomena: in addition to goods and services, 'they also produce distinctive cultural artefacts such as rituals, legends, and ceremonies' (1983: 344). In her root metaphor approach (Smircich 1983: 347–8), the formal characteristics of organisation are seen to be products of an expressive process including thought, language and interaction using the tools of the aesthetic: images and symbols (e.g. iconographic objects, logos, mottoes, trophies), and styles of behaviour to produce organisational artefacts. The role leadership plays in organisational culture is central – in fact, to some theorists is its main role, although most often from a culturally functionalist perspective. Pfeffer (1981) and Schein (1985) regard leadership as essentially concerned with the creation and management of culture, composed of language, symbolism, rituals, and ceremonies, focusing often on the creation of symbols of power, such as insignia. Deal and Kennedy (1982), Deal and Peterson (1991), and Deal (1995) more explicitly discuss the creative role of leaders in shaping the symbolic nature of organisations, consisting of artefacts, stories, and dramatic roles of organisational actors.

During the 1990s, a number of organisation theorists pioneered an aesthetic analysis, largely derived from anthropology and cultural studies, and from pioneering work by Edmund Leach in the 1950s, for whom aesthetics formed the basis for communication and ethics in groups. The field has evolved through three stages. The first is from a predominantly trivialised view of aesthetics as it relates to leisure and non-essential aspects of organisational life (such as inconsequential furnishings). Witkins argues that aesthetics has been trivialised because it emphasises the sensuous: 'It is the separation of the sensuous aspect of aesthetic experience from knowing and understanding that has led to the trivialization of the aesthetic domain' (1990: 327). The second stage is the functionalist perspective of the 1970s and 1980s, when aesthetics was appreciated in its symbolic and representational form serving conventional administrative goals (what

Gagliardi, 1996, calls the 'corporate view'). And finally, it has arrived at an independent analysis derived from aesthetic theory, regarded as the ontological underpinning of organisational life. In this latter sense, organisation, administration, and leadership are aesthetic constructions – the means by which interpersonal relationships and organisations take form. While many writers in organisational aesthetics still adhere to some extent to a functionalist view (e.g. Ramirez 1996), a significant number have explored aesthetics as a foundational discipline (notably Gagliardi 1996; Strati 1990; 1992; 1999; White 1996). What distinguishes foundationalism is that it avoids 'any distinction between what is a piece of artwork and what is an object of routine practice, and between what are art events and the events of every day life' (Strati 1992: 570).

An aesthetic theory of social reality derives from German idealism traceable from Kant through Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, for whom the aesthetic is integral to insight, intellectual freedom, and conceptual formation. Baumgarten, also in the 1750s, developed a bipartite theory of knowledge based partially on aesthetics, in which intellectual knowledge rests on logic, and sensory knowledge rests on aesthetics (see Wessell 1972). A contemporary of his, Vico, also explored aesthetics, not as a philosophical but an anthropological and psychological inquiry in the 'human sciences'. As Hofstadter (1965: 2–4) demonstrates, this central role of the aesthetic was adopted by post-idealist thinkers in social and political philosophy such as Nietzsche, Croce, Dilthey, Cassirer, Maritain, Whitehead, Dewey, and Heidegger. Important also in this tradition are Georg Simmel's aesthetically grounded sociology, developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Davis 1973), and Weber's value-orientation theory of social action and method in achieving *verstehen* that draws upon 'an empathic or artistically appreciative quality' (1968: 5). Art provides the means by which the three functions of symbolism, expression, and meaning are integrated (Hofstadter 1965: 6), evident in the Romantic view of politics as an art form (Turkle 1975: 86). The means by which these are formed socially can be derived from the expressive theories of art proposed by Croce, Cassirer, Collingwood, and Langer. For example, Cassirer argues that conventional artistic activity serves an ordering function to our understanding: 'Art gives us order in the apprehension of visible, tangible, and audible appearances … The infinite potentialities of which we had but a dim and obscure presentiment are brought to light by the lyric poet, by the novelist, and by the dramatist' (1956: 213, 215). It is from this heritage that Morgan draws in *Images of Organization* (1986), where experience is mediated through mental images of form.

The work of Kant and Baumgarten in large part derives from their idealist or Platonic lineage (Roberts 1988: 34), as does the aesthetic theory of Hegel and the later development of existentialism through the Nietzschean tradition (see Cazeaux 2000). The very style in which Plato wrote, fictional dialogues or conversations with a strongly developed poetics replete with metaphor, simile et cetera necessary to the dialectic method, emphasises the underlying aesthetic foundation to knowledge, ethics, and the political community. It is this kind of reading of Plato, engaged in the conversational and rhetorical qualities of the

texts rather than the doctrinal (Gadamer 1986), that distinguishes Gadamer's hermeneutic disposition towards the 'art of dramatization' (1991). In other words, Plato used what we would now call literary sources and style to critique ethics and politics, two of the most famous from the *Republic* being the cave analogy (Book VII) and the ship parable (Book VI) to illustrate the principles of authority, management, and leadership. The critical role that aesthetic modes, such as literature and music, play in educating people towards ethical and political ideals permeates his dialogues, but one of the most explicit arguments to this effect is found in the *Theaetetus* (1990), in Book III of the *Republic* and in Book VII where the abstract aesthetic principles of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, harmony, and music are deemed necessary to ward off vulgarity and decay in the development of reason (see Bowie 2000 for a discussion of the role of the arts in the German idealist tradition, particularly the role of aesthetics in knowledge theory).

Plato's conception of human nature, the state, and moral and political values, reflect an underlying aesthetic associated with his theory of forms (the Platonic solids) – the unchanging, objective, and perfect conceptions of truth and knowledge that exist on an ideal ideational plane. Aesthetic principle governing social reality can be seen in the tripartite form human nature takes (composed of affect, courage, and reason), and in his analogous conceptualisation of the ideal state in the *Republic* (consisting of three classes: commoners or artisans, soldiers, and guardians) (Book V). Contrary to many popular conceptions of the *Republic* being primarily a text on ethics or politics, six of the ten books are devoted to educational topics covering curriculum, the nature and role of teaching and their relationship to hierarchy, discipline, authority, ethics, and political values – as are many of the early Socratic dialogues like the 'Euthyphro' and the 'Meno' (Plato 1981). Here aesthetic expression is regarded as necessary for the education of the whole person towards the good consisting of wisdom, bravery, temperance, and justice (Book IV), which in turn are required for the development of the political system and the state (see Janaway 2002 on the role of the arts in Plato's argument for aesthetics in moral and political education). The philosopher kings or guardians are analogous in their administrative role to the mandarin tradition in Westminster systems (or any other elite-type administrative cadre produced traditionally in such countries as France, Germany and Russia), distinguishable by an intellectual formation characterised by cultivation, in large part produced through aesthetic education.

The purpose of philosophy, and of aesthetics, for Plato is to point the way to an ideal free from the degeneration, corruption and decay characteristic of a world not yet freed from evil and injustice. Aesthetic principles govern his conceptualisation of the Good at all levels, from the nature of the individual, the nature of social interaction, the structure of society, and, in particular, the nature of political systems (composed of leadership and administration) that have risen above the degenerate forms of political 'constitution': the timocracy produced by an aristocratic rule of honour; the oligarchic governed by wealth; the democratic ruled by licentiousness; and the tyrannical driven by violence.

It is proposed here that one can extrapolate from this relationship of the ideational to the actional as fundamental ordering principles, much as Weber did from Kantian concepts in developing social action typologies in *Economy and Society*. One can also use Khatchadourian's approach to the aesthetic: 'what we refer to or think of as the work of art is at least in part the sensible patterns qua kinds of patterns' (1971: 10). Administrative and leadership behaviour, then, are accessible to aesthetic analysis, such as the aims, enjoyments, ascriptions, psychological and epistemic factors, aesthetic valuation, and social utility of any work of art. Viewing the aesthetic domain within a general theory of culture and society, argues Hunter, has 'the potential for inaugurating a new and fruitful mode of reflection ... aesthetics appears both to embody and forestall [in a developmental dialectic of the ideal and real] the *unfolding of all that we might become*' (1992: 349). The aesthetic, then, is the way that leadership constructs organisational form and represents itself to its members and the outside world.

Fundamental characteristics of social reality need to be viewed for an aesthetic analysis of the transformational function of administration as heterogeneous, dynamic and conflictual, since significant organisational and subjective change is inherent to the phenomenon. Viewing organisations dialectically, as advocated by Murphy, requires stressing contradictions, inconsistencies, and paradoxes: 'It portrays a universe of dissonance underlying apparent order and seeks deeper orders beyond the dissonance' (1971: 117). As creatively formed, organisational activity continually evolves. The fixing and framing of social reality through symbols, myths, and customs, are themselves the products of processes borne out of a continuous flux, an approach taken by Pettigrew (1979: 572) who emphasises the creative activity of people in organisations in constructing and managing meaning. This flux is described by Turner (1986: 24–5) as a dialectical reflexivity between the workaday world and cultural performance, as both product and cause of change in social action. Organisations are constantly re-enacted and revised as social actors negotiate their way through organisational life, construct realities, ascribe values, and establish meaning for themselves individually and for the organisation collectively. Organisation, then, like any cultural construction, is the product of creative acts. Ebers emphasises this in his contention that imagination serves as the creative power that allows one to create the visions, management of meaning, symbolic action, and enactment necessary to organisation (1985: 54–5).

The connection between leadership and creativity is assumed, although not critically developed, in much of the leadership and charisma literature, beginning with Weber's treatment of the phenomenon. He contrasts charisma with rationality and routine: 'mass versus personality, the "routine" versus the "creative" entrepreneur, the conventions of ordinary people versus the inner freedom of the pioneering and exceptional man, institutional rules versus the spontaneous individual, the drudgery and boredom of everyday existence versus the imaginative flight of the genius' (Gerth and Mills 1946: 53). The earliest modern literature by Burns and House include, in their portrayal of transforming and charismatic leadership respectively, a strong creative dimension. For Burns, it

was a creative capacity that could result in new institutions such as nations, social movements, political parties, or a bureaucracy (1978: 454), and for House, it was characterised as a 'creative or innovative quality' (1977: 190). Trice and Beyer (1993), also, credit charisma's influence as primarily a creative one.

Many of the characteristics commonly associated with leadership, and charisma in particular, are highly suggestive of an underlying aesthetic, however, most frequently interpreted in social terms. These include the articulation of a vision (Conger and Kanungo 1988a: 325; 1998) and myth-making (Conger and Kanungo 1988a: 326), highly developed linguistic skills oriented towards the 'skills of artful persuasion and meaning making' (Conger and Kanungo 1988b: 316), performative abilities such as the heroic role (Burns 1978: 244), expressiveness (Bensman and Givant 1975; Willner 1968), and presenting an image through 'impression management' (Conger and Kanungo 1988c: 82, 85–7; see also Conger and Kanungo 1998; Bass 1988; House 1977: 205–6). Intellectual creativity was identified by Burns (1978: 163) as a defining trait, further developed by Bass as the stimulation of followers' thinking and imagination as one of the four key attributes of transformational, and therefore charismatic leadership (1985: 62; also Avolio *et al.* 1991; Bass and Avolio 1994). Their originality, according to Bass, extends to their use of 'symbolism, mysticism, imagery and fantasy' to construct and convey the distal goals and utopian outcomes of charisma (1985: 6). Conger and Kanungo promote in the training of charismatic leaders the use of 'creativity training programs' to enhance both the creation of an organisational vision and in developing the 'skills of artful persuasion and meaning making' (1988b: 315–6). While their conception of charismatic abilities is still tied to conventional organisational management and behavioural psychology, it does lay necessary groundwork for an aesthetic of charisma.

Shamir more explicitly assumes an aesthetic in the way that he identifies the source of charismatic authority as originating in their employment of artistic disclosure in making contact with the 'vital layer' of reality (1991: 87). Therefore, behaviour characteristic of the charismatic is not only pragmatic and goal-oriented, but also 'expressive of feelings, aesthetic values and self-concepts' (Shamir et al 1993: 580). Boal and Bryson, also, contend that charisma is 'intimately and unusually involved in the creation of a new or different world ... [consisting] of all the sensory, affective, and cognitive events subjectively experienced by the actor' (1988: 12–13). The verbs used in describing the activities of charisma appeal frequently to such artistic roles: orchestrate, mesmerise, create, shape, innovate, form, recast, design, construct, play, project, perform, generate, conceive, reorient.

The essential characteristic of leadership, and, following Weber's definition of all authentic leadership as charismatic, lies in the creation of new organisational, conceptual, and behavioural practices. As such, the study of leadership is also arguably an aesthetic field, a study of form. A few pioneered the aesthetic, like Tead (1951) and Selznick (1957), followed by Eble (1978), Wildavsky (1979), House (1982), Peters and Waterman (1982), and Duke (1986). However, their work is largely functionalist in approach, reducing the art and craft of leadership

to deft decision-making, exercise of judgement, both pragmatic and moral, and a greater facility in interpersonal relations. Duke, as well as Peters and Waterman, separates the creative from routine aspects of leaders' roles, relegating the aesthetic to that 'in' the organisation rather than 'of' it. One of the most intriguing to adopt an aesthetic perspective on managing is Kuhn:

> To borrow from Virginia Woolf a definition of managing as an art form, the manager continually affirms a point of view that is constructed and sustained through creative, aesthetic affirmation. Managing becomes art as managers create meaning, construct form, recognize patterns and place values on their relationships with others, both within and outside the organization. They affirm the structures of their perceptions in the face of the chaotic elements of daily life and the contradictions in nature and even the negations in themselves and in others. The meanings of their affirmations are as fleeting and fragile as the vital, creative part of the organization itself; it is art that exists only in process. It is in fact processional art.
>
> (1982: 12–13)

Klein and Diket (1999) consider an artistic expression of leadership through the management of space. However, they distinguish between artistic and non-artistic spaces, rather than using aesthetics as an ontological foundation to all organisational form. Selznick comes closer to a foundational notion of organisational aesthetics, for whom 'the art of the creative leader is the art of the institution building, the reworking of human and technological materials to fashion an organization that embodies new and enduring values' (1957: 152–3), however he, too, restricts this only to 'creative' leaders. Goodsell (1992) comes close to an appreciation of a foundational aesthetic in his consideration of styles and forms of administration. While aesthetic features of furniture and decoration do compose and reflect organisational identity, such a narrow view is indicative of a structural-functionalist paradigm in organisation theory, not one well equipped to consider a more radical and fundamental aesthetic approach to reality construction (Strati 1996: 210).

Reading social reality in aesthetic terms stresses the creative, that is, the material culture, social action, and presentation of ideas as the primary media of expression. Explored in this book is the degree to which such a reading suggests an aesthetic foundation to administration and leadership, and the educational organisations that form around them. A study of the aesthetic requires examining the means by which their symbolic, behavioural, and visionary dimensions, as a social art work, bring order out of chaos, shape physical and social reality, and embody values and visions (elevated quite often to ideological force). And it requires examining critically how these creative expressions make human action meaningful, satisfying emotional and existential (metaphysical), as well as rational, needs, or, in their more repressive or destructive forms, violate human values. These necessarily are political – one can examine both the aesthetic inherent in politics, but also the political use of art. Such a connection has been

explored in studies of Italian and German fascism (by Berezin 1994 and Friedländer 1984, respectively, on kitsch) and Stalinist Russia's (see Sabonis-Chafee 1999) aim to create a new national culture through public policies and a bureaucracy to regulate and administer state art. These examples are important, since in all these regimes, and arguably equally in the democratic politics of education, aesthetics plays a critical role in creating new regimes and institutionalising power.

Aesthetic features, as Carter and Jackson demonstrate, can elicit responses from organisational actors: 'in producing an aesthetic, what an organization does, intentionally and/or unintentionally, is to structure both form and content in such a way as to elicit a positive response from all those with whom it has any transaction' (2000: 189). Or, the aesthetic can mask or deny unpleasant realities by inducing, sustaining, and rewarding compliance (2000: 193). As a social aesthetic, administration and leadership structure, sustain, and convey meaningful social action. This is a broader application of the ethics of aesthetics that Hunter regards as a dialectic practice 'by which individuals shape themselves as subjects or aesthetic experience and conduct their lives as aesthetic beings' (1992: 352). While Hunter restricts his discussion to individual development characteristics of the Bildung tradition, it is expanded in this paper to social action as suggested by Mach:

> Symbolic forms like rituals, ceremonies, myths, festivities, art, literature, are the way in which a group, a community or a state organizes the intellectual and emotional framework of its members' lives, confirming its value-system, social norms and goals, and legitimizing social order. In such a way group identity is created, maintained, and transformed together with the identity of other groups with which one's own group has relations.
>
> (1993: 38)

Such a view, however, returns us to the functionalist conception of aesthetics where the 'function' of art is the maintenance of social order or group identity. Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1998) argues, for instance, for a high level of correspondence between 'social' space and 'symbolic' space where 'distinction' is conferred upon those with accumulated 'cultural' or symbolic capital. But the accumulation of such capital and its recognition are dependent upon a hierarchy of aesthetic values that specifies a system of relationships between positions in social space. 'Good' taste and 'poor' taste or 'high' culture and 'mass' culture are contrasts that construct social and aesthetic distances between locations within a social order. Aesthetics or 'taste' therefore not only serve as a unifying social mechanism, but also a divisive one, allocating those with various cultural or symbolic capital to different social spaces. Bourdieu argues that the function of education is to ensure the replication of distinction through the institution of 'social borders analogous to those that formerly separated nobility from gentry and gentry from common people' (1998: 21). The administration of education is therefore in part the administration of culture that through its construction and

allocation of aesthetic, symbolic or cultural capital serves to administer and perpetuate social hierarchy. The role of educational administrators is to preside over systems and institutions that structure and allocate access to aesthetic experience in particular socially conservative ways, thus matching the possession of cultural capital to the possession of economic capital. Leadership in educational administration is, therefore, constituted by ingenuity in devising ways to both further and legitimate this process.

Such a position is not far from that of theorists like Adorno (1970, 1991) who argued that the 'culture industry' was constructing an 'administration of culture' dependent upon the manufacture and consumption of cultural products. Here, he posited the extension of capitalism into the aesthetic sphere, with the consequent construction of class relations and exploitation in the sphere of culture through the construction of mass 'commodity fetishism'. Organisations of whatever kind (including education) therefore administered culture in ways that reproduced cultural as well as economic relations, serving to perpetuate as well as disguise the inequity of unequal class relations.

More recent analyses within the (largely British) cultural studies movement both support and challenge these ideas. Williams (1958; 1961; 1980), being a working class boy, was well aware of the social mechanisms by which 'distinction' was produced. He was also one of the first of a group of working class 'scholarship' boys to invade British universities and to argue that working class culture was not a degenerate form of elite culture, but rather a culture with its own unique and valuable aesthetic from within which cultural criticism could be articulated (Gorak 1988; McKee 2005). This aesthetic was closely related to the conditions of the working class as it emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular to the struggle for decent work, political representation and freedom of expression (Hartley 1992; McKee 2005). The role of schools in this struggle was central as the aesthetics of education were articulated in ways that were progressive in political as well as social terms.

Dewey (1931; 1966; 1980) argued that art, experience, and democracy were closely related through progressive forms of education. Herbert Read argued that 'art should be the basis of education (1958: 1) and that 'a democratic method of education is the only guarantee of a democratic revolution' (1958: 304). More recent advocates of the close relation between aesthetics, democracy and education such as Eisner (1979) and Greene (1988; 2001) have, like Dewey and Read, been largely ignored in the literature on educational administration and leadership. The result has been that discussion of aesthetics and educational administration has largely been confined to the consideration of aesthetics as a mechanism through which the understanding and effectiveness of educational administrators might be enhanced. Culture, as has been argued elsewhere, is seen as a mechanism for enhancing control (see Bates 1981; 1987). Few voices among writers on educational administration have seen beyond this horizon. To be sure, Hodgkinson (1991) spoke of educational administration as 'The Moral Art', and Greenfield (1993) provided constant allusion to art and literature as sources of insight into the reality of organisational life. But neither

developed an appropriately articulated theory of aesthetics and educational administration. Others, such as Ribbins and Zhang (2003a, 2003b) have appealed to 'Art and Artfullness' in their study of Headteachers. But here the 'art' is that of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz which, like that of Machiavelli, is the art of war, of strategy, deception and mastery. As a metaphor for educational administration such 'art' seems well removed from an aesthetic of sensitivity, imagination and cultural inclusiveness that might form a more proper ethical basis for democratic education. An alternative conception is, however, provided by Starratt (1990) who uses the metaphor of the drama of schooling (1990) and the drama of leadership (1993) to suggest that schooling is not only preparation for work, but also preparation for participation in a wider 'social drama':

> The social drama always has to deal with issues of alienation, whether that alienation has political, economic, cultural or familial roots. Similarly, the social drama involves the tension between individual autonomy, creativity and freedom on the one hand, and the demands of membership in one or more social organizations. Schools must deal with these issues.
>
> (Starratt 1990: 141)

So, in the pursuit of an aesthetics of educational administration and leadership, it is important that aesthetics are employed not only to examine administrative behaviour, but also to examine the aesthetic responsibilities of educational administrators in playing their role in the social drama: one that acknowledges Dewey's awareness of 'the continuity of aesthetic experience with normal processes of living' (1980: 10).

The contributed chapters in this volume explore a wide variety of issues. Chapters 2–6 in Part I address the philosophical foundations for an aesthetic approach to educational administration. In Chapter 2, Samier argues that Kant provides a foundation for a critical approach to educational administration through his insistence that the processes of imagination and judgement involved in aesthetics allow the development of independent thought and action, and suggests that such independence ought to characterise both education and administration. In Chapter 3, Samier and Stanley examine the contributions made by both British and German Romantic traditions in the drive for self-determination against various forms of despotic power, culminating in Nietzsche's advocacy of individual character as a work of art – an aesthetic and ethical achievement of the self, freed from irrelevant constraints through independence and self-determination. Harris, in Chapter 4, provides an exegesis of Collingwood's philosophical, historical and political critiques, showing how the aesthetic was central to his critical analyses, emphasising his distinction between art and craft, and highlighting the fundamental importance of imagination and its realisation through creativity of expression. In Chapter 5, Maxcy examines the metaphysics supporting the conception of pragmatic aesthetic leadership, drawing heavily on Dewey's view of the field as both a moral and an aesthetic enterprise. In Chapter 6, Milley looks to the Frankfurt School of Social Theory

and the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and especially Habermas, for an understanding of aesthetic leadership as a critical, emancipatory practice.

Following these initial chapters, Part II turns to an exploration of aesthetic sources for administration and leadership. In Chapter 7, Klein and Diket look to architecture and the conception of artful design as a metaphor for educational administration. Building for change through imagined alternatives is the thesis presented here as applicable to both architecture and educational administration. Stanley's Chapter 8 takes British Victorian literature, especially the novels of Dickens and Brontë, as the starting point for his analysis of the aesthetics of characterisation, arguing that the cultural archetypes found in their novels can be used as Weberian ideal types that can elucidate the nature of headmastership in educational administration. In Chapter 9, Stockton examines the nomothetic basis of most contemporary administrative theory and contrasts this with the ideographic possibilities inherent in literature and cinema as an aesthetic approach to the understanding of administration and leadership in education. Snowber, in Chapter 10, shares with us the poetics of an aesthetic that continually surprises and allows us to see the world in different, more sensuous ways; ways that have the capacity to transform the self and allow the development of a more personal and spiritual conception of leadership.

Part III develops various critical applications of aesthetics to educational administration. Samier, in Chapter 11, takes Weber's theory of charisma and examines its expressive features in terms of the architectural, the theatrical and the literary. These are used to propose a new way of evaluating the 'content' of charisma in both its creative and destructive forms, opening up a new possibility for the evaluation and critique of leadership. In Chapter 12, Ribbins draws on his work with Gunter to locate the aesthetic within a mapping of various forms of knowledge relevant to the understanding and practice of educational administration, and advocates this as part of a comprehensive approach to understanding and improving practice in leadership education. In Chapter 13, Gronn examines the aesthetics of the cult of leadership through an analysis of the careers and especially the fates of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, arguing that these are exemplars of the dangers of embracing ideas of heroic organisational leadership. In the final chapter, Bates sees the aesthetic as essentially a cultural product and argues, *pace* Bourdieu, that education typically distributes culture in ways that confirm social distance. This does not invalidate the liberatory potential of the aesthetic in developing a sense of agency; the construction of such an aesthetic is argued to be the central purpose for a truly educational administration.

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Part I

Philosophical foundations

2 Imagination, taste, the sublime, and genius in administration

A Kantian critique of organisational aesthetics

Eugenie A. Samier

> … we demand in all knowledge also beautiful things … otherwise they are disgusting.
>
> (Kant 1963: 31)

Immanuel Kant occupies a peculiar position in intellectual history, altering the modern philosophical landscape more than any other individual. He established an intermediate position in a range of confluences ranging from Newton's scientific writings, Rousseau's moral claims, and the early Enlightenment debates among Leibniz, Wolff, Jacobi, Fichte, Lessing and Mendelssohn on the nature of reason. His examination of the scope and limits of the mind were prompted by a polarisation in philosophy between the dogmatic metaphysics of rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz, and Baumgarten and the sceptical empiricism of Locke and Hume compromising, as Kant believed, both positions in creating a coherent theory of knowledge and action (see Beiser 1987; 2000; Israel 2001). While being one of the harshest critics of Enlightenment writers, whose positions led either to scepticism or materialism, his purpose was to establish a lasting foundation to the authority of reason within the boundaries of human finitude. This culminated in his series of critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, establishing the autonomy of reason, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, its implications for ethics in how moral principle can guide us in acting in particular situations, and finally the *Critique of Judgment*, exploring the interrelationship between subject and object in art, beauty and design in nature. Collectively, these resulted in a theory of mental faculties in which aesthetic judgement plays a critical role in establishing the active sources of cognition, imagination and understanding in a harmonious interplay (Henrich 1992: 33).

Viewing the fashioning of social reality as aesthetic derives in large part from German idealism and the Enlightenment traceable from Kant through Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Kierkegaard for whom the aesthetic is integral to creative cognitive processes leading to insight, intellectual freedom, and concept formation. Kant's influence, along with the work of Goethe and Herder, established aesthetics as an independent discipline, played out not only in philosophical writings but the literary works of Schiller and Hölderlin. Beiser notes the fundamental and far-reaching impact of Kant in establishing the relation of philosophy

to aesthetic writing for the claims made later by Nietzsche, and developed variously by Heidegger, Derrida, Rorty and Williams, that the validity of philosophy lay in aesthetic insights rather than traditional claims as a rigorous science (2000: 7), albeit in forms Kant would have been hard pressed to recognise. As Schmidt argues, it is Kant's examination of the role of the aesthetic in ethics and reintroduction of the sublime in philosophical discussion that renewed the importance of tragedy, laying the groundwork for its elaboration in German Idealist and Romantic thought (2001: 74–5) through Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.

What unites all these thinkers in their treatment of the aesthetic is the location of sensory experience (the aesthetic) into a central position in the pursuit of knowledge and truth. In other words, Kant 'asserts that human consciousness is not detached from the world but rooted in and actively engaged with it' (Cazeaux 2000: 3), proposing a new model for the relationship between mind and reality as an alternative to Cartesian rationalism and Lockean and Humean empiricism. Known more generally as his 'Copernican Revolution', Kant claimed a finitude of human experience based on the assertion that human consciousness is rooted in and actively engaged with the world rather than being detached from it: the new model of this relationship between mind and reality is analogous to Copernicus's new model of the cosmos removing the anomalies of sixteenth-century astronomy.

At first glance, administration seems to be wholly removed from the writings of Kant, apart from a questionable transmission through Rawls and frequent, if undeveloped, appeals to his authority in ethics (see Samier 2003 for a detailed discussion). And there is good reason for his under-representation – it is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate or use his moral and political theory without first tackling the underlying groundwork in the most famous of his texts, the three critiques. While the *Critiques of Pure Reason* and of *Practical Reason* have a more apparent relationship to administrative decision-making and ethics, the *Critique of Judgment*'s relevance has only emerged in more recent organisational culture theory. Ritual and symbolic interpretation have provided purchase for relating Kant's discussion of taste through aesthetics and the sublime as they relate to organisational form, organisational change, and independent critical thought. The administrative fad for leadership studies also opens the door to Kant's analysis of genius in the *Critique of Judgment*. And his theory of reflective judgement has relevance for the crisis literature of administration's disciplinary integrity and ideology (see Samier 2005). Probably of most importance in the *Critique of Judgment* is an emphasis on the complex exercise of judgement rather than simpler decision-making models that reinforce, through conformity to rules and procedures, an obedience to organisational authority.

The aesthetic critique

The *Critique of Judgment* was intended to address a number of moral and epistemological issues relating to mind and experience that Kant left unresolved in the

Critique of Pure Reason as 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover' (1933: 183). For Kant, our experience and the structure of the world are inextricably intertwined (the essence of his Transcendental Deduction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*). This is expressed in the doctrine of the 'two viewpoints': that in the phenomenal (under laws of causal determination), we are subject to existing conditions; and that in the noumenal, we are in the realm of the 'thinkable' (freedom). Sullivan translates this into practical terms as a distinction between the appearance and the possible (1994: 167–8), the latter providing in administration for engagement in the moral and Realpolitik. Greenfield, referring to Kant in several papers on the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal (1993a: 8) and the subjective construction of reality and knowledge (1993a: 8; 1993b: 95; 1993c: 123), concluded that without a full appreciation of this distinction 'control-oriented science aimed at the individual becomes an instrument of social repression and a threat to personal freedom' (1993d: 220).

It is in the appreciation of art that Kant found a model for a harmonious engagement of perception, imagination, judgement, and reflection, that is not confined to works of art, but, as this paper argues, extends to socio-political reality, and therefore administrative life. It is important to note that for Kant 'art' is whatever is made in the sense of artefact (McCloskey 1987: 105) and has no special subject matter – any subject can be expressed as aesthetic ideas (McCloskey 1987: 123), even administration, and therefore extends beyond 'fine art'. In this sense, it applies to administration as an art, both in creating interpersonal relations, creating the conceptual apparatus of administration in policies, and in shaping the material environment in which administration takes place.

In the *Critique of Judgment* aesthetic sensibility is used to bridge the difference between understanding and reason as a mediating element of his entire system of thought, uniting the abstract order of duties expressed through maxims of conduct and the source of freedom (form) with real life (or matter) (Kant 1987: 15–18). It is this organising property that allows us to establish the relationship between the world and our conceptual understanding of it, in other words, to apprehend and create regularity in experience. Metaphorically, the aesthetic of the arts to move us subjectively to objective judgement is what allows us to produce moral principles for our action and to construct knowledge. For Cazeaux, Kant's argument is summed up neatly as 'the demands made by an artwork on us to find the right words to describe its effect or significance are paradigms for the conceptual or interpretative decisions which have to be made in moral and epistemological judgements' (2000: 6). Aesthetic experiences and symbols are useful in making our sensibility harmonise with the demands of practical reason, or ethics, bringing our subjective nature in the form of emotions impelling action into alignment with objective reasoning (Kant 1987: 225–30; Guyer 2000: 368).

The main question of the *Critique of Judgment* is how subjective judgement can claim universal assent – aesthetic judgements are utterances describing something as beautiful or having special significance that are personal expressions but are expressed as if they should so be regarded by everyone (called the

antinomy of taste by Kant). These judgements of taste consist of four character-
istics based on the free play of cognition: their universality lies in the delight or
aversion we feel in objects apart from any interest; that the beautiful pleases uni-
versally apart from any concept of it; that beauty is the form of an object, 'insofar
as it is perceived in the object *without the presentation of a purpose*' (Kant 1987:
84); and the '*beautiful* is what without a concept is cognised as the object of a *nec-
essary* liking' or delight (Kant 1987: 90).

The rest of Kant's treatment of aesthetic judgement consists primarily of four
topics that will be discussed in this paper as they relate to decision making,
organisational design, and administrative ethics: imagination, judgement of
taste, judgement of the sublime, and genius. The essential question for adminis-
tration is: how can we establish the capacity for critical and imaginative thinking
when we are bound to empirical reality? Where do administrators find original-
ity, independent thought, and reflective judgement in order to transcend current
conditions or the status quo? This is a problem with which administrative stud-
ies, heavily dominated by positivism, structural–functionalism, and economic
modelling, is particularly plagued.

Imagination

Of especial interest for the more creative potential of administration in develop-
ing policy, and innovative ways of structuring personal relations, is Kant's theory
of the formative faculty underlying the perceptual and imaginative process and
the various types of formations (*Bildungen*) involved, particularly those involving
imaginative formation (*Einbildung*) through invention or abstraction, and the
form associated with genius, archetypal formation (*Urbildung*) (see Makkreel
1994: 12–15). In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, imagination serves a constitutive
role for understanding and regulative ideals of reason by allowing us to bring
together concepts of understanding with our experience of the empirical world.
Kant's transcendental philosophy is aimed at determining what the universal
preconditions for human experience are: 'I call all cognition transcendental
which is concerned not with our cognition of objects, but with the manner of our
cognition of objects, in so far as this is possible a priori' (1933: 59).

The transcendental aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* rests upon the dis-
tinction between sense and understanding, the former concerned with what we
know through intuition (the two forms of which are space and time) and the lat-
ter providing shape and identification through conceptualisation. Sense and
understanding are two different sources of representation, therefore matters of
sense can not be reduced to matters of understanding, and vice versa.
Imagination 'depends upon pure concepts of an object that originate from our
understanding – concepts that are at the same time the indispensable conditions
for the possibility of the thought of oneself as a constant and unchangeable point
of reference for all one's thoughts and judgements' (Henrich 1992: 36–7). Kant
distinguishes between three capacities that contribute to knowledge: under-
standing, the capacity for the universal consisting of rules; judgment, the

capacity to subsume the particular under the universal; and reason, the capacity to deduce the particular through the universal, or principle.

Imagination serves cognition in the following ways:

> (1) It synthesizes what is given in intuition according to the rules of understanding (the categories). (2) It apprehends particular manifolds while respecting the way in which the manifolds are given. (3) It provides instances of empirical concepts by designing appropriate images for them by means of which the concepts are 'exhibited'.
>
> (Henrich 1992: 50)

Aesthetic experience is not concerned with sensations and feelings themselves, but the harmonious relationship between sensations and understanding. Following a necessary principle of design, the sensations are brought together in the imagination (Kant 1987: 30–1; Uehling 1971: 32–3) producing an aesthetic unity in contrast to the conceptual unity of understanding or the systematic unity of reason:

> Aesthetic unities relate diverse materials into indeterminate yet apparently purposive 'un-wholes' in which a balance of difference and affinity is preserved …We find something beautiful, according to Kant, when its form invites a play of imaginative responses in which we explore ways to connect and relate its parts as a conceptually undetermined yet seemingly designed 'whole'.
>
> (Pillow 2000: 3)

For Kant, then, imagination provides the means for both the productive power making conceptualisation possible, and combining these in a harmonious interplay producing aesthetic pleasure (1987: 29–31). If it harmonises with understanding we get a judgement of beauty (1987: 29–30), and 'our ability to judge by such a pleasure (and hence also with universal validity) is called taste' (1987: 30). From this harmony arises a general fitness or purposiveness of the object, from freedom rather than constraint or desire. Its freedom lies in the unlimited variety of forms to which it gives rise through the free play of the imagination.

One mental faculty of critical importance to administration made possible by imagination is the 'visualisation' of temporality: the construction of past and future (Kant 1978: 73–81). It is through this capacity that one is able to carry out the many demands of administrative responsibility: planning, policy work, organisational restructuring and design, attending to organisational politics and culture, and developing and applying ethics and codes of behaviour.

Judgements of taste

Judgement consists of two elements for Kant: the analytic that considers formal logical character (e.g. 'administrators have authority'), and the synthetic that

combines properties of an object in its empirical character testable against experience (e.g. 'the administrators in this organisation are corrupt'). Judgement is the capacity to think of the particular under the general, thereby creating a direct connection between immediate sensory objects and the wider principles of reason. He distinguishes between determinative and reflective judgement: the determinative subsuming a particular under a universal or an intuition under a concept, thereby determining an object to be a particular kind of thing; and the reflective, describing an object as beautiful or sad, rather than assigning properties to it. Our cognitive powers have to look for a concept through imagination that provides an *indeterminate* concept of 'nature's subjective purposiveness, the idea that the world appears to us *as if* it had been designed for our awareness' (Cazeaux 2000: 5, emphasis in original). As such, aesthetic judgement provides the cognitive justification for the structuring of the world in terms of order, design, and beauty, with the last giving rise to form and quality (Kuehn 2001: 346–7).

Kant's definition of aesthetic judgement comprises four elements, or Moments:

> Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful.
> The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally.
> Beauty is the Form of Finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end.
> The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognised as an object of a necessary delight.
>
> (1987: 50, 60, 80, 85)

Aesthetic reflection is composed of two types of judgement: of taste or beauty, the subject of this section, that appeals through understanding to nature; and of the sublime (discussed in Part II), that appeals through reason to ideas. Judgements of taste differ from practical, or ethical reason by having no 'anchorage' in conceptual generalisations. For example, ethical norms can be deduced from categorical principles, but judgements of beauty cannot since there is no science of beauty, only experience of a beautiful object (Roberts 1988: 60). Ethical ideas, by virtue of the principle of duty, are opposed to a principle of singularity where the duty to act does not take into account one's social position or status, or any other personal attribute. In contrast, the idea of beauty has relation to the singular (unlike the other ideas which are universal). The response of pleasure or displeasure is related to the individual object in view: 'If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, then we lose all presentation of beauty. This is why there can be no rule by which someone can be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful … We want to submit the object to our own eyes, just as if our liking of it depended on that sensation' (Kant 1987: 59). Beauty is both universally compelling and individually material, constituting a 'subjective universal validity' (Kant 1987: 58). The judgement of taste has a purposiveness of

form, different from purpose to an end (Kant 1987: 64–5); it has inherent rather than instrumental purpose.

Aesthetic judgement must rely upon what Kant regards as the 'cultured opinion' (*Gemeinsinn*) to establish validity: 'only under the presupposition of such a common sense [the *sensus communis* arising from the free play of cognitive powers], I maintain, can judgments of taste be made' (1987: 87). For Kant the faculty of judgement follows the maxim of 'think[ing] from the standpoint of everyone else' (1987: 160). The leap from the individual to the universal is made through the *sensus communis*, or common sense in a peculiarly Kantian sense, consisting of three maxims of understanding: '(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) always to think consistently' (Kant 1987: 160). The *sensus communis* is described by Kant as meaning:

> … the idea of a sense *shared*, i.e. a power to judge that in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else's way of presenting, in order *as it were* to compare our own judgment with human reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjective and private conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have a prejudicial influence on the judgment.
>
> (1987: 160)

In other words, this type of common sense leads to unprejudiced, broadened and consistent thinking that avoids passivity and superstition, in effect, enlightenment (Kant 1987: 160–161). The aesthetic transports people from a purely subjective individuality to a public human community; however, without reducing them to blind conformity and groupthink. In this way, explains Roberts, there is a higher degree of freedom for aesthetic judgement than for moral determinations that must conform to duty (1988: 60). It is dependent upon the acts of 'artists' that are then adopted by the community, and are therefore variable and can be accepted or rejected both as an artefact and a set of principles derived from the creation.

A second way in which aesthetic judgement differs from reason is that it is disinterested: one derives pleasure regardless of whether one wants it, or whether it might be useful, although it is formally purposive in its harmonisation with our conceptual faculties and with our understanding of nature in that beauty is an idealisation of nature.

It is on the basis of the experience of beauty and its communication that we achieve sociability in full humanity, that is, in treating others as subjects rather than as objects of our individual ends. Beauty Kant regards as the symbol of the morally good (1987: 229). It is through the judgement of taste that we universalise our moral ideas making them sensible to others (Kamel 1992: 116–17). It is through judgement that we are able to relate to others in a developmental way, in general social relations, in teaching, and administering:

> … the propaedeutic does not consist in [following] precepts but in cultivat-
> ing our mental powers by exposing ourselves beforehand to what we call
> *humaniora*; they are called that presumably because humanity [*Humanität*]
> means both the universal *feeling of sympathy*, and the ability to engage uni-
> versally in very intimate *communication*.
>
> (1987: 231, emphasis in original)

The true dilemma for administration from a judgement of taste perspective is in
defending freedom from the demands of reason in constraining individual
thought, the quality of social action, and altering the ends of organisation and
the state.

Judgements of the sublime

The sublime in Kant's usage is borrowed to some extent from Burke's notion of 'a
sort of delightful horror' (*A Philosophical Enquiry* 1757) – it represents nature by
offending against proportion and regularity; for example, by representing what is
vast beyond measure the artist takes us outside experience and the 'confines of
habitual thinking' (Roberts 1988: 62). The sublime both exceeds and opposes
beauty and nature, and is found in our own 'human nature' (Kant 1987: 97–9). In
this way, aesthetic judgement of the sublime, by resisting the senses, acts primar-
ily for the purposes of practical reason, putting us into immediate contact with
ideas and providing the power to assert our independence of natural influences
(1987: 120–121). It takes us outside of what can be represented to a level of con-
ceptualisation characterised by vastness and grandeur – for example, to the
representation of the morally good which is accessible not through beauty but
through the sublime (1987: 126–32).

The sublime is similar to the beautiful in that it pleases on its own (without
reference to interest or purpose) and does not presuppose any concepts; however,
where the beautiful involves form of an object and is therefore limited, the sub-
lime is a representation of limitlessness. The two types Kant recognises are
mathematical, relating to cognition, and the dynamical, relating to desire – the
former leaving the mind at rest, and the latter moving it to change (see Kuehn
2001: 347). The sublime mathematical is immeasurable by virtue of size, boggling
the imagination and understanding and rendering them senseless; the sublime
dynamical overcomes us by virtue of power or might, moving us to fear of
destruction (McCloskey 1987: 98). It is that which 'is awe-inspiring magnitude
… which invites approach (in order to test how far one measures up to it); but
the fear of diminishing one's own estimation through the comparison with it is at
the same time acting as a deterrent' (Kant 1978: 145).

However, the sublime enlivens otherwise abstract concepts or ideas, expand-
ing the soul and giving supremacy to our intellectual side over sensibility (Kuehn
2001: 347): 'in order for the mind to be attuned to the feeling of the sublime, it
must be receptive to ideas' (1987: 124). An example of this in Kant is the com-
mandment to reject graven images in Jewish Law (1987: 135), and in tragedy

(1987: 134, 194). An appreciation of the sublime is dependent upon 'culture', meaning community expressed in sentiments of reason and high (moral) principle necessary for aesthetic judgements: 'It is a fact that what is called sublime by us, having been prepared through culture, comes across as merely repellent to a person who is uncultured and lacking in the development of moral ideas' (Kant 1987: 124).

In the *Anthropology*, Kant indicates his intent that the aesthetic be applied to the political and administrative realms: an example of this is his reference to the Russian empire as too vast for a single ruler (1978: 146), implying, of course, leadership as well as administrative capacity. This basic organisational principle of vastness applies on the macro level – that is to any political formation too unwieldy and complex, and global or international corporate entities that stretch administrative ability. But it can also be applied to any organisation that has become too unstable or complex in its personnel or activities to manage. On a more basic individual level, one can apply sublime judgement to experiential reality, referred to by Weber as the 'infinite concatenation', an infinitely complex interplay of individual characteristics, cultural forms, and organisational politics. On the other hand, the sublime presents us with the possibilities of organisational renewal, administrative ideal, and the social good. It is partly through the sublime that Kant conceives of his notion of international peace, one of the most important of his contributions to political and administrative thought in the 'Idea for a Universal History' (1991). The Kantian sublime represents a far more profound and significant potential for invention and innovation than currently hawked recipes for 'thinking outside the box' and leadership techniques.

Genius

Art for Kant is the product of genius, related to the romantic tradition of the capacity to produce work that transcends the established rules of composition. Genius gives phenomenal form to an aesthetic idea, which is 'a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it' (1987: 182). This includes the activity through which we explore the nature of our moral and perceptual contact with the world – and the possibility of finding new alignments between concept and intuition. Aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and the sublime, as the contents of works of artistic genius, are natural dispositions of human sensibility which can be put to work in the interest of reason to support our disposition to morality (basically overcome radical evil) (Guyer 2000: 371; see Samier 2003 for an explanation of radical evil as it applies to administration).

Genius uses art for expression to others rather than for purely private purpose, consisting of both aesthetic ideas and the creation of a suitable expression for the ideas (McCloskey 1987: 112). The importance of genius for administration and leadership requires the quotation of a lengthy passage from Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*:

Hence genius actually consists in the happy relation – one that no science can teach and that cannot be learned by any diligence – allowing us, first to discover ideas for a given concept, and, second, to hit upon a way of expressing these ideas that enables us to communicate to others, as accompanying a concept, the mental attunement that those ideas produce. The second talent is properly the one we call spirit. For in order to express what is ineffable in the mental state accompanying a certain presentation and to make it universally communicable – whether the expression consists in language or painting or plastic art – we need an ability [viz., spirit] to apprehend the imagination's rapidly passing play and to unite it in a concept that can be communicated without the constraint of rules (a concept that on that very account is original, while as the same time it reveals a new rule that could not have been inferred from any earlier principles or examples).

(1987: 185–6)

In the *Anthropology* Kant differentiates between genius and competence or general ability: 'To invent something is entirely different from discovering something … the talent for invention is called genius (1978: 123). To this, he adds an account consisting of four requirements in 'On the Powers of the Mind which Constitute Genius': that it is a talent for the rules and procedures of art, not science; that it presupposes a concept of the product or end employing understanding and imagination as a representation achieved through intuition; that it is displayed in the process of expressing aesthetic ideas in its freedom rather than in the end product; and that it is achieved through the free harmonising on an individual and subjective basis of imagination with understanding from the rules of science or mechanical imitation (1987: 186). Genius is able to produce novel syntheses or combinations of intuitions (the 'productive imagination'), allowing, as Makkreel explains, for these individuals 'to think the unknowable and express the ineffable' (1994: 97).

Kant contrasts true genius with a sort he calls 'apes of genius', of particular relevance in administration and leadership studies for distinguishing between intellectually sound and rigorous accounts from simplistic and sentimentalised models aimed at a lucrative consumer market, who:

… have declared that both painstaking study and research are amateurish and that they have laid hold of the spirit of all science in one grasp, although they pretend to administer it in small doses, concentrated and powerful. This type, like that of the quack and charlatan, is very detrimental to progress in scientific and ethical education when he, like the professional or dictator, dogmatises from the chair of wisdom in the tone of conviction on matters of religion, politics, and morals, and thus knows how to conceal the paltriness of his mind.

(1978: 125–6)

The genius is able to employ cognitive faculties in a manner unlike others in a manner truly gifted and comparing closely with the attributes of 'visioning' and communicative exceptionality commonly conferred on leaders or charismatic administrators. Kant identifies as the type of question typical of each cognitive faculty: 'What do I intend to do? (asks the understanding); What is of importance? (asks the judgment); What is the result? (asks the Reason)' (1978: 127). The first and third are cultivated through education, but the second, a matter of judgement 'is a greater rarity, because all sorts of ways are open to analyse the concept in question and to propose an apparent solution of the problem' requiring talent (1978: 127). For Kant, leadership is a gift, a matter of nature rather than nurture, not produced in graduate programmes of leadership that have replaced in many Anglo-Saxon countries the traditional credentialing of administrators.

Conclusion

This paper follows in the tradition of viewing Kant as a foundation for a critical approach to administration advocated by John Smyth:

> In Kant's terms this [critical self-awareness of teachers, students, and parents] amounts to an emergence from a state of immaturity which involves accepting someone else's authority, to a situation that calls for the use of reason. It implies a view of autonomy in which the rational thinking of the participants becomes the major source of what happens inside schools, rather than the dictates of those who operate at a distance from schools.
>
> (1989: 184)

Aesthetics, in the Kantian tradition, serves just this purpose – it is through the capacity for the aesthetic that independent thought and consequent action are possible. And combined in its harmonising way with ethics, or practical reason, that the individual is served as an end in himself rather than subjugated to organisational purpose, a violation in Kantian ethics of basic dignity. The aesthetic is a necessary feature of the Critical Philosophy that Banham maintains is, on the whole, political: 'to establish a peace which will create the possibility for an ending of the conflicts which arise from a luxuriantly over-grown culture of skill which has infected the grounds of discipline by introducing extraneous incentives and attempting to ruin the autonomous basis of reason' (2000: 186).

Berlin, too, assigns to Kantian aesthetics a necessary role in preventing ideology and authoritarianism, both political and bureaucratic: 'if authenticity and variety are not to be sacrificed to authority, organisation, centralisation, which inexorably rend to uniformity and the destruction of what men hold dearest – their language, their institutions, their habits, their form of life' (1991: 224). It is the contribution of the aesthetic to individualism that provides a critique of and prophylaxis against collectivist domination, expressed in its preservation of the free play of imagination, of judgement and of genius in the manner that organisational form is created and its administrative activities are carried out.

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3 The art and legacy of the Romantic tradition

Implications for power, self-determination and administration

Eugenie A. Samier and Adam Stanley

> The romantic imperative furthers the integration of all arts. All nature and knowledge should become art – art should become nature and knowledge. Imperative: poetry should be moral and morality should be poetic.[1]
>
> (Schlegel 1957: 12)

It has been most common for Romanticism to be regarded as a literary movement, best studied through literary criticism and history, a result partly of early twentieth-century analytic philosophy and related positivistic social sciences predisposed against its fundamental principles.[2] However, Romanticism consists of an intellectual movement, falling roughly between 1760 and 1840, with broad implications for socio-political analysis. It serves as a predecessor to a variety of later disparate intellectual movements – Hegelianism, historicism, existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics – and a variety of artistic styles such as decadence, absurdism, surrealism, and DaDaism (all artistic movements oriented towards socio-political critique). The underlying precepts for the better-known literary authors were derived from such humanist philosophers as Rousseau, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, Herder, and Montesquieu, later influencing idealist and hermeneutic writers like Hegel and Gadamer.

Romanticism arose as a direct reaction to classicism, the Enlightenment, and Cartesian rationalism, emphasising uniqueness, singularity and particularity, intuition and the unconscious, and situatedness in historical context. Its metaphysical assumptions offered an organic conception of nature as an alternative to Enlightenment mechanism. Its ethics was predicated upon love and individuality in contrast to formalist ethics. In aesthetics the Romantics overturned classicist standards and values, instead respecting the context and individuality of text. And in political philosophy they argued for the communitarian principles of Plato and Aristotle over modern individualist contract theory (Beiser 2003: 2). What unites an otherwise broad range of writers stylistically and philosophically, is the pursuit of personal freedom and equality in overcoming despotic power and authoritarianism, oppression, hypocrisy, bigotry, and materialism of the modern state that lead to alienation, scepticism, and anomie (see Morse 1982), in effect, an early critique of modernisation. Its highest moral ideal was *Bildung*, the development of individual powers into a self-realisation, avoiding the extremes of

hedonism and stoicism by cultivating an integrated, harmonious and balanced whole, freely chosen by the individual rather than imposed by norms and tradition (in other words, it cannot be imposed by the state).

Romanticism also offers a mediating role between a number of intellectual polarisations: epistemological foundationalism and relativism, mental dualism and mechanism, political community and individual liberty, and aesthetic dictatorial classicism and anarchic subjectivism (Beiser 2003: 2). Ideals for all forms of creative activity were generalised from literary writing to all the arts and sciences, formulated by Schlegel as eclectic in style and genre, and consisting of aesthetic and moral qualities typified by fantasy (in the free play of imagination in combining materials), mimesis (containing a portrait of a whole age or reproducing the fullness of life), and sentimentality (in the sense of the spirit of love rather than in the expression of feelings) (Beiser 2003: 13–14).

While Romanticism is essentially a philosophical movement, it is its literary expression informing administration and leadership that is the subject of this chapter. This includes writings ranging[3] from the Gothic novels of Horace Walpole and Beckford, and Charlotte Smith and Ann Radcliffe who reoriented the Gothic politically, carried through the historical novels of Scott and dramas of Goethe and Schiller[4] who treated history as a means of addressing universal problems in human history (Morse 1982: 107), through the English romantic poets, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, and Byron, the German *Märchen*, novels of Novalis, the tales of Hoffmann, the lyric poetry of Hölderlin, and the tragic poetry of Kleist.

What does unite all romantic writers is the literary form as an appropriate medium through which to critique social, cultural and political reality, borne out of the ferment of industrialisation, eighteenth century revolution and liberalism, and the development of philology, antiquities and folkloric studies that provided much grist for the romantic mill. They advocated the unique position of the artist in capturing a transcendent vision of political rights with implications for administration in a critique of unjustifiable concentrations of power and authority. In other words, authority is achieved by and for the individual within a human community rather than through positional privilege in a bureaucracy. And they exhibited a self-critical awareness of their own presuppositions: 'Concepts of self and society and of self and relation to society, of human nature and civilisation, of reason, the imagination and the unconscious, that … never lose their problematic character' (Morse 1982: 6). Rather than an accommodation to convention, institutions or law, Romanticism is the cultivation of a sensibility of sincerity, integrity and willingness to sacrifice for ideals, on occasion to the point of martyrdom (Berlin 1999: 8–9).

The British tradition

> Beauty is truth, truth beauty, – that is all
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.
>
> John Keats, 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'

British Romanticism represented a blossoming of creative and artistic integrity at a time when positivist conceptions of a coherent world order had been shattered by the decline of eighteenth century authoritarianism. With the onset of the almost painfully introspective sentimentalism that characterised the Victorian quest for meaning through poetry and prose, the spirit of the British Romantic ideal would fall, in pieces, to be collected by existentialists and others who still sought to champion truth in text, free will, and a less constrained and structuralist freedom of expression.

It is difficult to frame, without controversy, the time span that properly embraces the British Romantic movement. Typically it is conceived to begin with the publication of Coleridge's and Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads*, and to conclude, perhaps even more contentiously, with the passage of the *First Reform Bill* in 1832, which began to clear the path for Victoria's ascent to the throne in 1837. Some, such as Marshall (1963) have suggested that Wordsworth's longevity is sufficient grounds to consider as late as his death in 1850 the true termination of the Romantic movement. This, of course, depends uneasily on whether Wordsworth's later works can be considered commensurate in spirit to his earlier efforts. This seems difficult to support in the same way that one might proceed only with great apprehension to find thematic unity between Tennyson's 'The Lotus Eaters' and 'Locksley Hall: Sixty Years After'.

What can be said, however, is that the roots of British Romanticism, and the drive towards self-determination and the struggle over despotic power, can be found as far back as one might choose to go in the catalogue of English Literature, even represented in non-cycle morality plays such as *Everyman* and *Wisdom*. In these works we see the struggle of the anti-theatrical tradition that emphasises individuals caged by despotic (supernatural, in this case) forces presumably outside their control – although this early treatment is not necessarily linked to the affirmation of self that characterises more commonly accepted works of Romanticism. A sound discussion of this matter may be encountered in Davidson (2002).

At the onset of what we now conceive as the Romantic Era in British literature, we see a pronounced response to the absolutist policy pursued with such futility by George III, as satirised in Byron's *The Vision of Judgement*. As Marshall notes (1963):

> ... [George III] was never to understand the times in which he lived or the intellectual and social forces that were so subtly at work in much of Europe. Neither was he to understand that for the first time in Western history the basic assumptions of the intelligentsia were shifting in a way that, during the two centuries following George's ascension, was to alter the history of the world and to affect the viewpoints and reactions of most men.
>
> (1963: xviii)

It goes without saying that the policy of absolutism did not work out particularly well across the Channel in France, nor did it accomplish much for the

reputation of George III and the number of colonies Britain, at the outset of his reign, possessed.

The indisputable energy of Regency society, which embraced the major Romantic impetus in Britain, waned through the reign of George IV, and saw the rustical visions of Wordsworth further displaced by the row house and the interminable hum of the mill and factory. As Marshall notes (1963) of the five major poets identified in the British Romantic movement (Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, Keats, Shelley) only the two former survived it – Coleridge '... turning for the most part from poetry to metaphysics ...become gradually detached from his own times' and Wordsworth, ever the watchman of social deterioration '... increasingly he came to distrust mankind in the mass ...' (xxiii). Keats died in 1821, Shelley in 1822, and Byron in 1824.

Bloom and Trilling (1973) note that:

> Romanticism, even in Wordsworth, depends finally upon a fuller sublimation of the instinctual life than had been thought necessary in all the centuries of European thought and feeling. By demanding more of natural love and of sensuous beauty than these could afford, the High Romantics each in turn attained a crisis in the instinctual life that could be overcome only by a yielding up of the instinctual life to a fully self-conscious creative mind.
>
> (1973: 4)

The short-lived Romantic poets, perhaps for obvious reasons, may be considered to have a more consistent vision than their more long-lived contemporaries. Keats was consumed by the relationship between art and life, Shelley politically active throughout his tenure, and Byron, of course, lived up to the ideal of the Byronic Hero by dying in pursuit of the Greek cause.

Keats exemplified '... the uncompromising sense that we are completely physical in a physical world, and the allied realisation that we are compelled to imagine more than we can understand ...' and the ability to comprehend '... the individuality and reality of selves totally distinct from his own' (Bloom and Trilling 1973: 495). Keats, perhaps more than any other of the High Romantics, was to have the most lasting impact on his successors, despite, as Stromberg warns us, being a man of 'no discernable politics' (1975: 235). Wrestling throughout his work with the relationship of art and artist, his concluding couplet from 'Ode on a Grecian Urn' has become almost trite through repetition. As noted in his letters, Keats was committed to his ideal of poetic construction, and as such objected significantly to Wordsworth:

> ... for the sake of a few fine imaginative or domestic passages, are we to be bullied into a certain Philosophy engendered in the whims of an Egotist – every man has his speculations, but every man does not brood and peacock over them till he makes a false coinage and deceives himself ... We hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us – and if we do not agree, seems to

put its hand in its breeches pocket. Poetry should be great and unobtrusive, a thing which enters into one's soul, and does not startle or amaze it with itself, but with its subject.

<div align="right">(Keats cited in Morse 1982: 247)</div>

Shelley, probably the most charismatic and popularly identified of the High Romantics, was politically active from the moment he was expelled from Oxford for the publication of his pamphlet 'The Necessity of Atheism'. Much of his tribulations seem to stem from what Perkins has described as a 'boundless confidence in the reasonableness of mankind'. Shelley could be criticised, and has been, as vague and merely emotive, but as Perkins points out:

> Shelley intuited an internal reality beyond and sundered from the mortal world in which we live, where all we know is fleeting, unsubstantial and illusory ... Poetry or art is created in or immediately after moments of visionary ascent to the eternal, and is an attempt to render such moments in words and images. That is, an artist has only the data of this world as expressive means, and using them he must attempt to convey something utterly different and ultimately quite ineffable.

<div align="right">(1967: 955)</div>

Sadly for all of us, more of a poet than a boater.

Without a doubt, it was Byron who most lived up to his own ideals as a man of action, acting as a shaping agent to redress the politically oppressive landscape of his times; although he died ignominiously enough, the thought was there and that is what counts. 'If Wordsworth and Coleridge died as Tories, Byron, by far the most popular poet of his day, was an aristocratic revolutionary, who defended the Luddites, died fighting for Greek independence, and wrote much about rebels ...' (Stromberg 1975: 235). Although well known for his various appetites, Byron typified the struggle against the positivist rationalism of the Enlightenment more than any other single poet, casting the form of activism in the realm of popular culture. The aesthetic of his work was that he lived and died by.

The German tradition

German Romanticism grew out of a broad variety of intellectual and historical influences, from classical writings, translations of Shakespeare, proto-romantic developments in English and French literature, as well as socio-political events like the French revolution and Napoleon's rise to power. An important distinguishing feature from that of the British was the professional profile of German writers affecting their more systematic institutional analysis; most were civil servants or administrative officers in quasi-public enterprises, notably Hoffmann, Novalis and Goethe. As is typical with the legalistic German administrative tradition, and a strong classical Greek influence of Plato, Aristotle and Sophocles

on German academia,[5] their preoccupation with legal-administrative themes is carried throughout major romantic texts (see Ziolkowski 1990).

It was Lessing, in the German tradition, who first effectively ended neo-classicist literary criteria through his *Hamburg Dramaturgy*, *Laocoon*, and *Minna von Barnhelm*, arguing the superiority of creativity over the imitative practices that the Enlightenment had engendered, at the same time imbuing the creative with a moral and ultimately political purpose. The flouting of the unities of time, place and action explored by Lessing, as well as by Goethe (e.g. *Götz von Berlichingen*) and Schiller (e.g. *The Robbers*), exemplify the transcendence of rationalist classicist unity of tone, clarity, transparency of motive and historical fidelity, to the power of analysis, the juxtaposition of contradictory values, and liberation by showing that destiny is open and freedom attainable. It was also through Novalis that foundational scepticism led to the claim that only art was sufficiently rich and 'inexhaustible' to present and represent the experiential by 'infinite approximation' (Frank 2004: 52–4).

Schiller's early *Sturm und Drang* (Storm and Stress) plays,[6] and the essay 'On the Aesthetic Education of Man', presented the coterminous goals of political activity and aesthetic education, for which the fullest development of human potential was the creation of culture. In its highest form, it was the nobility of the hero 'who continues to embody its highest virtues even when its hour is past' (Morse 1982: 109), and is able simultaneously to be of his own time and to have the capacity to transcend it: 'Live with your century; but do not be its creature' (Schiller 1967: 61). Goethe (e.g. the trilogy *Götz von Berlichingen*, *Egmont* and *Iphigenie auf Tauris*) and Schiller's historical dramas (e.g. *William Tell*, *Maria Stuart* and *Wallenstein*) are explicitly concerned with the corrupting effects of centralised and imperial administration on personal liberty and autonomy (Morse 1982: 110), championing instead heroic figures who, through individual transcendence and existential necessity, combat compliance, manipulation, obsequiousness and deceit in achieving independence, dignity, courage, and moral autonomy.

Goethe created in *Faust* (idealising Byron as the character Euphorion), *Sorrows of Werther* and *Wilhelm Meister* the new genre of the *Bildungsroman*, a novel that 'relates the education and character formation of the hero' (Kaufmann 1960: 52).[7] The role of the hero as artist, though, produced a problematic dilemma for Goethe in these works. In abjuring societal and organisational norms and arid rationalism, the hero/artist risks losing contact with the world through self-marginalisation and a potentially damaging 'fervid, narcissistic immersion in a morass of subjective impressions' (Morse 1982: 198), thereby reducing heroic potential to pointlessness and social dysfunction. For example, Goethe's Faust is willing to sacrifice Gretchen to his own self-realisation and Mephistopheles becomes elevated to the prototype of the dark romantic hero. In the German gothic irrationalism was intensified through metaphysical salvation from social injustice characterised more by escapism into a dream or fantasy world of medieval settings, supernatural phenomena, or bandits. Creativity and imagination are wasted through intense sensationalism in gloomy

settings and terror (Heiderich 1982: 40–2), where heroes paid the price of madness, or at least social condemnation. Goethe himself, although regarded culturally as a positive romantic hero, repudiated the excessive abandonment to feeling and subordination of life and character to art of romanticism later in life (Kaufmann 1960: 88).

Many of the distinguishing features of Romanticism foreshadow characteristics of existentialism found in authors like Nietzsche, as well as the related absurdist tradition in such novels as Camus's *The Outsider*. This includes the role of subjectivism and individual freedom from rules, moral conventions, and external constraints. In Nietzsche, these take the form of the Creative Genius, or Übermensch, who, through joyful wisdom, strives for individual creativity in knowledge and ethics. His style of writing, which itself is highly poetic, assumes that all language is metaphorical, and 'that our original and most fundamental involvement with experience is artistic and transforming … through which the human individual functions essentially as "an artistically creating subject"' (Danto 1980: 45).

To Nietzsche, Romanticism was not a disease (as Goethe claimed in his later career), but a therapy or cure for the disease of rationalism. It is through an analysis of art that Nietzsche developed his theories of psychology, politics and ethics, leading to a criticism of modern society as nihilistic and decadent, the result of a centuries' long cultural decline (Schmidt 2001: 192). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *The Birth of Tragedy*, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, and *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche presented a more fundamental questioning of the moral foundations previously assumed, proposing in *Genealogy of Morals* a typology consisting of 'master morality', consisting of self-affirmation by those who rule, and 'slave morality', characterised by resentment and negation of life by those who are oppressed (1989: 36–7; Kaufmann 1960: 210–13). It is in this cultural and moral analysis of the degradation of values that he found his inspiration for a theory of the transvaluation of values, that Nietzsche proposed an extra-rational foundation for morality.

For Nietzsche, the source of creativity and art lay in a Dionysian and Apollonian duality in the human spirit, the former leading to rapture and the latter to rational individuation. Through interplay: 'They are, simply put, powers greater than that which we define or control. Outstripping human being, they are the "drives to art" which animate life as such' (Schmidt 2001: 201). The Apollonian supplies pictorialisation, and the Dionysian deeper impulses producing lyric, and in their integrated form, produced the highest art form of the tragic (evident for example in Sophocles), in which Nietzsche argues we are confronted with our most basic humanity and the source of values and culture. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence is justified (1956: 61). And that art, in the narrower conventional sense, is what makes life bearable: 'Art, religion, philosophy, morality, and indeed whatever gives a form to experience, are, in the end, a response to suffering and must be understood as a means for making life possible and tolerable' (Danto 1980: 52). For Nietzsche, it is the 'power of art to transfigure life by creating lasting images of true beauty out

of the meaningless chaos' (Heller 1988: 14). The *Übermensch* is one who is 'no longer the *artist*, he has himself become a *work of art*' (Nietzsche 1956: 24). And part of the impulse for this self-understanding was inspired by the romantic emphasis on the enabling power of myth (Safranski 2002: 90, 99).

It is through tragedy, in its artistic expression, that Nietzsche argues one finds the deepest and perennial questions of humanity, following in the romanticist wake. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche analyses Greek tragedy as a means of understanding culture and individual life, using this to critique culture in the modern industrialised world, for example the 'bourgeois desecrators of art' Nietzsche called the 'cultivated philistines' (Safranski 2002: 112). It is through this aesthetic form that a political and ethical sensibility is developed: one of the main arguments of *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Zarathustra* is that style of thinking and expression has to be consistent with the content of thought, and that the language of art is superior to conceptual and prepositional writing in capturing the depths of experiential truth. It is in music, though, that Nietzsche finds the most potent art form for its 'symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain … language, as the organ and symbol of appearance, can never and in no case disclose the deepest interiority of music' (Schmidt 2001: 195–6).

While heavily influenced by Romanticism, Nietzsche also departed in a number of significant ways. First, he affirmed the fundamental irrationality of reality, characteristic of existential writers. And, in contrast to the romantic occasional celebration of suffering that repudiates the present, escaping into the past or future, Nietzsche affirms the present including the way suffering transforms it into 'ecstatic bliss' (Kaufmann 1960: 231–2), seen in Zarathustra's 'Drunken Song': 'You wanted everything anew, everything eternal, everything chained, entwined together, everything in love, O that is how you *loved* the world … so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for Hell, for hatred, for shame, for the lame, for *world*' (1969: 332). This is developed in the paradoxical and mythic formula for the Eternal Recurrence of All Things, meant 'to teach strength through despair' from which the *Übermensch* emerges having 'learned to live without belief and without truth' willing a 'resurrection of meaning from its total negation' (Heller 1988: 12–13). Also in contrast to the anti-intellectualism of many romantics, he presented intellectuals like Leonardo, Michelangelo, Dante and Goethe as the greatest of artists, arguing for an equal freedom of the intellect to that of the emotions (Kaufmann 1960: 259). Rather than a celebration of emotion and the passions per se, they served as 'the necessary raw material of creative sublimation' (Kaufmann 1960: 274).

Nietzsche represents one of the most important proponents in epistemology for the position that art is superior to science in attaining truth. For him, the conceptualisation of knowledge and truth is essentially an aesthetic function – even scientific knowledge's source lies in intuition (see Heller 1988).

> What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropo-
> morphisms, a sum, in short, of human relationships which, rhetorically and

poetically intensified, ornamented, and transformed, come to be thought of, after long usage by a people, as fixed, binding, and canonical. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn-out metaphors now impotent to stir the senses, coins which have lost their faces and are considered now as metal rather than currency.

<div align="right">(Nietzsche 1979: 52)</div>

Conclusion

Romanticism is both an ideal and a caution for administration and leadership. On one hand, it provides a liberationist ethic for rising above the mundane, the profane, and the conventional in which educational administration is mired, in its promise of heightening the human potential towards self-determination, self-actualisation and authenticity. It also includes a critique of power, authority, educational mediocrity and political stagnation. The essence of Romanticist philosophy as it pertains to administration and leadership is as an art, infused with the otherworldliness and subjectivism of all authentic art: it consists of 'a quest for wonders, a constant endeavour "to seek strange truth in undiscovered lands"' accompanied by the conviction that the everyday world is "pervaded or surrounded by mysteries" beyond the dehumanisation of rationalists and empiricists' (Prawer 1970: 4–5). The fundamental romantic trait was diversity, the search for unique particulars, instead of the Enlightenment standardisation and simplification, universals and generals (Lovejoy 1936).

On the other hand, transcendence and revelation, and pursuit of the intangible and ineffable, give rise to the grotesque and uncanny, as well as states of mind that, while breaking through rationality, lead to madness, and other heightened emotional and spiritual states (e.g. ecstasy, terror, horror) through their potential to create deeper apprehension through engagement of the unconscious and imagination in unlimited excess.

Even though romanticist authors differed in their media and to some extent philosophical notions, 'they produced a nearly coherent system of tales, partly invented and partly adapted, which tell of man's relation to the demonic and the divine' (Prawer 1970: 9). They pursued a search for deeper meaning at a time when phenomenology and hermeneutics were forming in scholarship, producing in a little recognise heritage that informs more critical and humanistic strains in current administration and leadership theory. Through social and political philosophy, romanticism advanced an organic conception of the state characterised by community rather than mechanism, emphasising national consciousness based on culture, and non-classed democratic ideals. Romanticism also achieved a synthesis of otherwise contradictory conceptions and experiences, embracing the complex human condition composed of the good and perverse.

The educational goal of romanticism, *Bildung*, is achieved only when people have the knowledge and will to live as responsible, enlightened and virtuous citizens (Beiser 2003: 89). The role of educational administration and leadership is to create the conditions within which *Bildung* can be realised, rather than acting

as impediments to its formation. A necessary aspect of this is the cultivation of a deep and broad sensibility, rather than a narrow rationality or self-interest characterised by the lust for power or money for which bureaucratised administration is notable, evident in the pseudo-scholars who, like the charlatans of old, hawk trivialised and ersatz leadership wares in the educational marketplace. The special role of art is in the construction of ideals through imagination and the engagement of feeling in motivating people to live by high moral ideals; in other words, regard our own individual character as a work of art, or 'beautiful soul' characterised by the self-transcendence of freedom from irrelevant constraints through independence and self-determination (the essence of Schiller's aesthetic education) (see Beiser 2003: 'The Concept of Bildung').

Notes

1 'Der romantische Imperativ fordert die Mischung aller Dichtarten. All Natur und Wissenschaft soll Kunst werden – Kunst soll Natur werden und Wissenschaft. Imperativ: die Poesie soll sittlich und die Sittlichkeit soll poetisch sein.' Translated by authors.
2 And, according to Beiser (2003: 1) was discredited by liberals and Marxists since World War II for Nazi (mis-)incorporation of romantic principles in their ideology.
3 Although some authors, like Stromberg (1975), date Romanticism from Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse*.
4 Grounded to some extent in the political philosophy of Montesquieu in *L'Esprit des lois*.
5 The most important works are Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics*, and Sophocles' *Antigone*.
6 It was the Sturm und Drang movement in the 1770s in Germany that gave German Romanticism much of its impetus and major themes.
7 The Bildungsroman, a characteristic genre for romanticism, influenced later authors like James Joyce and Hermann Hesse.

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4 Collingwood on imagination, expression and action

Advancing an aesthetically critical study of educational administration

Carol E. Harris

> There exists a specific sensory experience – the aesthetic – that holds the promise of both a new world of Art and a new life for individuals and the community.
>
> (Ranciere 2002: 133)

> Art is not a quality of objects [but rather] a mode of acting; a necessary mode, in so far as every mind that is a mind at all acts in this way. Our ordinary name for this mode of acting is 'imagination'.
>
> (Collingwood 1964: 195)

> Whenever conditions are such as to prevent the act of production from being an experience in which the whole creature is alive and in which he [sic] possesses his living through enjoyment, the product will lack something of being esthetic. No matter how useful it is for special and limited ends, it will not be useful in the ultimate degree – that of contributing directly and liberally to an expanding and enriched life.
>
> (Dewey 1980 [1934]: 27)

Although, as these opening quotations indicate, all experience is open to aesthetic attention, too often schools, if they attend to aesthetics at all, relegate this aspect of living and learning solely to arts education. This is hardly surprising given the changed linguistic status of 'aesthetics' from its mid-eighteenth century meaning as a referent to sensory perception to that of interpretations of 'the beautiful' and its association with art (Eagleton 1990). The later definition brought with it concepts of an elite and contemplative realm of beauty, distant from utilitarian purposes and everyday reality. This division of art from a broader aesthetic, and beauty from utility, tends to cloud from view the ingredients of sentient experience and imagination, common to aesthetics and the process and reception of art.

British philosopher, historian and political theorist R.G. Collingwood (1889–1943) manages to close some of these gaps. He weaves a profoundly aesthetic presence throughout his wide-ranging commentaries, dividing art from utility for heuristic purposes, but re-uniting them in his broader analysis. In this chapter, I call upon Collingwood's explication of art in order to apply his theories of expressive imagination and action to the narrower canvas of school

administration and leadership. I am assuming first, the importance to school leaders of the study of ideas, and second, in agreement with Bates (1984: 260–1), that administration ought to be considered holistically and, to this end, that administrators need to break the 'deafening silence concerning the fundamental message systems of schools: curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation'. My arguments are directed, moreover, to administrators and other leaders who, in seeking a more just society, question the restructuring of schools according to the neo-liberal, neo-positivist and market ideologies of the day.

Collingwood, as a representative of modern idealism, may seem a strange choice for this critical focus. A consistent mode of critique, however, informed all of his work; he was a systematic thinker who developed a distinctive philosophical method that he applied to various fields, most notably aesthetics, political analysis, and the study of history. Specifically, he was concerned with the socially constructed presuppositions that underlie the perceptions, propositions and actions through which we experience the world.

I have several reasons, apart from the recent renaissance of his work among philosophers (Booth 2005; Garnett 2003; Smallwood 2001), for selecting Collingwood's ideas for this text. First, his writing reaches across the years since his death, offering a contemporary call to interdisciplinarity. He holds an important historical place in the development of a hybridised 'post-modernism' where subject boundaries are permeated and transgressed.

Second, he offers readers, through his perspective on history, a constructive or re-constructive role as active interpreter. In this, he forms an important link between the critical present and past. While strong scholarship, by definition, contains a critical edge, I am primarily interested here in the role of the arts, and of aesthetic appreciation in general, as visionary in the sense of providing a venue for seeing the world as it could become (Greene 1995), and emancipatory in lending greater awareness of our underlying 'presuppositions'. To this end, I prize Collingwood's approach to aesthetics, history, and politics as products of the human imagination and, thus, as always open to interpretation and revision. Collingwood, I believe, walked the fine line in aesthetic understanding between modernity and post-modernity, and between those who embrace aesthetic ways of knowing with eyes wide open to class distinctions and other forms of social exclusion, and those who would carry sociological critique to the point of artistic annihilation.

Third, Collingwood speaks to many metaphors that encompass the educational project, including the common categorisation of successful leadership as 'art'. With remarkable clarity, he outlines features of art that allow administrators to focus detailed attention on what it is they do. Fourth, Collingwood's theory of imagination, which informs his entire literary output, causes students of administration to reflect upon imagination's essential components of sentient experience, emotional response, attention, memory, thought and expression. These components of experience receive scant attention from the literature of administration, despite the many parallels drawn between art and leadership (Blumberg 1984; Grint 2000; Hodgkinson 1991; Howard 1996). Collingwood's

accessibility provides my final reason for re-visiting his work (Harris 1996; 2002). Not all philosophers write clearly and well. Collingwood does, and with the added features of wit and, not surprisingly, imagination.[1]

In the following pages, I define art and aesthetics and then outline briefly their place in educational administrative literature. Next, in the light of debates about the nature of administration-as-art, I review Collingwood's *Principles of Art* (1958) and related commentaries, where his theory of art and imagination is most clearly articulated. From this work, I point to three explanatory points that bear on the nature of artistry writ large: the distinction between art and craft, the nature of imagination, and expression as its creative outcome. Implications of these points are then elaborated upon in his historical and political tracts. In the discussion, these themes are further pursued: first, as the linkage between administration and management; second, as the knowledge and understanding necessary to fuel administrative imagination; and third, as creativity in the consciously achieved administrative project. As a preliminary, let us consider aesthetics and what educators have to say about its relevance to school leadership.

Aesthetics, the broad picture

As established in the Introduction to this book, aesthetics is that branch of philosophy that deals with the arts, *and with other situations* that involve people in meaningful experience and reflection. Art and aesthetics overlap, without one clearly subordinated to the other (Honderich 1995: 15), in an exploration of expression, attitudes, judgements and experience. Expression is inherent in any work of art, while 'aesthetic attitude' suggests the kind of receptiveness that that can provide one with a valuable experience from a wide variety of objects, processes and occasions. In this general sense, Gagliardi (1996) maintains that aesthetics in an organisational context includes first, a form of *sensory* knowledge (different from intellectual knowledge), often unconscious, tacit and ineffable, and that is not translatable strictly into speech; second, it involves a form of *expressive action*, shaped by impulse and by a mode of feeling (the opposite of *impressive action* aimed at practical ends); and third, it constitutes a form of *communication* which provides a way of passing on and sharing particular ways of feeling and knowing (Gagliardi 1996: 566). There is also a sociological perspective on aesthetics; one that reminds us that realms of aesthetic attitude and judgement may be co-opted by particular classes in society for political and ideological purposes. This becomes particularly problematic, from the critical perspective, when the aesthete who partakes of art, or the artist who expresses it, become dissociated from the general population (Bourdieu 1984; Eagleton 1990).

Educators on art and aesthetics

Educators, presumably convinced that the arts and artistry contribute significantly to the way we come to understand ourselves and the world around us, have focused several lenses on aesthetics. Some comment on what it means in

terms of the larger curriculum to attend aesthetically to objects of beauty and/or interest (e.g. Eisner 2002; Greene 1995). Morton (1994), for example, notes the relevance of aesthetic attention to science, physical education, and language 'arts' but, at the same time, identifies its neglect in these areas of school curricula.

Other theorists cast their nets further to include in their aesthetic potentially all aspects of experience (e.g. Dewey 1980; Hodgkinson 1991). Maxcy (1991; 1995) follows a Deweyan approach to read administrative artistry and aesthetics in the meaning intrinsic to natural events, in the meaning that moves us from raw experience to intelligent understanding, and as symbolic meaning (1995: 157). Greene (1995), also influenced by Dewey, brings her vision of the good life to the school curriculum as a combination of education, art, and social change. There is for Greene, as for other critical theorists, an emancipatory potential in the arts that draws us towards envisioning the world as it could become. Art, in constantly exploring new regions of sentient life, can free us from accepting and repeating everyday reality. Greenfield, like Greene in this one respect, calls on discursive art – poetry, films, drama, and essay – as illustrative of the human condition. He speaks of administrative problems, human strengths and weakness, and the wisdom and folly of leaders in action (1978; Greenfield and Ribbins 1993; Harris 1996). His message is that human action, driven largely by emotion and ideology, escapes the bonds of pure reason. Descriptions of the wide range of human motivation, for Greenfield, are most vividly – and most accurately – found in works of discursive art.

Within adult educational circles in Canada, a growing number of practitioner/ researchers facilitate community resilience, as well as classroom teaching and learning, through poetry (Hall 2001), popular theatre (Butterwick 2002), collective craft making (Clover and Markle 2003), and theatre about administrative problems (Meyer 2001; Meyer and Moran 2005). While each of these approaches involves educational leadership, the scenario extends beyond what school and community leaders do, to what it is that inspires their work. The arts, whether for reflection, explanation, pedagogy or community development, are used by these educators to uncover the intentions that lie behind everyday community and organisational life.

In the 1980s, Blumberg (1989; 1984), with a focus on the preparation of school administrators, sought an exact description – in terms of aesthetics – of administrative action. He asked, specifically, if their efforts could be termed 'artistry' or 'craft' and, in his quest, was directed to Collingwood's[2] work on art. Blumberg came to the conclusion that administration more closely approximates craft than art. In the following two sections, I explore Collingwood's distinctions between art and craft and trace his extension of this to his theory of imagination, arguing that both art and craft inhere in successful administration. This investigation, together with the study of other areas of his writing, demonstrates a consistency in Collingwood's aesthetic that can heal the dichotomy between art and craft, and underlines the importance of an imaginative approach to teaching, learning and administration.

Administrative action, art or craft?

As Blumberg (1984) discovered, Collingwood attacks the technical theory of art that focuses on the artist who has 'mastered the technique of handling his [sic] medium (paints, stone, etc.)' thus distinguishing him 'from other people' (Hospers 1982: 195). In Collingwood's reading, the artist can indeed be a craftsperson but only '*after* he gets his artistic ideas' or 'intuitions' (Hospers 1982: 195). The significant point for the preparation of administrators is that technical aspects of an art can be learned by:

> ... almost anyone with training and practice: it can be taught in schools, and most persons, if they have no physical or mental handicap, can learn to paint or sculpt or compose music [or administer an organisation]. But all this is only the *externalization* – putting one's ideas on paper or canvas. It tells one nothing about *how to get the ideas*.
>
> (Hospers 1982: 195)

Nor is the craftsperson simply a technician, although he must have technique in order to produce a preconceived result by means of his consciously controlled and directed action. There is in his work a clear distinction between means and the end product, and between planning and execution. The craftsperson knows, moreover, what he will make before he begins his work.[3]

Artists, according to Collingwood, differ from others in that they have intuitions that most of us never have. As Pope remarked, 'the poet's business is to say what all have felt but none so well express'd' (Collingwood 1958: 119). This also links artistry and imagination, in that the artist feels, sees and hears what many are unable to grasp and, by her art, she 'enlarges our experience' by her own (1958: 27).

Collingwood distinguishes the technical from the intuitive process by delineating six guidelines for the identification of art 'falsely so called' in which 'the practitioner can by the use of his skill evoke a desired psychological reaction in the audience' (1958: 31–2). He speaks of amusement, whereby emotion is aroused for its own sake, as an enjoyable experience; of magic, whereby the work has some practical value as in religious, political or patriotic art; of a puzzle, in which intellectual faculties are stimulated for the mere sake of their exercise; of instruction, whereby the audience learns something new; of advertisement or propaganda in which, much like magic, the work is expedient for practical activity; and of exhortation whereby a certain view or action is proposed as right and just. While each of these characteristics may be useful, a means to an end, none of them is helpful in deciding the work's worth *as art*.

Collingwood makes two points concerning the technically rational nature of art that are particularly relevant to administrators. If we consider administration as an art, we can read Collingwood symbolically as he warns about utilitarian purposes usurping those of higher value. He speaks of art as 'broken ... to the plough, forced aside from its own original nature and enslaved to the service of an end not its own' (1958: 33). Surely, any school administrator today, in

Blumberg's context two decades ago, or in Callahan's (1962) 'cult of efficiency' traced through the first half of the twentieth century, recognises in the everyday workplace the pull between primary purpose (or informed intuition) and utility.

Another parallel situation gleaned from the art/craft distinction, and addressing the school administrator's everyday life, lies in Collingwood's assessment of amusement and enjoyment. For Collingwood, amusement has

> ... no value in itself; it is simply means to an end. It is as skillfully constructed as a work of engineering, as skillfully compounded as a bottle of medicine, to produce a determinate and preconceived effect, the evocation of a certain kind of emotion in a certain kind of audience. ... The danger sets in when by discharging their emotions upon make believe situations people come to think of emotion as something that can be excited and enjoyed for its own sake, without any necessity to pay for it in practical consequences.
>
> (1958: 33, 94)

Enjoyment, on the other hand, demands a payment of some kind – perhaps hard work or lost leisure. The difference, for Collingwood, inheres in the credit and debit effect amusement and enjoyment produce on the emotional energy available for practical life. Amusement becomes a danger only when the debt becomes too great. Then, according to Collingwood, amusement can seem 'the only thing that makes life worth living. A society in which the disease is endemic is one in which most people feel some such conviction most of the time' (1958: 95). As an example of this malaise, Collingwood (now the historian) points out that the Roman Empire died, not at the hands of barbarian invaders, but rather, from the disease mentioned above and the 'deep-seated conviction that its own way of life was not worth preserving' (1958: 96).

This consideration of amusement and enjoyment, and society's focus on the former to the neglect of the latter, speaks with particular urgency to the highly commodified environment in which school students, and Western societies as a whole, find themselves today. The generalised malaise noted by Collingwood signals an administrative problem as it affects the lives of young people but, more constructively, as a challenge when we consider ways and means to counter this danger through imaginative teaching and school management.

The distinction between art and craft may be annoying to those who see instances of cross-over between the two. For example, we often identify artistry in collectively crafted articles (Clover and Markle 2003), craft in artistry (Howard 1982), and political messages embedded in visual representation (Howard 1996). The distinction drawn by Collingwood, however, should be viewed as a heuristic device, particularly as he corroborates the blending of art and utility, pointing out that an artwork may contain any of the features described above, but that these characteristics or messages inhere in the work over and above its existence as art. With characteristic humour, he puts it this way:

This is not because (as Oscar Wilde said, with his curious talent for just missing a truth and then giving himself a prize for hitting it) "all art is quite useless", for it is not; a work of art may be very useful indeed. It is because, as Oscar Wilde perhaps meant to say, what makes it art is not the same as what makes it useful.

(1958: 32)

For Collingwood, art is to be judged by the artist's process. It is the working out of an intuitive idea that illuminates his definition. Collingwood contends that, whereas craftspersons know, within fairly narrow limits, what their products will be, artists realise their art only in and through its expression. He reminds us of the 'booming, buzzing confusion'[4] that reigns during the process of artistic creation, and of the immense satisfaction that comes with the completion of the work of art:

As unexpressed, [the artist] feels it in what we have called a helpless and oppressed way; as expressed, he feels it in a way from which this sense of oppression has vanished. His mind is somehow lightened and eased.

(1958: 110)

The value of the work (to others), of course, depends on the artist's technical ability as well as intuition. The better the technique, the better the working out of an idea – or 'product' we could say in market discourse.

Blumberg (1989), in considering the features of craft as depicted by Collingwood, and the nature of administration as a rational pursuit, came to favour the craft metaphor for administration. I would suggest that, at best, a school leader's action involves both art and craft. While there are occasions when principals or schoolteachers must fashion their actions (means) to a pre-designed end, there are many other times when they act intuitively. Many take risks, well-considered risks granted, but risks nonetheless. In this, they enlarge that zone of 'choice' that is said to exist between everyday 'demands' and administrative 'constraints' (Sergiovanni *et al*. 2004).

The argument for administration-as-art and craft, I trust, will become clearer in the next section, where I outline Collingwood's theory of imagination in which feeling, as sentient impression and emotional response, provides the foundation.

Imagination in Collingwood's concept of mind

During the period of administrative science, the concept of 'feeling' lost whatever status may have remained to it in the three centuries following Descartes' dismissal of the senses as deceitful and untrustworthy – and is only recently gaining attention in the studies of emotion (Hargreaves 2001), embodied knowledge (Abbey 2002), and aesthetics. Yet for Collingwood, feeling is foundational to all thought and action.[5] In his theory, feeling itself is composed of messages from the senses and our emotional response to these sensual stimuli. At this basic level,

feelings – i.e. both as sensual and emotional – are involuntary; they are immediate, occurring in the 'here and now' (1958: 159). Yet these feelings are structured in experience so that sentient impression takes precedence over emotional response. While Collingwood denies such precedence to be specifically temporal – one can see fire and experience panic simultaneously – he refers to an '"emotional charge" on the corresponding sensation' (1958: 162). Although both feeling and response are part of experience, he contends that we, in the educational sphere, attend far more carefully to our sensations than to our emotions. This condition, which he refers to as a 'sterilization of the senses', seems:

> ... especially characteristic of adult and 'educated' people in ... modern European civilization; among them, it is more developed in men than in women, and less in artists than in others . ... In children [openness to sentient experience] is clearer than in adults, because they have not yet been educated into the conventions of the society into which they have been born; in artists clearer than in other adults, because in order to be artists they must train themselves in that particular to resist these conventions.
>
> (1958: 162–3)

Collingwood, thus, contends that various forms of organisational life, perhaps including certain educational systems, have a numbing effect on people's emotional sensitivities.

In becoming aware of our feelings – be they sentient, emotional or a combination of the two – we engage in thought. And when we fix feelings in time so that they may be contemplated as past or anticipated events, thought becomes memory or imagination respectively. Warnock, in distinguishing between the two, draws on Hume's metaphor of control, 'the memory is in a manner ty'd down' to produce its ideas in the same order as the original impressions were received, whereas imagination has liberty 'to transpose and change its idea' (Warnock 1976: 15). Memory and imagination become the grounding of feeling whereby the feelings to which one attends must be somehow stabilised or perpetuated in order to be studied. For practical purposes, we form solid perceptions and stable conceptions of that which is mobile in reality. We can, in fact, 'obtain from [reality] by thought as many stoppages as we desire' (Bergson 1955: 51). While Collingwood discounts this claim of unbounded control over memory and imagination,[6] he accepts their importance in reorganising and re-designing experience, for memory and imagination constitute the means by which we consciously repeat and present impressions to ourselves as ideas. Beyond this, we begin to hold one thought in relation to another.

It is in this transposition of ideas that Collingwood identifies his second order of mind in which we engage in thoughts about thoughts, 'affirming relations between one act of thinking and another, or between one thing and another' (1958: 167). This is both the conscious and the willful aspect of imagination. Whereas memories cascade upon us, willy-nilly, we are usually able to direct the imagination, attending to certain features of our experience and not to others, and use it intelligently to 'open spaces for possibility' (Greene 1992: 236).

Finally, ideas to become art – or meaningful discourse – must be expressed. Collingwood refers to this expression as 'language' but hastens to point out that language may be considered speech or, in the wider sense, 'any activity ... which is expressive in the same way in which speech is expressive' (1958: 233). This would include as language, I believe, all media of the discursive, fine and popular arts. It would, as well, include the symbol systems of numbers, kinesthetics, kinetics, and sciences – in other words, all means by which we aesthetically experience and symbolise the world.

Before moving on to trace the role of imagination in aspects of Collingwood's work, apart from his discussion of art as such, I wish to review aspects of his theory of imagination, covered so far, that apply directly to the importance of aesthetic awareness in the processes of teaching and learning. Several concepts, common to Collingwood's theory, deserve consideration in this respect. First, Collingwood clarifies not only the importance of the senses as both impressions received and as the recipient's emotional responses, but he warns also of the 'sterilization of the senses' that occurs widely among adults. Collingwood offers a profound educational message about 'lifelong learning' when he directs our attention to the renewal of our own sentient awareness through the observation of children and artists who best seem to retain an openness to this aspect of experience. Second, Collingwood points to distinguishing features of human experience including feeling, emotional response, attention, imagination, memory and ideas. These distinctions, rarely considered in educational writings, are intertwined in experience and applicable to everyday classroom realities. Third, Collingwood locates imagination as an '"indispensable function" of our knowledge of the world around us' (1958: 192). The functions of imagination, which include attention to the senses, the ability to play with memory and to conceive of things not actually in our sphere of experience, and to combine seemingly dissimilar ideas, have long been recognised as foundational to creativity (Egan 1992; Koestler 1964; Warnock 1976). Finally, artists-as-educators and learners must, according to Collingwood, establish themselves *in* the everyday world, for they prophesy 'not in the sense of foretelling things to come, but in the sense of telling [their] audience, at risk of their displeasure, the secrets of their own hearts' (1958: 336).

These claims highlight the emancipatory continuum of Collingwood's explication of feeling, which acts on us unconsciously, through imagination whereby we attend to sensations (or impressions) and bring these forth as ideas and, finally, to the intellect where we juxtapose thoughts about thoughts. The important point here is that intellectual expression, as a work of art that reveals one to oneself and that broadens the experience of others, requires at its base sentient experience and imaginative critique. Collingwood points out the role of critical consciousness in this way:

> Even if consciousness never actually erred, it would still have this in common with all forms of thought, that it lives by rejecting error. A true

consciousness is the confession to ourselves of our feelings; a false conscious-
ness would be disowning them, i.e. thinking about one of them 'That feeling
is not mine'.

(1958: 216)

The disowning of feelings, in psychological terms, amounts to repression while
projection would be the ascription of feelings to others.

The critical perspective, firmly introduced in *The Principles of Art*, is elabo-
rated upon in Collingwood's work as historian and political commentator. We
now turn to history as critical reconstruction, and to politics as value-laden.

Rational imagination in history and politics

In the spirit of post-positivists today, Collingwood rejects the notion that his-
tory[7] could be understood according to a model of natural science, whereby
objective truths form the foundation of new investigations. He challenges, thus,
the view of history as a story of successive events, or as an account of change.
Rather, he contends, 'the activities whose history [the historian] is studying are
not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own
mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because they are also subjective,
or activities of his own' (1936: 16). History is, for Collingwood, more a way of
being than a discipline, as he believes that 'all thinking is, in a sense, historical'.
For example, one can discover what one thought ten years ago by examining
one's own writing, and five minutes ago by reflecting on an action (1936: 17).
Collingwood assures us that the only way in which we can know our own mind is
to perform some mental act or other and then consider what the act is that has
been performed. It is here that Collingwood as artist–historian delineates the
creative act, the bringing forth, the expressing of an idea, that is always inherent
in the work of an artist (in this case, an artist/historian). Thus, one's personal his-
tory, or history as the entire pageant of the past, is at once a critical and
constructive reconstruction of acts, and of documents written and unwritten,
critically analysed, interpreted – and expressed.

Collingwood looked holistically at events and the historian's process that was,
to him, one of critical thought. Thoughts about events have an 'outside' of fac-
tual information that can be checked and verified, whereas actions possess, as
well, an 'inside' which requires the historian to 'think himself into this action, to
discern the thought of its agent' (1936: 11). Collingwood gives the example of
the stabbing of Caesar by Brutus (i.e. the event) that demands of the historian an
imaginative re-entry into the mind of the person by whose agency the event
came about. Collingwood points out that this is not something other than the
event but, rather, the *inside* of the event itself.

The reader, at this stage, may point out that imagining causes for an event
amounts to pure fantasy and has no place in a serious theory of historical method.
Collingwood assures us, however, that the web of imaginative reconstruction
must be for the historian:

... stretched between certain fixed points provided by the statements of his authorities; and if these points are frequent enough and the threads spun from each to the next are constructed with due care, always by the *a priori* imagination and never by merely arbitrary fancy, the whole picture is constantly verified by appeal to these data, and runs little risk of losing touch with the reality which it represents.

(1967: 242)

Yet reliance on authoritative sources must also be questioned, for truth will be found 'not by swallowing what our authorities tell us, but by criticizing it' (1967: 243). For Collingwood, the tools for historical reconstruction are 'not given to us ready made' but, rather, must be reached always through critical reflection (1967: 243).

This point about the intellectual quality of imagination is essential to those who would understand Collingwood's approach to learning. While Collingwood considers imagination to be common to everyone and, at times to reside in the realm of fantasy or even hallucination, he establishes its place as well in the upper levels of rational thought and action. In an essay on the place of art in education, he contends that 'a person who has not, somehow and in some kind of language, *said* what he means, does not yet *know* what he means, and strictly cannot be said to *have* a meaning'. Further, he holds that the act of imagination is not simply the 'embroidering of a pre-existent thought; rather, it is the birth of thought itself' (1964: 196).

Without delving deeply into Collingwood's political theory – and he wrote a great deal in this area, including his final work, *The New Leviathan* (1942) – I wish to return to another philosophical thread which permeates his politics and metaphysics in particular, and seeps through into all other aspects of his writing. Collingwood was overwhelmingly preoccupied with what he called people's 'presuppositions' (Collingwood 1989: 17–48). By this he referred to underlying belief structures that are so much a part of us that they are hidden from our awareness. Thus he differentiates presuppositions from assumptions, which can be recognised. I said at the outset of this chapter, for instance, that I assumed readers' interest in philosophy and a broadly based view of school administration. These assumptions, and others that I could have selected, come easily; I know them; they constitute my purpose for writing. On the other hand, identifying my reasons – my presuppositions – for attending to these assumptions, and not to others, may occupy me for what is left of my lifetime.

For Collingwood, the philosophic attitude assists us in making explicit the presuppositions that were formerly implicit. Connelly, quoting from Collingwood's *Speculum Mentis* (1924), distinguishes between explicit and implicit knowledge in this manner:

In any given experience there are certain principles, distinctions and so forth of which the person whose experience it is cannot but be aware: these I call explicit features of the experience in question. ... An observer studying

a certain form of experience often finds it impossible to give an account of it without stating certain principles and distinctions which are not actually recognised by the persons whose experience he is studying.

(Connelly 2003:106)

In my discussion of the arts, I noted Collingwood's recognition of false consciousness as the unfamiliarity with, or rejection of, one's own feelings, emotions and ideas. His political thought re-emphasises this danger but holds out promise that such faulty or incomplete thinking can be rectified at least partially through self-questioning, and a certain kind of dialogue with others. He speaks of those who engage in 'eristic' thought, and speak with the clear object of winning arguments. Against this practice, he recommends a dialectical approach in which the debaters challenge one another in the common pursuit of truth (Smallwood 2001: 295). In artistic and discursive processes alike, we come to know *what* we know by expressing ourselves; in art this is through the realisation of the artwork,[8] in conversation, though hearing ourselves speak and in listening to others. Thus it is possible to become aware of our absolute presuppositions, although coming to know them does not *ipso facto* mean that they will be rejected. The point is that alterations to presuppositions, whether they are explicitly known or not, and whether they are accepted or rejected, are not brought about directly, but indirectly (Connelly, 2003: 107; 2005) as outcomes of action and dialogue.

From Collingwood's copious literature on historical processes, I have extracted the theme of imaginative and critical reconstruction and, from his political writings, I have returned to the concept of underlying values that can be brought to light most effectively through artistic and linguistic expression. In the final section of the chapter, these threads are united with aesthetics and the artistry – potential or realised – of school leaders.

Administration and management

On being introduced to Collingwood's distinctions between art and craft, students of organisation theory[9] cannot but be reminded of the long-standing claims and debates surrounding administration and management (Blumberg 1984). The daily lives of school leaders, we know, are occupied with such activities as ensuring the smooth operation of the organisation, ordering texts, scheduling classes and conducting meetings. These and related tasks, if we accept Hodgkinson's (1991: 51) definition, can be considered managerial. While such practices deserve attention in graduate classrooms, where 'we can offer conceptual frameworks for different elements of [the administrative] craft', Blumberg (1984: 39) claims the craft itself is best approached and refined 'at the work site'.

The tasks of administration, many would argue, are more closely attuned to decisions that involve policy and that, not incidentally, affect the lives of other people; for this reason, the planning and execution of these tasks call for a 'moral

art' (Hodgkinson 1991). From the socio-political point of view, it is also in this administrative realm that school leaders reflect upon the connections between micro-level problems and macro-level issues (Mills 1959). In a contemporary setting, as well, administrators frequently face the painful gap between their purposes in becoming school leaders and the demands and constraints they face as part of the new management – what Blackmore (1996) refers to as the doing of 'emotional labour'.

But where would one place Blumberg's description of administrative work as refining the 'techniques of knowing how' to do things: reaching out to people, seeding staffs with new ideas, unravelling problems, and negotiating settlements (Blumberg 1989: 112)? Whereas Blumberg considers these capabilities to involve 'technique', they could, in reference to Collingwood's schemata, as easily be considered as art. Do school leaders who sow intellectual seeds among their colleagues know what will be the outcome of their words? Do they even know, before the speech acts take place, what it is, exactly, that they will say?

Answers to these questions, following Collingwood's line of questioning, will begin to offer distinctions between, not art and craft, but between art and 'art falsely so called' (1958: 31). These and similar categories of meaning are important insofar as they draw the attention of school leaders to their actions. The distinctions will be about clarity of purpose and execution. Such clarity – about whether, for instance, one is responding to a generalised directive from a ministry of education, or to a policy agreed upon by teachers, parents and in harmony with one's own beliefs – requires recognition of the distinction between bureaucratic (or technical) and values-based thought and action. Of course, the school leader's work contains technique (craft) as well as art, and that technique is of fundamental importance. As Hodgkinson reminds us, organisations can 'persist longer without administration than they can without management' (1991: 51). The important thing is to define management and administration to ourselves and others – for words are important – and to know the difference for, as Collingwood reminds us, 'the business of sound theory, in relation to practice, is not to solve practical problems, but to clear them of misunderstandings which make their solution impossible' (in Collingwood 1989: 94).

Administrative imagination

As with Collingwood's distinction between art and craft, the details of his theory of imagination are not on trial here. There are many such theories (e.g. Egan 1992; Makkreel 1990; Sartre 2004; Warnock 1976), concepts of mind really, and considerable disagreement among them. The beauty of Collingwood's explication of imagination inheres first in his assurance that it is an activity for everyone and, second, in his insistence that imagination applies to all disciplines of study, and carries the potential to contribute aesthetically, as Dewey hoped, 'to an expanding and enriched life'. For Collingwood, 'imagination is a fundamental mode of mind's activity, and the right training of the imagination is therefore a fundamental part of education' (1964: 198).

As I have shown, Collingwood conceives of imagination at the meeting point of feeling, emotional response and nascent idea. The 'educative' administrator (Foster 1989; Smyth 1989) and teacher-as-leader will benefit from reflecting on the inclusiveness of this point, as will all school students if the reflection is implemented in a pedagogy that explores the genesis of knowledge as well as its transmission. In Collingwood's model of education, each subject area would be open to critique through a process of dialogical debate and imaginative reconstruction (1964: 198; Stanage 1972). But in stating 'poetry first, prose afterwards', Collingwood prioritises art and emotion in the child's intellectual development (1964: 199).

Eisner (2002: 196–208), a curriculum theorist who focuses on the visual arts, describes what education in general can learn from the arts: that there can be more than one answer to a question and more than one solution to a problem; that there is such a thing as 'rightness of fit'; that the fine-tuning of the sensibilities has a carry-over effect; that intrinsic satisfaction matters, and so on. While, as a former arts educator, I concur with Eisner's assessment of art and its potential aesthetic benefits, Collingwood adds a gentle reminder concerning the value of art. He points out that the better the technique of the artist [student, teacher, or administrator], and the richer the knowledge base from which he can draw, the richer will be the work of the imagination. While this seems obvious, the lesson has not been learned in all school settings, as is apparent in the allocation of arts education to classroom teachers untrained for the job, or in the rising popularity of private artists-in-the-classroom. One illustration of this tendency to shift responsibility for arts education to the private realm invites classroom teachers to attend artist-led workshops where they can 'develop ways simple artistic tools could be used to teach new academic concepts'. As a follow-up, the promise is that 'each artist educator [will visit] the classroom at least three times over a six-week period (Royal 2002: 4, 6). The implication is that, through superficial art activities – as opposed to arts *learning* – teachers (and one must assume children) can 'pick up' artistry in brief periods of observation, and that one classroom visit by a competent educator every two weeks will do the job. Yet, as Morton points out, even where schools still have 'strong arts programs, the relegation of aesthetic inquiry to the study of fine arts' perpetuates an isolated and elitist interpretation of aesthetics that 'further marginalizes aesthetic education' (1994: 9). Collingwood reminds us that, while one can engage imaginatively in any subject, to do so well requires depth of knowledge rather than a smattering of knowledge 'falsely so called'.

This illustration from school curricula symbolises the importance of artistry over technique in administrative action, not because of its advocacy for art education but, rather, because it praises clear over muddled thinking. Clarity of thought, furthermore, brings us closer to a freedom from the technical control in education that tends to move in a hierarchical line of authority from government ministries, down to school districts and on to schools and classrooms (Colebatch 2004). The dialectical mode of learning, recommended throughout Collingwood's entire genre, opens new 'ways of seeing' (Berger 1977) that include diverse points of view. When we use these new ways of seeing, or

'being' in the world, we enter consciously an imagined world in which we seek to disrupt and break through existing conditions. In this way, the door is opened for a loosening of the grip of dominant perceptions of educational 'reality', couched as they often are in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In Weberian terms, we come closer to breaking free of the 'iron cage' of bureaucratic life. In economic terms, we are encouraged to question the 'controlling hand of the market'; in human terms, the popular concept of humanity as inexhaustively acquisitive.

Administration as critical project

I return now to Rancière's rather large promise, given in the opening quotation, of a specific sensory experience – an aesthetic – that may usher in not only a new world of art, but also emancipation for individuals and communities. In this statement, Ranciere 'grounds the autonomy of art, to the extent that [the aesthetic experience] connects it to the hope of 'changing life' (2002: 134). The most obvious way that this can be done is through the new vistas on reality that become accessible when the senses become engaged. If, as Collingwood suggests, artists make evident what we all know but cannot express (and what they too come to truly know through their art), they reveal *for us all* new depths of understanding and new vistas of possibility.

   The most freeing aspect of the aesthetic gaze, and of artistry, comes about as the shock, disruption and challenge to everyday understandings. As Marcuse contends, art, by definition, breaks boundaries; otherwise it would not be art for, given 'all its affirmative-ideological features, art remains a dissenting force' (1978: 8). It is this dissenting voice, expressed through Collingwood's reasoned yet provocative argument, that I find foundational to the political and economic issues facing critical administrators today. The administrative area of study sorely needs challenges to such accepted 'realities' as the growing gap between rich and poor, the inevitability of market dominance, the tendency to consider 'facts as sufficient evidence' of human progress (Stone 1997), the commodification of our institutions of learning, and the re-emergence of a 'positivistic philosophy which ignores [people's] emotional nature and reduces everything in human experience to terms of the intellect' (Collingwood 1958: 58). In considering these challenges, we at least have the opportunity to transcend the limitations of everyday, taken-for-granted experience, and break free of the web-of-meaning that 'both constrains ... action and makes it possible' (Greenfield 1993: 99).

Conclusion

Collingwood reminds us that the aesthetic experience in general, and artistic activity in particular, come from expressing emotions, and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called language. He hastens to point out, however, that the artistic activity does not '*use a ready-made* language'; rather, it '*creates* language as it goes along' (1958: 275; emphasis in

original). This preoccupation with coming to terms with one's most basic convictions through expression informs the way Collingwood approaches artistry in all areas. In this chapter, I have highlighted art, history and politics. Artists, as we have seen, attempt constantly, and usually with great difficulty, to know themselves through their own artistic expression. If they act always as critics (and philosophers, in this sense), they will know if they are pursuing their art successfully or unsuccessfully (1958: 291).

A critical attitude surfaces in Collingwood, the historian. Here he calls for imagination in the service of re-creating the past, of filling in the gaps to the very best of one's ability, given available evidence. Historians, however, are not neutral observers. They bring to the imaginative search their rational understandings, as well as their own presuppositions that may be acknowledged fully, partially, or not at all. Finally, each student of politics or political activist comes ready-made, so to speak, with a deeply embedded social agenda. Collingwood's service is to remind us always of the position this agenda plays, first, at a sub-conscious level, second, in our own consciousness and third, in the manner in which we allow it to dominate our actions.

We can therefore think of administration as both art and craft – craft in its many technical and organisational tasks – and art insofar as school leaders' actions call on their sentient lives to inform their emotions, reason and action. In so doing, they will constantly question their own motivations, and make spaces for themselves and others to work imaginatively – perhaps with painful false starts and uncertainty about outcomes – but work, nonetheless, with the curriculum, school life and the larger community in ways that have never before been tested.

Notes

1 See p. 174 of *Principles of Art* for Collingwood's defence of plain speaking, ending with the declaration that 'to insist that every conversation shall be conducted in one's own language is in men of the world only bad manners; in philosophers it is sophistry as well'.
2 Before turning to Collingwood, Blumberg explored the ideas of Benedetto Croce concerning the nature of art and craft. Although subtle differences exist in the aesthetics of these two men, their theories are sufficiently alike for Hospers (1956) to refer to their ideas collectively as the Croce–Collingwood Theory of Art. While both theorists emphasise the centrality of expression in artistry, Collingwood brings to his analysis a far more inclusive cognitive component (Graham 2002).
3 Howard (1982) objects to such distinctions between art and craft, maintaining that art of performance (classical singing in his illustration) depends on craftwork. Collingwood joins the two as well, though this full development of his theory of art (in Part III of *Principles of Art*) is often overlooked.
4 This phrase, or variations on it, is attributed to William James though I have not been able to locate the original source. Hospers, in reference to the Croce–Collingwood theory of expression, notes that an artist's intuitions do not burst upon him in a flash. Rather, the ideas begin with 'what William James called 'a big blooming buzzing confusion': a glimpse here, a spark there, a relation perceived, a promising avenue developed' (Hospers 1982: 196).

5 Space does not permit me to pursue the 'double-barrelled' distinctions drawn by Collingwood, in true philosophical fashion, concerning feeling, thought, knowledge, and experience, each of which he refers to as activity and content – e.g. feeling as distinct from what it is that is felt (1958: 160). Feeling, as well, refers to both sentient and emotional experience.
6 Collingwood observes, quite correctly, that we have little control over recurring traumatic images and disturbing fantasies.
7 In considering Collingwood as historian, I wish to acknowledge the essay by Lemisko (2004) in which she applies Collingwood's imagination-as-method directly to the history classroom.
8 Collingwood claims that a work of art, fully imagined in the mind of the artist, has been created (PA: 130). As this claim seemingly contradicts his contention that art must be expressed, I can only conclude that he is referring to someone like Mozart who was said to hear a musical work in its entirety in his head.
9 By 'students' I refer both to well-established scholars in the field and the graduate students they interact with in the course of classroom and school-based learning.

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5 The metaphysical sources of a pragmatic artistic leadership

Spencer J. Maxcy

> ... nature is an affair of affairs, wherein each one, no matter how linked up it may be with others, has its own quality.
>
> (Dewey 1929a: 97)

In this chapter I propose to show that leadership may be conceived of as an artistic enterprise as well as a moral one. The touchstone by which this relationship may be understood is metaphysics. John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy will be used to demonstrate the rationale for, the logical flow of, and grounding for, a philosophy of aesthetic moral leadership.

Leadership has been the most elusive factor in the management of organisations (Maxcy 1991). While an enormous number of research articles, scholarly papers, and books have been written on the subject, it remains an operative mystery; and its acquisition still something of a dice toss.

There are three difficulties with today's leadership concept: 1) its rhetoric is vainglorious and is founded in philosophies of desire and action; 2) it is value-neutral, ready and willing to range from dictatorial to saintly; and 3) it possesses a vocabulary that is largely programmatic: celebrating goals, policies, and agendas. The vast majority of researchers characterise leadership as being tied to personality, behaviours, the setting, or some combination of these. This has led, most recently, to the writings of pop social scientists who have come to regard 'leadership' in terms of a Cartesian philosophical worldview, and evaluate it via the language of classical physics. We are told that leadership has to be 'effective', possess 'density', or demonstrate 'vision'. Leaders always deal with 'power,' and must seek to exploit 'conditions'. Leading requires 'effort' and 'moral imagination'. And, when leaders fail it is owing to the leader's moral character (President Richard Nixon), the times or conditions (General Robert E. Lee), or in followers' inability or refusal to follow properly (Queen Boedica).

Leaders are seen as one half of an age-old equation of 'leaders' and 'followers'. It is assumed that leaders get followers to do something. Thus, leading is a transaction of inspiration, motivation, instruction, threats, punishment, deception, etc, for 'achieving', 'gaining', or 'producing'. We are taught to judge followers by their achievements, and thereby cast light upon the leaders' ability or skills as leaders.

But I wish to offer another view of leadership, one that advances our understanding of the dynamics of leading beyond this overly simplistic Cartesian model. Leading can be a form of pragmatic artistic 'transaction' (Maxcy 1991; Weber 1947). In the pages to follow, I wish to discuss John Dewey and his metaphysics as they relate to the formation of a theory of moral aesthetic leadership. My reasons for limiting this discussion to Dewey's pragmatic view of moral leadership are threefold. First, Dewey, of all the pragmatists, wrote the most about morals and ethics. In 1908, he collaborated with James Tufts on a book, *Ethics*, which went through several revisions and reprints into the 1930s and provided the moral grounds for his most popular book, *Democracy and Education* (1916). Second, he took special interest in metaphysics after quitting the University of Chicago and moving to New York City and taking a post in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University. And, finally, Dewey, rather than Charles S. Peirce or William James, spent the most time seeking to spell out a systematic way in which morals–ethics could be practised in the modern era (Boisvert 1988: 127). Often overlooked, Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalist ethics offers a template for us today for grappling with moral–ethical issues, yet it is particularly informative for leadership and its study.

For the present, it is perhaps enough that we suggest that leadership has both a moral and aesthetic dimension, but to add to this claim that it has its sources in pragmatist metaphysics seems a stretch of the imagination. Yet, pragmatists, despite their avowed distaste for metaphysics, have often fastened upon generic categories, traits of existence, permanence and change, and similar metaphysical tools to explain their philosophy and methods.

Pragmatism and leadership

The central idea here is that leading does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is rooted in our deepest beliefs about humankind, nature, and the real world around us. While Max Weber and John Dewey shared a fundamental belief regarding the centrality of human transactions, Dewey had formed the nascent idea of leadership as 'transaction' before Weber. In *Experience and Nature* (1929a), Dewey argues that nature is an affair of interactions or transactions of differing extents and durations (Hahn 1970). He identifies three levels of transactions in nature: the psycho-chemical or material level; the psycho-physical or organic level; and the level of mind or human experience. Dewey argues that mind 'emerged as an element in evolution out of the lower level'. Mind or intelligence was seen as an evolving process rather than material brain and something that could not have appeared in history without the former levels. Moreover, these three levels continue to operate in nature today (Dewey 1929a: 254–8).

Historically, a large number of philosophers, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, have sought to trace metaphysics as a guide to morals (Murdoch 1992). Sidney Hook claimed that pragmatism has always been 'dogged by metaphysics' (1996: 6). That tailing has not been stressed in the past when scholars have addressed the problems of leadership. And, while for the pragmatist the

transactive nature of leadership is highlighted by its surface level and practical nature, its roots may be traced deeper into the realm of metaphysics.

Researchers interested in the pragmatic face of leading have presented us with two difficulties. On the practical side, leadership in the recent past has been equated with business-like values of efficiency and effectiveness. As such, it has been connected to a kind of 'vulgar pragmatism' that stresses expediency. This emphasis has left open and unexplained the relationship pragmatism may have to matters of artistry and creativity. Pragmatic avenues to leadership have thus been truncated, cut off, or sidelined.

The second difficulty presented by the pragmatic approach is the question of foundations. Foundationalism has fallen upon hard times in pragmatists' philosophical circles. Leadership is logically assumed to be without foundations, or bereft of a set of abstract universal concepts. This has had a bearing upon leadership and its discovery as now the processes of leading must be contextualised rather than deeply rooted to fixed categories. In this version of leadership theorising, leadership is freed from Abstract Idealism, and more generally unhooked from metaphysics. The view of leadership, as celebrated from this point of view, is a practical matter of influencing other people to do your bidding.

The result of these two characterising directions in leadership scholarship and practice has been that pragmatic leadership has been assumed to be a business-like venture in which the terminology and psychology draw upon managerialism rather than leadership. Certainly, our love affair with logical empiricism and thirst for science has contributed to this absence of regard for aesthetic values within leading acts. But leadership may be tied to a richer philosophy than anything so simple.

Aesthetic grounding of leadership

The legacy of the ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle, was to celebrate 'form' as the terminal end of art. Yet to the practising artisan, '... form is alien, unperceived and unenjoyed' (Dewey 1929a: 91). The Greek philosophers arrested or halted art in its process, and called it 'form'. But for Dewey, 'If we take advantage of the word esthetic in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, esthetic quality, immediate, final or self-disclosed, indubitably characterises natural situations as they empirically occur' (1929a: 96). What we mean by any quality as such is not its finality. Rather, the enjoyment of validity is an essential factor in experience, and not something that must be laid upon it via cognition.

What has occurred in the traditional research on leadership is the imposition of an Aristotelian philosophy of form on what is essentially a process already in possession of quality and enjoyment. We see the vast number of empirical studies of leadership not as exercises characterising leading, but noting the features of leadership as a final form. Today's theories, rather than taken to be transactions between human beings and their culture, are often cut into variables taken to be facts then judged in their enumeration. The final form is frequently a statistical table!

One place where art comes into leadership is in the fashioning and communicating of visions. Leadership is charged with an artisan's task of providing us with insights into primal qualities of experience, such that we may plan, co-ordinate, fashion, and in other ways add quality to future experiences. The element of enjoyment has all but dropped out of the current research efforts. Leading is measured by its difficulty rather than its aesthetic nature. Templates for the future are hard scrabble plans that rise and fall on ineffectiveness. But what are these visions to be? Pragmatism is helpful here for it tells us how to link prospects, anticipations, filled out expectations, etc., with a method of thinking or intelligence. And it tells us that leadership visions are but 'dramatic rehearsals for future events' (Maxcy 1991).

Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* (1961) sets forth the 'picture theory of meaning,' by which he meant that propositions are but pictures of reality. These pictures are possible because we as human beings possess the capacity to picture, or to envision. They are possible, too, because they are linked with analytic features of the universe to aid us in correlating the word image with the real world. But, Dewey argues that in addition to this we are subject to a variety of generic traits of existence, some of which are in flux and others stable, and all in motion. These characterising features of experience (or 'culture') as he later believed, are the givens that are formed and being formed for us and by us.

Aesthetics, the theory of art, has its roots in the datum of primary experience, Dewey tells us (1934: 263–5). Yet, the aesthetic experience presupposes mind or intelligence, and as we have seen, this emerges only from social relations of individuals. As Mead expressed it, 'Aesthetic objects come with unbought delight and thus have a peculiar pleasure; but if there were no pleasures bought with intelligent effort, there would be no aesthetic pleasures. They are dependent upon this contrast' (1938: 625).

Leadership has traditionally been viewed as part of politics. Yet, it is more appropriately linked to art. While Plato sought to expel the poets from his model republic on the ground that they deceived, Aristotle found poetry to be close to philosophy. Dewey dislodges leading from politics and elevates it to statesmanship! Organisational leaders such as CEOs, school principals or line supervisors are invested in processes saturated with artistic qualities. To reduce leading to managing is precisely to elide quality from its practice.

Metaphysics as a route to artful leadership

It is possible to praise Dewey or castigate him for his metaphysics. Shook says that '… when it comes to metaphysics, his [Dewey's] philosophy yields an embarrassment of riches' (2000: 7). On the other hand, Richard Rorty criticises Dewey for adopting a magisterial view of metaphysics, seeking to ape traditional metaphysics. For Rorty, Dewey comes up empty-handed, offering a metaphysics that is not metaphysical (Boisvert 1998: 151).

The truth may lie somewhere between these two extremes. If we look at Dewey's three major books written in the second period, *Experience and Nature*

(1929a), *The Quest for Certainty* (1929b), and *Art as Experience* (1934b), we see a defensive posture taken to some of the most warmly held philosophical chestnuts. Together with *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), these books form the most significant expression of Dewey's philosophical naturalism (Boisvert 1988). And they provide excellent arguments against several widely held doctrines of nature and art.

During his entire career, Dewey seemed to wrestle with early Greek thought and Aristotle, within whose philosophy there was an emphasis on nature (*physis*). Dewey tended to emphasise production (*techne*). While nature was something given and simply subject to contemplation for Aristotle, Dewey took another view: nature was a challenge. This led Dewey to emphasise human proaction: 'reshaping', 'modification', and 'control' of nature as a Modernist and child of the industrial revolution (Boisvert 1988: 52–66).

A second issue with which Dewey had to deal was the question of the essential nature of the world: Were things permanent or were they forever changing (Boisvert 1988)? Dewey saw both settlement and flux in the universe. He wrote in *Experience and Nature* and in *Art as Experience* of the merging of aesthetics (the study of form) and morals (the study and practice of conduct) as giving us an understanding of the complex nature of the universe as a dramatic evolutionary saga.

For Aristotle and the Greeks, form was more permanent (Boisvert 1938: 130–4). For the catastrophist social scientists of Dewey's era, it was in continuous flux, or ready for shape shifting. Dewey took the middle ground: form and its state (permanence or change) is something that cannot be broken down into the immutable and the chaotic. Both conditions are inherent in nature, and both ought to be reported, Dewey argues. He also sought to separate himself from other later philosophers such as Kant through his adoption of unique terminology. For example, Dewey preferred 'takens' rather that 'data' or 'givens', and sought to replace 'reason' with 'intelligence' (Boisvert 1988: 122). In 1939, Sidney Hook described what he took to be John Dewey's critical view of metaphysics as what was practiced historically:

> Traditional metaphysics has always been a violent and logically impossible attempt to impose some parochial scheme of values upon the cosmos in order to justify or undermine a set of existing social institutions by a pretended deduction form nature to Reality.
>
> (Sleeper 1986: 133)

Dewey took another position. He believed that metaphysics could, and should, offer a positive role, joining together the pluralistic, divergent and conflicting elements of a culture; as well as providing that culture offers some measure of coherence in the face of these dissipative sources (Sleeper 1986).

Dewey tells us in *Philosophy in Civilization* (1931) that pragmatism's origins were found in the writings of Charles S. Peirce and William James. Dewey disliked Peirce tying his version of pragmatism to the narrower meaning of words

and logic, instead favouring James, the artist and teacher; seeing his method to be more humanist and psychological in nature. More importantly for our purposes here, Dewey favoured James because 'James showed, among other things, that in certain philosophic conceptions, the affirmation of certain beliefs could be justified by means of the nature of their consequences, or by the differences which these beliefs make in existence' (Dewey 1931: 22).

Dewey goes to some lengths to praise James's version of pragmatism for shifting emphases from raw desires, antecedent phenomena, precedents, categories, and systems of thought by relocating pragmatism's thrust toward consequences for action. But in doing so, James's pragmatism became devoid of metaphysics, which had historically dealt with these large-scale ideas. Dewey's solution to this difficulty was to argue that pragmatism shifts its metaphysical implication:

> The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James's term, 'in the making, in the process of becoming', of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.
>
> (1931: 25)

Thus, Dewey accepts the Jamesian notion that a pragmatic method need not be hooked to a set of certain features of the universe and human experience that are antecedent and explicable via metaphysics, instead tethering pragmatic method to the belief in an evolving universe, filled with uniqueness and propelled by freedom and intelligence. And this shift of emphasis left room for the creative function of human intelligence, both psychological and moral. Hence, reason or thought takes on, as James believed and as Dewey accepted, a creative and constructive role. James offers a revision of empiricism that is a prolegomena for Dewey's own philosophy of 'instrumentalism' by replacing ' ... the value of past experiences, of what is already given, by the future, by which is as yet mere possibility' (Dewey 1931: 26).

Of course, the early pragmatists owed a great deal to the American Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Amos Bronson Alcott (West 1989). Emerson in particular preached the value of self-reliance, the importance of nature, and the embrace of a faith in human individuality to make it through life. Emerson linked morality to leadership, and denigrated leaders such as Napoleon for wasting their genius upon affectations. If a person becomes aware of his or her place in nature, seeks to draw upon natural sources of continuous inspiration and value, then the outcome is more assuredly to be great. Dewey expressed this Emersonian cosmic glue as 'continuity' and his conception of 'experience' rests upon continuity.

When we look at Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (1929a: 46–7), we find him showing his opposition to dualisms. He therefore suggests that the 'universe has the character of contingency'. Contingency is part of human thought and growth: it

leads to his hypothetical model, or the proactive meanings of a phenomenon. Both contingency and continuity operate throughout pragmatism as focal concepts.

Dewey further draws upon the concept of 'emergence' (Dewey 1929a: 271–3) to deal with the problem of the origins of human mind and intelligence. How 'mind' developed initially was a problem for philosophers and anthropologists. For Dewey, the theory of biological evolution provides a solution. Mind 'emerged' from the transactions among primitive humans. It required that humans cluster into groups for the purpose of solving essential problems of survival. Language and mind emerge from the encounters of humans with their experiences, and the need to find food and shelter. Emergence, rather than 'progress', is used to account for the linking of events that produce uniqueness. It is a metaphysical concept in the sense that things are the way they are, but they are also 'becoming'. But, for the pragmatists like Dewey and Mead, there is no force behind it. Once there is a group of people, or a social, then the concept of individual is possible. Emergence is just a mechanism in the universe that is without a driver. In summary, Dewey's metaphysics stressed the sources of social and political forms to have their origins in the bedrock of nature.

Dewey's aesthetics of leadership

John Dewey's metaphysics joined together his ontology with his epistemology: the subject matter of experience with the search for quality. While Dewey does not specifically adopt Peirce's categories, he does acknowledge the importance of a primary stuff or experience. He wrote: '... in every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive'. Dewey held that such events have '... irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable, and indescribable qualities'. As such they are immediate but unknown and unknowable, 'because knowledge has no concern with them' (1929a: 85, 86).

Ontological sources of aesthetics

Philosophers in the past had separated questions of morals and ethics from considerations of beauty. Plato was perhaps most adamant that artists not be considered sources of authority regarding what was true or false (Murdoch 1992). Yet, Dewey went against philosophic tradition and joined these matters through his adoption of two approaches: 1) a theory of existence (ontology); and 2) a method of value deliberation (an instrumentalist epistemology). His ontology interests us here, for it is in questions of being and existence, thought and action, that Dewey sought his first set of metaphysical foundations for artistic moral leadership.

For Dewey, the universe was wide open. The stream of experience found events to be contingent, rather than predetermined by antecedent forces of either a material or spiritual kind. He believed that there was no beginning and no end to the cosmos. Nature had preference for neither 'good' nor 'bad.' While

humans experience immediate gratification of desires, Dewey believed that these were not necessarily to be considered values.

When Dewey wrote of religion in *A Common Faith* (1934a), he did so without reference to God. William H. Kilpatrick, after reading the draft for the text, asked Dewey about this. His reply was that he did not see a need for it. 'Religion' is a special body of beliefs and practices, he argued, while 'religious' was the generic aspect or quality that can come to many kinds of experiences. These latter experiences can occur independently of any doctrines or practices, rituals or services. Religions were organised systems and often prevented the religious quality of experience from coming to consciousness and finding appropriate expression relative to the present moral and intellectual conditions. This prevention was owing to their weight and historic encumbrances, Dewey argued.

In seeking to distinguish naturalism from supernaturalism, or science from mysticism, Dewey favoured a co-operative inquiry and idealising imagination, with freedom based on knowledge, imagination, etc., and the common culture. He held no beliefs about personal immortality; instead, he favoured naturalistic humanism as a type of 'natural piety'.

Today's pragmatists are less apt to include metaphysics in their pragmatism, yet it remains lurking in the background. Cornel West (1989) has capitalised on James and Dewey to formulate his own pragmatic take on religious experience and American history – a conception he termed 'prophetic pragmatism'. While Richard Rorty eschews traditional notions of both science and metaphysics in his pragmatic accounts, his writings beg the question of what the origins and determinants of existence may be, such that they appear operational in the novels and short stories he analyses. His talk of the all-important 'hope' seems to be tied to a belief in the unification of persons in the pursuit of a well-intentioned world (1991: 35–45).

Generic traits of existence

Dewey went through several distinct metaphysical periods during his career: he embraced a form of intuitionalism of the Kantian variety, Hegelian Idealism, Experimental Idealism, Instrumentalism, and finally, Pragmatic Naturalism (Hahn 1970). These phases of his thought corresponded to issues and individuals he encountered and were the result of his wrestling with real issues both in the pages of the scholarly journals and in his professional life.

We find Dewey first dealing with metaphysics in a naturalistic manner in his 1903 book *Studies in Logical Theory*. Here he offers two metaphysical contributions: Reality is in process and inquiry is a part of existence. 'Judgment appears as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on ... Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving' (Cunningham 1995: 238). And so, when researchers engage in an inference, they are engaging in an existential act, one in which thought can influence reality.

Cunningham tells us that the second metaphysical contribution of Dewey's *Studies* was redefining the idea of 'object'. Experience goes through several

phases. In phase one, experience is merely 'had.' Experience is pre-cognitive with no thinking taking place. In the second stage, experience becomes 'reflective'as 'objects' emerge. The real world merely 'suggests' objects; they are not given, but rather 'taken' (1995: 238).

After rejecting the possibility of linking metaphysics to his moral–ethical theory, Dewey changed his mind in his 1915 *Journal of Philosophy* article, 'The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry'. He declared a reconstruction of metaphysics as a naturalistic task. In this new and remodelled metaphysics the search for first causes of traditional metaphysicians would be abandoned and a new scientific effort undertaken to apply the empirical study of the non-reducible 'traits of nature'. The benefits of such a change in method would be that scientists would be saved the frustration of being confused by where quantity stood in the place of quality, pluralism masqueraded for monism, and so forth (Cunningham 1995: 238–9). By 1925, and the release of the first edition of his book *Experience and Nature* (1929a), Dewey offered seven more 'traits of existence' (Hahn 1970). Like some metaphysical anthropologist, he hoped to provide an empirical survey of the traits of existence to guide researchers so that what were to be seen are those traits most often occurring as 'complementary pairs' (Cunningham 1995). Eventually, he wound up with a long list of traits, such as continuity, discontinuity, contingency, diversity, individuality, plurality, unity, and so forth.

Coherence and unity

Two traits of particular relevance to his idea of transactional leadership were coherence and unity. The aesthetics of social science research and social practices, like educating, nursing, organising, and leading, have long been neglected by philosophers of science. John Dewey's *Art as Experience* (1934b) and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938) made a concerted effort to correct this oversight; he sought to link art with ordinary human practices such as nursing, educating, and leading.

As a coherentist, he took knowledge and reflection not to be ends in themselves, but rather the means for ensuring the continuity of action over time. Coherence, continuity, and order were just more significant relative to experience and practices than incoherence, discontinuity and chaos (Burke 1994: 12). While the coherence of appearances is one thing, coherence of language is something else. For in the latter as opposed to the former, their relationship is logical in nature. However, the logical ordering of propositions (theories) may be accomplished by transitivity, symmetry, correlation, and connectivity. Simply accumulating or collecting linguistic propositions is insufficient. For, as Dewey points out, we may have a collection that varies in number or one that varies in kind (1938: 365).

For Dewey, practical crafts, in our case leadership, benefit when the practitioner takes on the 'attitude of the artist':

When the artist is preoccupied overmuch with means and materials, he may achieve wonderful technique, but not the artistic spirit par excellence. When the animating idea is in excess of the command of method, aesthetic feeling may be indicated, but the art of presentation is too defective to express the feeling thoroughly. When the thought of the end becomes so adequate that it compels translation into the means that embody it, or when attention to means is inspired by recognition of the end they serve, we have the attitude typical of the artist, an attitude that may be displayed in all activities, even though they are not conventionally designated 'arts'.

(1933: 287–8)

Dewey's pragmatic programme of aesthetics centred on the belief in art as experience, and that experience was a kind of restorative project in which breaks and ruptures were re-fashioned into a unified whole. Leadership is more than the language used to describe it: It is a kind of picture or sketch, at times portraiture, then again landscape; moving in and out from close-up to long-shot. Leading in artistic ways is rendering meanings in the coherent and holistic manner, as if the portrait of practice were something found in the Louvre or the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art (Shusterman 1992; Jackson 1998).

Characteristics of Dewey's instrumentalist method

If we are to locate all of Dewey's metaphysical foundations for his aesthetic leadership, we need to look beyond his ontology to his epistemology and methodology of inquiry. For the early pragmatists there was no single metaphysical doctrine, but rather a focus on 'method'. For Dewey 'method' replaced 'truth' by providing a means to settling doubtful situations. William James said 'truth happens to an idea'. So the status of being true is a linguistic one, and not an essential characteristic of the experience. For Dewey, it was not possible to find truth in the relationship to givens. Certain notions of 'the world' are just there for us. When he spoke of his Coal City, Pennsylvania 'religious' experience, he meant a thing is what it is, and not some essence.

Dewey's method of inquiry is scientific, but not narrowly so: the method of inquiry is its own justification. However, at the same time, perhaps most strongly of all pragmatists, he called for the abandonment of metaphysics as it was characterised by the Absolute Idealists and others. Accepting the fact that his philosophy could not begin with nothing, he shifted his emphasis upon the future as a test of the value of received ideas such as God, Nature, etc. In his book *A Common Faith* (1934a), he provided the non-supernatural explanation as a new explanatory device for determining the meanings of faith in a democratic society. The pragmatic maxim of assigning meaning based upon concrete consequences of holding a belief, separated pragmatism for other philosophies. And, it moved metaphysics to a kind of 'scientific status', thus making it a comfortable piece of the pragmatic system.

For Dewey, intelligence is a method, and moral theory is a useful lens for seeing value dilemmas. Instead of taking moral theory as an historic set of abstract truths set forth by great philosophers, he sees it as a highly motile set of approaches to resolving value doubts with an eye towards conduct or behaviour. Dewey's ethical theory is teleological. As a pragmatist, he was interested in consequences or short-range results; and thus, the results stemming from one moral approach versus another took on urgency. For Dewey, 'The Good' is growth, a given state of nature. As the ultimate or metaphysical goal, good emerges out of conduct rather than being discovered: it is something we work towards and not a particular place or thing.

Certain necessary conditions had to be met for Dewey's ethics to work. First, ethics was inherently a social matter. His metaphysics allowed him to cast 'the social' as the supreme among the 'traits of existence'. Next, the individual human agent had to be free to make a decision that must be tied to some 'end-in-view.' As this method and process of value deliberation was refined, this instrument would lead to the development or growth of moral character in the chooser. Similarly, virtue, for Dewey, was a part of an individual's moral character, joining proposed action with the individual's self. Instead of a laundry list of external virtues, he relocates them as either specific virtues or 'excellences' (e.g. playing baseball, bricklaying, etc.) and cardinal virtues; or such matters as mediation of impulse, or 'social awareness'; wisdom; justice; or socially oriented excellences of character. Often these virtues were not capable of being distinguished from one another (Rucker 1970).

Two other characterising features of the situation inform Dewey's metaphysical view of morals–ethics. Dewey was a devout coherentist, believing in holism and harmony. Moral conduct was to be aimed at harmony. Only when choices led to future richer choices was the mechanism of moral instrumentalism working. Reflective thinking guided the process and improved the chances of successfully carrying out in the world those habits and attitudes we call virtues. Therefore, a good is a satisfaction of a desire or interest, arising only from thinking about the consequences of our actions and the relation of those consequences with other desires and interests. Ultimately, the new comes to be combined with the older; the chosen good fits into the homogeneity of our organised life. In judging situations and seizing upon options, the chooser is interested in enhancing co-operation and fluidity in experience. On the other hand, the chooser is also seeking to eliminate discord and chaos, aiming at harmony as a guiding principle. The particular parts of the action results from reflective thinking. And, it ought to lead to an expansion. It is tool for analysis (Rucker 1970).

Democracy

In Dewey's hands, pragmatism provides grounds for a democratic type of moral leadership as well. He implies that these are: a socio-biological ground; a socio-psychological ground; and a methodological ground. The socio-biological ground

provides explanation for the emergence of intelligence. The sociality of human beings is a common good for Dewey. Thus, leadership must please the group. Next, it is important to understand the context within which a democracy may arise and flourish. For this we need the ideas of social psychology. In particular we need to know what 'desire', 'habit', and a host of other concepts mean. Lastly, we need to see the democratic organised form of life is an experiment that requires a belief in that way of life.

Dewey did not look to efficiency as a guide to discerning good leadership. There is no external criterion for him to tie to democratic leading. Democracy was the measure that would judge between leadership practices. If the leadership acts elaborated on what democracy was – provided richer meanings for democracy – then, it was considered to have the good in common. The common good, through social consensus, is the criterion for that form of organisation to be judged best, and that form was democracy (Dewey 1916). Dewey ardently believed that democratic forms of living had advantages over all other forms of social life. For in a democratic form of life, and here we must keep our eye upon leading within such a form, commonalities were stressed, communal threads of associated living were supported, and communication of investigative inquiry into the problems and prospects of the unit were maximised. His value preferences were for the collaborative and communicative, cohesive and collective, unified and co-operative. Democracy is seen as a way of settling value controversies as well as launching new values. Group democracy is an exercise in consensual value formation for Dewey (1916).

But how did Dewey get to his democracy, and his belief that democratic leadership was the best kind (Dewey 1937: 457–62)? The route to a democratic leadership was not to be taken through science. He rightly pointed out that science did not dictate ends (Gouinlock 1972). And, while the scientific attitude was helpful in reflecting upon desired directions, it was best seen as a habit within an intelligence that is open, communicative, and communal. Thus, thanks to science, Dewey looked for his notion of democratic leadership with the lens of democracy already set in place.

Moral leadership in this equation proves to be a leadership of the group and by the group. No 'great man' lives to exercise his birthright. There is no investment in leadership as traits of personality. And, leading is not determined by circumstances, although such may contribute to the emergence of leadership. For Dewey leadership is an art. In the classical tradition of the Greeks, Dewey sees leading as a set of skills that may be learned and may be judged. Any art requires experience and practice. Leadership of an artful kind is no different. The formation of a democratic community is the basis upon which a true moral and artful leadership will emerge. But, in the final analysis, leadership is an experiment. It is easy to see how Dewey could see leadership aided where it adopted a kind of 'democratic statesmanship' along the lines of international democratic movements of the 1930s and 1940s (Dewey 1937).

Conclusion

The twin metaphysical routes Dewey used, we may conclude, were logic (epistemology) and reality (ontology). Add to these tools the idea that the state of the universe was one of risk and we see Dewey's outline for a moral artistic leadership. Early on, Dewey had sought to strike metaphysics out of his ethics, only to later embrace the copulation of the two (Cunningham 1995). Dewey stressed an ethics viewed from the perspective of the social and the individual. In his book *Ethics* (1908), however, he and his co-author, James Tufts, provided elaborate arguments for the understanding of moral life as social rather than purely individual and personal. His concern for the ethical nature of individual as a function of the social led to his discussion of larger social issues and laid the groundwork for his theory of democracy. In summary, Dewey's philosophy provides the route to an artistic leadership through metaphysics. We see two avenues. The first was via his adoption of 'The Social' as the most significant of a long list of metaphysically situated concepts. By positing 'social' as the generic trait of existence, Dewey offered up a context wherein the mechanisms of commonality, communication, and community (democratic) would emerge. The social sciences could be used to investigate this avenue to an aesthetic leadership.

The second route Dewey chose for grounding his aesthetic leadership paradigm was via the individual. The discipline of psychology provided the lens through which this route could be studied. Here Dewey offered methodology as the touchstone for deciphering leading. His investment in 'instrumentalism' provided a logic of inquiry that could characterise the ways and means of providing a 'reflective leadership' (Dewey 1938; Maxcy 1995; 2003). The idea that leading was a cognitive, but practically based activity set Dewey apart from his contemporaries.

Joined together, Dewey's idea of art and leadership hung from a single metaphysical assumption: the world is comprised of quality. Some of that quality may be parsed out into claims about morality, and some of it about art. This tethering of his philosophy of leadership to a fundamental investment in qualitative firstness, as primary and metaphysically explicable, puts Dewey apart from all the rationalists and idealists of his day. What is so remarkable is that his artistic leadership conception has escaped so many scholars over time. This may be explained by Dewey's relative silence about leadership. We know of only two short essays he wrote about educational leadership, 'Toward administrative statesmanship' (1935) and 'Democracy and educational administration' (1937) that help us understand his position.

The image is that if we but adopt Dewey's vision of an artistic leadership, the conflicts and divisiveness of race, class and gender will slip away, and the search for quality through unity (democracy) will be powered by the method of critical intelligence. In this end-in-view, leading will be a communal transactive conduct in which morals–ethics are part and parcel of the search for The Good. And, that Good will be the process by which we direct the future fortunes of ourselves and our affiliations.

This chapter has argued that an aesthetic moral pragmatism may be conceived, and may well serve to ground contemporary leadership practice in the twenty-first century. I have sought to demonstrate the fact that John Dewey is the best candidate among the pragmatists for such a leadership conception. I have argued that the sources of a Deweyan artistic moral leadership are evidenced in his philosophical treatises. Finally, I have sought to demonstrate that a fixation upon an artistic moral–ethical leadership has certain benefits over traditional leadership conceptions and their articulation in plans and programmes of organisational practice (Maxcy 1994; 1995).

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6 Aesthetic experience as resistance to the 'iron cage' of dominative administrative rationality

Peter Milley

In recent times, the research, practice, and instruction of educational adminis-tration have become increasingly concerned with leadership.[1] State policy makers in Anglo-American nations over the last two decades have imposed on administrators of publicly funded schools, colleges and universities managerial frameworks that heavily emphasise cost-effectiveness, accountabilities, internal competition and goal-oriented behaviours (Samier 2005a). This has increas-ingly made clear the need for administrators to demonstrate social, cultural and educational vision, moral reasoning and ethical judgement, creativity, intellect and exemplary character – in other words, leadership (Bates 2002; Blackmore 2004; Sergiovanni 2000). The corporate doctrines and private sector manage-ment practices that administrators have been aggressively encouraged to adopt often contradict their lived experiences in attending to the needs and interests of students, educators, families and other educational stakeholders (Bates 1987; Giroux 1999; Turk 2000). These contradictions sculpt into relief the politics, socio-economic and gender inequality, racism, cultural tensions, alienation, vio-lence and other issues they face on a daily basis in their institutions and communities (Blackmore 1999). Addressing such issues requires substantive human qualities (e.g. judgement, character) and actions (e.g. leadership) that cannot be adequately apprehended or shaped solely in the context of formal sys-tems of performance management with their standardised indicators of administrative efficiency and effectiveness (Blackmore 1995; Hodgkinson 1991; 1996).

As a result, many educational leaders – and, especially those with a social con-science – increasingly find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place (Bates 2002; Blackmore and Sachs 2000; Greenfield 1993; Harris 2003; Tudiver 1999). On the one hand, they must concentrate on wresting resources from the larger political and economic systems of administration, while working assidu-ously within a formal structure of roles and accountabilities to meet performance targets. On the other, they have a duty to respond to and negotiate the diverse, contradictory and sometimes incommensurable interests and needs of members of their institutions and communities, while faithfully helping these members strive towards wisdom, social justice, autonomy and solidarity, values that arguably comprise the bedrock of public education in Western societies. Despite

its rational basis in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, the predominant policy stance towards educational administration in these societies can seem irrational from the standpoint of actual administrative and leadership contexts, values and practices. In this context, it is sometimes hard for educational leaders (and those who study their practices and plight) not to feel disoriented, disempowered or disillusioned.

The administrative paradox contemporary educational leaders appear to be facing is not new. Callahan identified it in his book *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (1962) in the mid-twentieth century. Even earlier, in what has become famously known as his 'rationalisation thesis', Max Weber suggested that this paradox may be an inherent condition of administrative life in advanced industrial societies. Weber (1968) observed that the more 'technical' and 'rational' (as opposed to 'spiritual' or 'metaphysical') the sources of authority, beliefs and knowledge became in modern, Western societies, and the more effective modern systems of administration correspondingly grew to be in efficiently managing the needs of large scale populations in those societies, the more 'disenchanted' their cultures tended to become. He noted that this ongoing pattern of development could result in social crises in which the populations of modern societies experienced profound meaninglessness, cultural fragmentation and anomie. He pointed out that the combination of highly effective and efficient structures of administration, lack of social cohesion and widespread anomie provided a fecund context for questionable forms of political and social (and even self-) domination to take root. And he suggested that those who were subject to domination under such conditions would likely have lost much of their capacity to imagine how things could be different, and how they could thereby creatively challenge the legitimacy of existing political and social (and psychological) orders.

Weber's (1968) analysis found its most poignant expression in his metaphor of advanced industrial societies as 'iron cages' in which the hegemonic grip of technical rationality leads to the functional systematisation (in large measure through bureaucratisation) of all social action, including the actions of those who are putatively responsible for steering modern organisations towards their social purposes. Here, technologically rational means displace substantive ends, and/or power and authority cease to be means to achieve substantive social goals, instead becoming ends in themselves.

Weber's thesis highlights the important moral and cultural dimensions of administration and leadership (Samier 2002). The preponderance of political, social and cultural issues in and around public education have led some scholars of educational administration and leadership to see their field as having a humanistic core, suggesting that administration and, in particular, leadership are more art than science (e.g. Greenfield and Ribbins 1993; Hodgkinson 1996; Samier 2005b). Some of those who have conceived administration and leadership as a creative, humanistic endeavour have concentrated on its moral and ethical aspects (e.g. Greenfield 1993; Hodgkinson 1991; Samier 2003; Sergiovanni 1992), while others have focused on its cultural elements (e.g. Sergiovanni 2000).

Only a small number of researchers have elaborated the art of educational administration and leadership in specifically aesthetic terms (see Duke 1986; Greenfield and Ribbins 1993; Harris 1996; Klein and Diket 1999; Meyer 2001a, 2001b; Samier 1997; Young, 1993).

This chapter explores aesthetic concepts from the critical theory tradition of the Institute for Social Research – commonly referred to as the Frankfurt School as it was founded at the University of Frankfurt in 1924 – suggesting how these theories offer part of a promising philosophical foundation for conceiving, researching, encouraging and practising humanistic forms of administration and leadership, particularly within the current Weberian context of public education. The analysis offered draws on the perspectives of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. Horkheimer and Adorno, who are no longer living, are part of the 'first generation' of the Frankfurt School; while Habermas, who continues to make a far-reaching contribution to the humanities and social sciences, represents the 'second generation', having been Adorno's research assistant and protégé in the 1950s and 1960s.

There is insufficient room to provide a detailed social and intellectual history of the Frankfurt School and its legacy, but a brief sketch is required to indicate why research produced within its tradition merits consideration here.[2] Upon his appointment as director of the Institute in 1930, Horkheimer defined its research agenda in humanistic terms as an attempt to develop social philosophies that shed light on 'human fate ... the fate of humans not as mere individuals, however, but as members of a community. It is thus above all concerned with phenomena that can only be understood in the context of human social life: with the state, law, economy, religion ... in short, with the entire material and intellectual culture of humanity' (Horkheimer 1993: 1). Such a research agenda required an explicitly inter-disciplinary approach, drawing on political economy, psychology and cultural studies to allow for a questioning of the connections between economic life, the psychical development of individuals, and changes in the realm of culture (Duvenage 2003).

For Horkheimer and Adorno, and, after them, Habermas, aesthetics finds its place in this approach through their emphasis on cultural studies. Their research agendas regarding the fate of humanity are not neutral ones, focusing primarily on a critique of positivism and scientism (see Habermas 1971; Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). Instead, their perspectives contain normative content from the outset (Cannon 2001). Reacting to and building on Marx and Engel's (1972) theory of historical materialism and Weber's (1968) rationalisation thesis, they seek in different ways to analyse the theoretical and empirical prospects for achieving socially just, non-violent and non-totalitarian societies in which

> reason and [the] rational organisation of society are expressed in terms of a reconciliation between the universal and the particular, where the particular ... is no longer sacrificed to the universal, so that the ideas of freedom, truth and justice are reconciled with the desire for happiness'.
>
> (Wellmer 1994: 45–6)

Their research methodologies consist predominantly of sustained critiques of ideologies, and social, cultural, political and economic philosophies, arrangements and practices. Their findings about the human prospect in advanced industrial societies have not been flattering: despite the enormous increase in secular forms of knowledge, modern reason has resulted in social regression instead of progress; and, despite the tremendous growth in the productive forces and wealth in modern society, profound social socio-economic divides persist.[3]

Of central importance to the overarching theme of this chapter, however, is Adorno's (1984) and Habermas's (1971, 1984, 1989a, 1997) assertion that the aesthetic dimension of human experience offers *the* source of catalytic potential for the emergence of (fully) enlightened and emancipated individuals and societies (a claim made less forcefully by Horkheimer). Their theories thus offer potential keys with which to unlock the Weberian 'iron cage' in which educational administration and leadership can become confined.

In the humanities and social sciences the critical social theories of these three thinkers have had a significant influence on how culture and art specifically can be critically produced and apprehended, and how the production, reception and criticism of art contributes to socially progressive forms of individual, cultural and even political transformation (Agger 1992). In the field of educational administration and leadership, a number of scholars have drawn on critical social theories derived from the work of Horkheimer and Adorno (e.g. Giroux 1994, 2004) and directly on Habermas's ideas (e.g. Bates 1989; Foster 1989; Milley 2002; Sergiovanni 2000) to address a host of issues associated with truth, social justice, and emancipation in education; however, significant attention has not yet been paid to the central role that aesthetics plays in those theories. As a result, the catalytic potential of aesthetic experience in fostering socially progressive transformations in and through educational administration and leadership arguably remains under-developed in theory, research, practice and instruction.

This chapter proceeds with an introduction to Horkheimer's and Adorno's aesthetic ideas, followed by a discussion of their potential contribution to the field of educational administration and leadership. Next, Habermas's aesthetic ideas are introduced in terms of how they react critically to and extend those of Horkheimer and Adorno. This is followed by a discussion of the potential contribution of those ideas and a brief conclusion.

Horkheimer's and Adorno's critical aesthetic ideas

At least two related sets of aesthetic ideas exist in the work of Horkheimer and Adorno that offer insights for the field of educational administration and leadership. The first concerns the tendency of advanced industrial societies to turn culture into an industry, thereby reducing (most) works of art to commodities and (much of) aesthetic experience to consumption. This regressive tendency signals the intrusion of 'technological rationality' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993: 4) into the cultural fabric of society, creating widespread negative social effects. The second set of ideas, which are largely those of Adorno rather than

Horkheimer, focus on the significance and nature of aesthetic experience with certain forms of autonomous – or, non-commodified – modern art. Here, aesthetic experience offers alternative ways of knowing and being that destabilise the hegemonic grip of technological rationality, offering an antidote to the negative social effects associated with the industrialisation of culture.

Horkheimer and Adorno wrote their famous work, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1993), near the end of the Second World War. Both Jews, they were living as refugees in the United States at the time, having fled Germany shortly before the war. Their opening lines read: 'The Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men [sic] from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993: 3). Their diagnosis is not limited to their nation of birth. Everywhere they look they see authoritarianism disguised as freedom, totalitarianism as democracy, technological rationality as reason, and ideology as truth.

In conceptualising this state of affairs, Horkheimer and Adorno borrow heavily from Weber (1968). They contend, 'The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy' (1993: 3). As secular forms of knowledge replaced religious superstition, as bourgeois economic relations displaced feudal ones, and as democracy dislodged the aristocracy, individuals were to learn the true meaning of freedom, humanity and their relation to nature. Instead, new forms of domination and oppression emerged: 'What men [sic] want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men ... that is the only aim' (1993: 4). At the root of this damaging stance is the treatment of others and nature as instrumentalities, as means to individual ends. They argue this stance relies on (and exemplifies) technological rationality because 'technology is the essence [of it]. It does not work by concepts or images ... but refers to method, the exploitation of others' work, and capital' (1993: 4).

The social problems associated with a widespread, single-minded reliance on technological rationality in society are numerous. Society becomes devoid of spirit, substantive values, emotion and authentic self-expression. As these represent the source of morality, ethics, culture, art and aesthetics, a society without them can be very ugly indeed. But Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) combine this Weberian prediction with a Marxist critique of capitalism,[4] to describe an even worse scenario. Under capitalism, everything, including culture, is subject to an economic calculus, transforming qualitative aspect of their being and world into abstract quantities (Geuss 1998). Utility becomes the predominant value that directs the deployment of technological rationality, and the exchange and consumption of commodities becomes the main object of social action, focusing individuals on the means of reproducing their lives (in an economic sense), and not on the substantive meanings potentially associated with living and guiding a life. The result is an oppressive, virtually totalitarian administration (and self-administration) of life (and the meaning of life).

For Horkheimer and Adorno, the transformation of most aspects of culture into industries (e.g. advertising, television, radio, film) represents a prime

example of the systematic commodification of meaning. While art had been bought and sold long before bourgeois society arrived on the scene, the difference now is that contemporary art 'deliberately admits it is [a commodity] ... and proudly takes its place among consumption goods' (1993: 156) targeted to specific groups in the mass market based on (manufactured) tastes and purchasing power. For the masses, 'their reduction to mere objects of the administered life, which pre-forms every sector of modern existence including language and perception, represents objective necessity, against which they believe there is nothing they can do' (1993: 38).

Horkheimer and Adorno conclude that 'Ruthlessly, despite itself, the Enlightenment has extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness' (1993: 4). Yet they also believe that the modern, secular reflexivity with respect to truth, justice and freedom (and the relationship between these universal ideals and individual, particular aesthetic conceptions of happiness and virtue) that was built into the Enlightenment project can (and should) be redeemed. The problem for them thus becomes whether and how the contemporary hegemony of linear means-to-ends thinking (i.e. technological rationality) that represses other, more reflexive ways of knowing, experiencing and imagining, can be disrupted. Adorno observed that certain works of modern art achieved a degree of autonomy from administered society by exhibiting a sort of 'uselessness', in a technologically rational sense, and an image of meaningfulness and freedom that society promises but does not provide (Geuss 1998). Adorno also argues, in dialectical fashion, that art will never be fully autonomous, and nor should it ever be, for if it were to achieve complete autonomy it would be unable to call critical attention to the evils of administered society (Hahn 1999). As a result, he decided to explore how aesthetic experiences associated with such art might harbour the disruptive potential he was seeking.[5]

In *Aesthetic Theory* (1984), and other writings (1983; 1992), Adorno defends autonomous modern art that manages to break through the crust of commodified culture. Examples of these include, in his view, the music of Schönberg and the writings of Proust, Kafka and Beckett (Adorno 1992; Duvenage 2003). Such works do not aim to change political attitudes, yet often they do so: 'Kafka's prose and Beckett's plays ... arouse the anxiety that existentialism only talks about ... Their implacability compels the change in attitude committed works only demand' (Adorno 1992: 90). For Adorno, politically committed art harbours an instrumental purpose (e.g., to change political attitudes), and therefore (re)opens a back door to dominative, technological rationality in its production and reception. He argues that the critical self-reflexivity of such art offers a 'truth quality' that disrupts administered subjectivity. Unlike traditional and mass forms of art, which explicitly offer harmony, reconciliation and closure, these works proffer dissonance, rupture, fragmentation and openness. They refuse to affirm administered society or to provide imaginary resolutions to its contradictions.

But how does this truth quality come about? Artists tear elements (e.g. content, materials, techniques) of existing (totalitarian) reality out of their context,

juxtaposing and critiquing them (Baur 1996). As a result, these elements become susceptible to new meanings both for the artist and audience, potentially giving rise to new intimations of reality (Edgar 1990). While there is an element of dominative technological rationality involved on the part of the artist in trying to shape and control their materials and content, 'the idea of construction has always implied the primacy of constructive methods over subjective imagination ... The unforeseen, then ... has a moment of objectivity' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993: 35). In such moments of objective truth, the antagonisms and contradictions in modern society are laid bare, rather than being masked by a false harmony, and can be grasped by the audience. This is particularly true when artists apply both an instinctive and self-consciously critical approach to their subject matter, materials, and formal techniques of construction in their works. Produced in such a manner, art becomes more than communication, more than an object to be 'read' by an audience in such as way as to have a specific social effect (Edgar 1990), as in morality plays, propaganda and advertising (Geuss 1998).

While autonomous modern artworks do not simply communicate something, they do have logic to them and synthesise their materials and content to create a kind of unity. For Adorno, the aesthetic rationality associated with this art is nothing like that associated with commodified art. Instead, the aesthetic experience of producing such autonomous art consists in 'rationality criticising itself without being able to overcome itself' (1984: 81). In their reception, such works offer to radicalise existing rationality to the point that it fails, provoking or intimating a state of being free from the dominative social forms embedded in existing rationality. This makes them the pre-eminent medium for stimulating new, non-reified forms of cognition (Wellmer 1994) through which the audience may find the world disclosed to them in novel and imaginative ways (Duvenage 2003). Furthermore, the radically reflexive, non-repressive manner in which particular elements of autonomous modern art are integrated into a unified work that manifests freedom prefigures for the audience the possibility of a dialogical reconciliation between free individuals in a liberated society. This too is part of the truth character of autonomous modern art: it represents 'an irrepressible push by spirit in the direction of what is beyond spirit's grasp' (Adorno 1984: 173).

The potential contribution of Horkheimer's and Adorno's aesthetic ideas to educational administration and leadership

Horkheimer's and Adorno's ideas about society, art and aesthetic experience are challenging to grasp. Their style of writing, particularly in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, mirrors their arguments and creates a similar aesthetic to the autonomous art admired by Adorno. They construct their work by tearing disparate elements of contemporary society from their contexts, contrasting them, subjecting them to a ruthless critique and recombining them. At times, they are lucid, giving the appearance of logic and reason; at others they give themselves over to impulses that take them in illusory directions. Their work at times exemplifies 'rationality criticising itself without being able to overcome itself'

(Wellmer 1994: 48). Wellmer observes that the line of argument Horkheimer and Adorno developed put them in the 'desperate position' of trying to defend an idea of reason which, strictly speaking, they could no longer defend in the medium of discursive thought and writing. Their aesthetic writing style is a reaction to this problem. In the context of this book their works signal their autonomy in another sense: distinctly 'anti-administration', they resist an immediate assignation of 'use-value' to the field of educational administration.

Given the scope of this chapter, two questions arise at this point: can Horkheimer and Adorno's ideas provide value to the field of educational administration and leadership? And, if so, in what ways? The first question points to the need to assess whether Horkheimer and Adorno's (1993) mid-twentieth century diagnosis of modern society resonates in the contemporary socio-cultural context of educational administration and leadership. The second question points to the need to elaborate more specifically how their ideas hold significance for the field, whether for theoretical research, empirical research, practices or instruction.

The Weberian context of administration in public educational institutions discussed at the outset of this chapter suggests that Horkheimer and Adorno's diagnosis of advanced industrial society has some staying power. A macro perspective on contemporary advanced industrial societies bolsters this view. For example, Janice Gross Stein (2001) contends that a cult of efficiency has taken hold in public administration in Canada. John Ralston Saul (1997) observes that advanced industrial societies have become unconscious civilisations, having relinquished the capacity for individual thought and action to the ideologies that attend economic globalisation. Contributors in Bruneau and Turk (2004) describe how corporate interests have extended their reach deep into cultural institutions, controlling a good deal of what circulates as knowledge in journalistic media and influencing what can be produced as knowledge in academic settings. Ursula Franklin (1999) discusses how the prescriptive deployment of modern technologies interferes with their potential contribution to the well-being of global society. Amartya Sen (1999) shows how large social and economic divides currently exist on a global scale, despite large increases in the world's productive forces and wealth since the era in which Horkheimer and Adorno were writing. Finally, Henry Giroux (2004) observes that the modern, enlightened ideals of truth, justice and freedom are being (re)cast in staunchly ideological and militaristic terms in light of geopolitical concerns.

Following Adorno, certain forms of art and aesthetic experience can *lead* us past the 'dominant' forms of economic and administrative rationality that are often manifest in contemporary society and educational settings. In this sense, art and aesthetic experience can play an important role in educational leadership. Horkheimer and Adorno's work encourages us to think about leaders as artists, producing aesthetic spaces, dramas and texts that, ultimately, demonstrate the key qualities of high modern art that he admires: artistic commitment; refusal to acquiesce to dominative forms of rationality; clear autonomy from the

economic–administrative system; radical reflexivity and instinct. These are the qualities contemporary educational leaders would need to develop in order to create aesthetic experiences that help them and their audiences transcend iron cages of administration.

Their work also encourages us to consider the status and significance of popular culture and high art in the theories, practices, research and instruction in educational administration and leadership. Following their analysis, popular culture in the field of educational administration would be characterised by utilitarian, functionalist, commercial values that could have the effect of impoverishing the field if they assume too prominent a place. In contrast, high art could contribute substantially to the field; however, by its very nature high art is difficult to produce and only a limited number of masterpieces should be expected. Meanwhile, those aspiring to produce educational leadership as something resembling high art would have to struggle with the need to demonstrate some kind of value, whether substantive or utilitarian. This is where the instructional dimension of the field comes in. Academic preparation programmes represent relatively safe spaces in which aspiring educational leaders and researchers could be encouraged to practise their cultural work as a form of high art, at least part of the time. This would involve engagement with high forms of art, including the art of leadership, either as texts or as empirical cases. Such a programme would be challenging to implement. Certainly, it might be a tough sell. But in an era when leadership is a hot commodity that, precisely, is the point.

Habermas's critical aesthetic ideas

Habermas is well-recognised as a sophisticated contemporary analyst of social and cultural modernity, and as a highly self-reflexive defender of the ideals of reason, truth, justice and freedom that help to sustain advanced industrial societies in the West (Bernstein 1994). Much of his work is an attempt to 'vindicate the rational potential of modernity, to redeem its promise of emancipation and enlightenment, however qualified this may be in the face of the pathologies of the modern age' (Passerin d'Entreves 1997: 1).

In terms of aesthetics, Habermas's work is a critical reaction to, and extension of, the ideas of Horkheimer and Adorno (Duvenage 2003; Habermas 1997) and, by direct association, Weber (Habermas 1984). Similar to them, he (1989a) argues that systems of economic and state administration in advanced industrial societies tend to colonise and thereby impoverish cultural processes (e.g. education and its administration), cultural institutions (e.g. schools, colleges and universities) and culture itself. And he observes that certain forms of aesthetic experience enrich culture, offering important sites of resistance to, and potential freedom from the processes of colonisation (1997). To arrive at a coherent understanding of Habermas's key aesthetic concepts, it is necessary to review the ways in which they represent a critical reaction to the work of Horkheimer and Adorno and how they fit within his overarching theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984; 1989a).

According to Wellmer (1994), Habermas saw the work of Horkheimer and Adorno relying on a philosophy of consciousness that emphasises the subject-centred conception of reason that has predominated in Western philosophy since Descartes. At the centre of this philosophy is an historical subject who has learned to objectify natural and social phenomena, not only to better understand them but also to predict, control, and exploit them. Such a philosophy encourages a search for truth *and* domination. It creates a divide between self (or subject) and other (or object) that militates against mutual understanding, reciprocity and solidarity, thereby undermining preconditions for the realisation of reason, justice and freedom in society. As such, it has been at the root of a range of troubling social, cultural and political developments, not the least of which is the continuing reliance on power, hierarchy, domination and subordination as the means by which to structure the social relations and institutions of advanced industrial societies.

In response, Habermas (1984, 1987a, 1989a) re-elaborates the critical tradition of the Frankfurt School in terms of a philosophy of communication that emphasises the capacity of humans to reach mutual understandings through their symbolic (chiefly linguistic) interactions. His 'theory of communicative action' presents an *intersubjective* and differentiated perspective of rationality and social action, situated within a dialogical model of advanced industrial society.

Habermas (1984) argues that there are two distinct types of socio-linguistic interaction: communicative and strategic. Communicative action exists when people interact in consensual ways to co-ordinate their activities. Strategic action exists when actors calculate their interactions to achieve individual or social objectives. The primary orientation of communicative action is to foster mutual understanding. The primary purpose of strategic action is to pursue and attain goals. These types of action exist in a dialogical relationship, and both are required to maintain and reproduce society. But communicative action is the ideal case of 'normal' human communication: 'Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus' (Habermas 1984: 396). He claims: 'If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication – and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement – then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality inherent in communicative action' (1984: 397). In contrast, strategic forms and uses of language are derived from this fundamental purpose. Habermas (1990) cites lying as a concrete example of how strategic action is derived from the communicative foundation of human communication. It would not be possible for one person to lie if the other person did not presuppose the interaction was an attempt to establish a genuine mutual understanding (i.e. a truth).

Habermas (1989a) also conceives society dialogically, as both a socio-cultural lifeworld and an economic–administrative system. The lifeworld and system each have a dual character: on one hand, they represent action orientations, or perspectives, that correspond with communicative and strategic forms of social action; on the other, they designate actual physical domains and infrastructures

of social life in advanced industrial societies. He constructs this model on the distinctions between communicative and strategic action. In the lifeworld, individuals communicatively co-ordinate their private and public activities with others. The lifeworld represents the socio-cultural relations, spaces and institutions (e.g. schools, colleges and universities) in which people are socialised, enculturated and integrated into society. In the system, individuals engage in strategic actions aimed at implementing the agreements to which they consent in the lifeworld. The system represents the economic and administrative relations, spaces and organisations through which people provide for the material sustenance of their lifeworlds.

The lifeworld-system model suggests that communicative interactions in the lifeworld give rise to personal and civic ends (e.g. personal and cultural values, normative expectations), while the system exists to provide effective means for achieving those ends.[6] Where a genuine mutual understanding exists in the lifeworld, social actors have implicitly reached a background consensus with respect to at least three important validity claims – truth, rightness and authenticity – which they could justify if requested (Habermas 1984). In the system, where interactions are oriented towards achieving objectives and goals, success and effectiveness are important validity claims that justify action. Importantly, Habermas views authenticity as an aesthetic validity claim, a point that is discussed further below.

In the hurly-burly of organisational life, administrative interactions often aim to direct thoughts and behaviours. Habermas does not suggest that such strategic actions are unnecessary or inferior to communicative action. What concerns him, however, is when the 'instrumental' (1984: 117) rationality that orients strategic action is overextended and misapplied in settings that properly require the use of the 'substantive' (1997: 45) rationality inherent in communicative action. When this happens, communication becomes 'systematically distorted'; potentially generating 'pathologies' (1984: 117) in the lifeworld that manifest themselves in such things as psychological disturbances, cultural impoverishment, and decreased social cohesion. As examples, Habermas (1970; 1987b) discusses how political and vocational uses of public universities can systematically distort and impoverish learning processes in higher education.

Systematically distorted communication is an unconscious form of deception (Habermas, 1984). The false understandings at the root of distorted communication stem from the repression of conflict, including contradictions at the level of validity claims. Situations of systematically distorted communication are difficult to reconstitute into mutual understandings as they involve both the intra- and interpersonal levels of communication.

Habermas (1984: 117) argues that social actors can undo systematic distortions in communication by entering into 'discourse', a special mode of communicative action whereby participants (attempt to) make explicit and debate the validity claims which have formed the implicit or repressed backdrop to their interaction. Discourse requires some very special conditions to work. He (1989a) frames these in the concept of the 'ideal speech situation'. To participate

in discourse, social actors presuppose that genuine consensus regarding the truth, rightness, and/or authenticity of their claims can be achieved through the rational force of the better argument. This means they must mutually hold in abeyance all other forms of force, such as role authority, coercion or manipulation. Clearly such a situation is nearly impossible to achieve in reality.[7] Rather, it is an 'ideal type', analytically derived from observable tendencies in empirical reality, that provides a means by which to identify the undue influence of power (other than the power of ideas and their justification) in communicative contexts. For Habermas (1987b), educational institutions are (or ought to be) primary sites for discourse. Their curricular and administrative practices (should) provide for ideal speech when required.

Habermas (1984) identifies the validity claim of authenticity with acts of self-expression in communicative contexts. Authentic self-expressions are required if people are to be able to build mutual understanding. Without confidence that their interactions are sincere or truthful social actors cannot be assured they have reached a genuine understanding. For Habermas expressive acts are *aesthetic* phenomena. All communicative acts therefore contain an important 'aesthetic-expressive' form of reason (1984: 329) that contributes to the formation of identities (or socialisation), cultural values, tastes and evaluative judgements (or enculturation), and participation in the public sphere (or social integration). The twin concepts of strategic action and systematic distortion show how self-understandings and expressions may not always be truthful or authentic. Overt and repressed conflicts can impede this. However, the twin concepts of discourse and ideal speech show how authenticity can be regained. With power held at bay and with self-expression explicitly valued in discourse social actors can be *creative* in communicating their views, needs and interests. In so doing, they may generate new understandings of self and others, and provide new interpretations of personal and social needs.

It is important to educational administrators and leaders that Habermas conceives aesthetic–expressive acts to be intersubjective learning processes. On Ingram's (1991: 91, 96) reading, Habermas suggests aesthetic–expressive learning processes have two potential modes. Through 'aesthetic critique' they can lead to 'profane illumination'. Through 'aesthetic experience' they can result in 'poetic illumination'. The latter consists of artistic expressions (e.g. the use of poetic language) with discourse creating metaphorical connections between any number of potential validity claims and the participants' lifeworld experiences as a whole. The former consists of specific expressions of taste and judgement, with discourse emphasising the standards of value (i.e. aesthetic validity claims, including authenticity) that underpin these expressions. Through poetic illumination, participants in discourse arrive at intuitive, compelling understandings of their situations. This can sometimes lead to the world being 'disclosed' in entirely new ways, providing the fuel for personal, social or political transformations. When art is

> … related to problems of life or used in an exploratory fashion to illuminate a life-historical situation … aesthetic experience not only revitalises those

need interpretations in light of which we perceive our world, but also influences our cognitive interpretations and our normative expectations, and thus alters the way in which these moments *refer back and forth* to one another.

<div align="right">(Habermas 1997: 51)</div>

Through profane illumination participants arrive at a more self-reflexive understanding of the cultural standards of value that underpin their judgements. This can make them more competent – that is, communicatively rational – in working through social or organisational problems that concern questions of values.

The potential contribution of Habermas's aesthetic ideas to educational administration and leadership

Habermas' aesthetic ideas are arguably more immediately applicable to the field of educational administration and leadership than those of Horkheimer and Adorno because his social philosophy is also a learning theory (Outhwaite 1994; Young 1990). His model of the system and lifeworld encourages us to see that educational administration is a fine balancing act between substantive cultural work and instrumental action. Leadership is constituted in the dialogical learning processes that take place as administrators navigate within these poles of social action. As processes of socialisation, enculturation and social integration are at the heart of education, Habermas's ideas prompt us to be concerned about the potential overextension of instrumental rationality into the lifeworld of schools, colleges and universities and the 'pathological' effects that can result for individuals, institutions and communities. His ideas also cause us to consider how, under the appropriate discursive conditions, aesthetic–expressive learning processes, both poetic and profane, can ward off these unwarranted intrusions of instrumental reason and the problems they result in. Moreover, his ideas show how aesthetic–expressive discourse builds capacity for making justifiable evaluative judgements and dealing rationally with organisational and educational questions of value, both of which are at the heart of educational administration and leadership (Greenfield 1993; Hodgkinson 1991; 1996).

In terms of their potential contribution to theory and research in educational administration and leadership, Habermas's reasoning shows that it is equally justified to focus on aesthetic aspects of administration as it is, for instance, on the science of administration or leadership effectiveness. The aesthetic validity claim of authenticity is foundational to a full understanding of the socio-cultural role of administration and leadership. His ideas thus suggest that theorists and researchers could benefit from a decentred view of their field in order to see that, from a socio-cultural perspective, scientific, moral and aesthetic epistemologies and standards of value all have a contribution to make. After all, 'In the communicative praxis of everyday [administrative] life, cognitive interpretations, moral expectations, expressions and evaluations must interpenetrate each other' (Habermas 1997: 49). Theorists and researchers could learn from Habermas that

the cultural work in which they are engaged is subject to impoverishment not just by influences from the 'system' but also from the internal dynamics within and between their specialised communities. They must continually find ways to reflect on the standards of value within their specialities, and to dialogically interconnect their knowledge with standards in other specialities, if their work is to have meaning and relevance to practitioners and the general public.

In terms of the teaching of educational administration and leadership, Habermas's ideas suggest that a balanced approach is required with respect to sociocultural and instrumental dimensions of the field. In striking such a balance, however, it may be necessary to do the critical work of rooting out systematic distortions in the curriculum and in the classroom. This critical work would involve dialogical instructional practices that open up opportunities for participants to explore the full range of rationality–complexes associated with administration and leadership, including the aesthetic–expressive. The latter would involve not just authentic self-expression, but also other aesthetic experiences (e.g. poetry) and aesthetic criticism. Emphasis would be placed on continually querying the full range of validity claims that underpin theory, research, teaching and practice, in order to increase self-reflexivity about reason, truth, justice and freedom in contemporary educational settings. Following Habermas, these ideals are not simply at the heart of education, they are preconditions for human understanding.

Conclusion

If we return to the Weberian paradox of educational administration and leadership with which this chapter began, we can see that, at a very general level, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas offer similar analyses of the pathological tendencies that haunt putatively enlightened, modern societies in the West. In each case, they see dominant forms of economic–administrative rationality as being a chief cause and symptom and of these tendencies. And they view certain forms of art and aesthetic experience as sites of resistance to dominative rationality and catalysts for transcending it.

There are, however, some key differences in their theories. Horkheimer and Adorno rely on a philosophy of consciousness, which emphasises a monological perspective on the production of art and its aesthetic reception. In contrast, Habermas develops his aesthetic ideas in the context of a philosophy of communication which foregrounds a dialogical perspective on aesthetic experience. Horkheimer and Adorno offer a one-sided view of society in which technological rationality is virtually all-encompassing. Habermas offers a differentiated view of modern reason that includes cognitive, moral, aesthetic and instrumental forms of rationality, and situates this perspective within a dialogical model of society. This provides him with greater theoretical and analytical flexibility than Horkheimer and Adorno. But it also makes his theory less radical.

From these differences it would appear that the aesthetic ideas of Horkheimer and Adorno fit best in educational contexts where radical aesthetic interventions

are required to undo a truly hegemonic grip of dominative rationality in thought and action. In contrast, those of Habermas serve as an important reminder of the foundational role that of aesthetic–expressive rationality (ought to) play in the social actions of educational administrators and leaders. If education in enlightened societies is at least in part about freedom, these ideas (should) spring to life with every (expressive) interaction.

Notes

1 In Canadian universities some departments of educational administration have instituted curricular streams that treat leadership studies as a distinct sub-field (e.g. University of British Columbia, Memorial University of Newfoundland, University of Calgary), while others have created stand-alone departments of leadership studies (e.g. University of Victoria, University of Toronto).
2 For a description of the history of the Frankfurt School, see Agger (1992) and Duvenage (2003).
3 The work of Horkheimer and Adorno, and less so Habermas, is often seen as paradoxical in that it harbours a utopian ideal which is expressed through an unflinching, critical negativity (Cannon 2001).
4 Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) did not limit their criticism to capitalist societies. They also decried the overtly repressive, totalitarian administration apparent in communist societies.
5 Horkheimer went on to explore how religion and mysticism possibly harboured redemption.
6 See Sergiovanni (2000) and Milley (2004) for theoretical and empirical insights, in the context of educational administration, on the relationship between ends and means in Habermas.
7 Habermas (1989b) cites as an empirical of example the emergence of an expanded 'public sphere' in the modernising societies of nineteenth century Europe – an observation that very much informs his conception of the importance of the public sphere in the lifeworld.

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Part II

Aesthetic sources for administration and leadership

7   Aesthetic leadership

Leaders as architects

Sheri Klein and Read Diket

> The third sense of consciousness bridges perception and action, the events we perceive and the ones we bring about.
>
> (Zeman 2002: 21)

The architecture of leadership, focused on the designing of transformative and artful spaces within educational contexts, extends the idea of form to that of meaningful and active surroundings. Meaningful surroundings invite participation, and are created through a consciousness that values participation.

We envision leaders as architects in the construction of spaces who can promote more humane, thoughtful, and aesthetic leading. We explore the transformative leadership paradigm as a model to promote humane, thoughtful, and aesthetically inviting workspaces. Architectural metaphors for leadership include the creation of doorways, paths and portals, the idea of hand building shelters, and glass architecture. We draw inferences from contemporary architecture found in the public spaces of art museums, and we consider the visions of utopian communities for their relevance to imagining educational contexts and environments that promote hope and possibility. We look to aesthetic and leadership theories to inform architectural metaphors for leadership in education.

In need of hope and beauty

A review of professors' office spaces by Smith-Shank (2005) reveals a complex semiotic reading of higher educational environments. Art educators' offices initially were sterile, often without windows, colourless – many were just plain boxes. Conscious efforts made the difference in these settings; professors brought in artwork and visual collections to enhance their office spaces. Some professors used their doorways and spaces to make personal and political statements. We observe similar personalisation of work space across the spectrum in public school classrooms and hallways, in secretarial offices, and in worker cubbyholes. These are attempts by workers to define themselves and individualise their working spaces. Universities and public schools were built according to the factory model, not designed to address the psychological needs of inhabitants. We are not surprised to see that professors and teachers adorn their work spaces, and that

children personalise their lockers. We have a basic human need to see beauty in our everyday environment and to experience harmony in daily life. Educators, health workers, and psychologists are all saying the same thing – having beauty and aesthetically pleasing forms in our daily lives fosters good mental health and positive attitudes – that aesthetics do matter. The way in which physical and organisational spaces are designed and personalised has an impact on our work life, individual performance, and ultimately, our mental health.

Leadership models

In 'Creating artful leadership' (Klein and Diket 1999), we explored the relationships between transformational leadership practices and artistic concepts. We discussed the work of DePree (1989) and others (Fishbaugh 1997; Henderson and Hawthorne 2000) who believe that leadership begins with heart-felt beliefs, and not with immediate tasks, or shallow mission or goal statements dissociated with actual practices. We also discussed how transformational leadership could bring about an aesthetic infusion in the work environment that Sergiovanni (1996) and others believe is necessary. Through a fusion of art and leadership concepts we were hopeful that leadership would be viewed as a creative process more likened to art, and that this ideal could lead to the creation of spaces (physical, visual, psychological, interpersonal, and cyber) that are viable for teaching, learning, and leading. We discussed artful spaces, such as museums, as metaphors for leading. Viewing leadership as creative suggests a powerful avenue for change that can connect, inspire, transform and even heal individuals and their organisations. We suggested that leadership is not a technocratic process suitable for keeping participants in line, managed, and well behaved, but rather an artful and aesthetic process that unleashes human potential in ways that can mutually benefit individuals and groups. Our definition of a leader was therefore somewhere between artist and architect, as change agents, envisioning on paper and constructing spaces that can attend to human needs.

Traditional models of leadership support a top-down, hierarchical model that can be counterproductive, resulting in participant/employee/learner disengagement, passive/aggressive behaviour, and failed productivity. Transformative models of leadership, in contrast, value the relationships fostered among participants, recognising the spiritual and emotional needs of those involved as they collaborate, dialogue, and decide as interactive planners and implementers (Miller 1993). Leaders in transformative models are expected to be change-oriented (King *et al.* 1992), and we suggest that leaders should be change- and future-oriented, while at the same time, rooted in the present. Transformative leaders must also be cognisant of past models so that they can counter and revision dysfunctional patterns of interaction within their organisations.

Post-modern theory, or institutional theory, implies that art must be understood in the context in which it is created, produced, and exhibited (Best and Kellner 1991). With respect to educational institutions, participants and leaders must understand the particulars of the contexts, architectures, and cultures in

which they work. Models for leading and innovation towards change must be constructed keeping local culture(s) in mind. Transformational leadership requires leaders and participants to pay greater attention to the nuances of their spaces, to the details of communication, to sectors where improvements are needed, and to where beauty might be infused.

There are two kinds of leaders: appointed and assumed. Appointed leaders usually manage resources, people, and maintain order. Other leaders arise out of circumstance, usually without being officially sanctioned as a leader; they often see the potentials of challenge, the necessity for positive action, and the need for structural change. These individuals are assumed leaders and can be like architects, envisioning contexts as transformational opportunities and actively designing for change. Changing and creating spaces for leading may, in the interim or short term, result in confusion and disharmony for participants. There may be leadership struggles as well as differences in opinion about where organisations should be headed. After all, leading is about change.

Building an environment for change is a political act because it involves changing participants' beliefs and paradigms that do not dissolve easily, if at all. Leaders, like architects, deal with the politics of space and users. Building support for change can, however, be artful. Howard Gardner, in *Changing Minds*, discusses how artists change minds:

> Creators in the arts – be they in dance, music, literature, cinema, or fine arts of painting and sculpture – change minds primarily by introducing new ideas, skills, and practices. They rarely wield the theories, ideas and concepts that scientists and thinkers employ, or the stories that leaders of nations or more homogenous groups use to create large-scale shifts in thinking. Artists make use of diverse forms of representation and symbolic systems ...
>
> (2004: 121)

The definition of artist today can be broadened to include creative workers who engage the public with their ideas as well as their products. Architects as creative workers visualise working and living spaces as functional, appealing, and uplifting, while challenging traditional notions of space, time, and materials. Leaders as architects conceptualise the working space as a public space where participants can connect with a greater purpose.

Leaders/architects as change agents

The creators of artistic form Gardner discusses in *Changing Minds* – whether they are painters, sculptors, or architects – communicate through the symbolic systems of their discipline: sketches, floor plans, drafts, drawings, etc. Leaders and architects as innovators, or change agents, compel new structures into the lived worlds of people. Their structures physically and psychologically alter the ways that people eventually interact with each other and the world. One such innovator is the architect, I.M. Pei, who designed the most recent addition at the Louvre, Paris.

Read at The Louvre

The Louvre, a former palace of French kings and a museum for the last 200 years, underwent a transformation of spirit with architect I. M. Pei's grand redesign. Pei worked within the foundations and walls of an existing structure that spans some 40 hectares in the heart of Paris. In 1987, when I visited the Louvre with my family, we entered a street side, encountering the grand staircase and *Winged Victory* before entering the splendour of the Grand Gallery. We photographed from an interior window the glass pyramids emerging from the muddy soil of the construction area in the interior courtyard. At that time, visitors did not know much about the plan for the Grand Louvre Project, particularly, the manner in which it would dramatically change the way visitors to the Louvre experienced exhibition spaces and public passages. The project was intended to double the size of exhibition spaces, to increase technical and administrative work areas, and provide extensive service areas for museum patrons.

Little did I know that my slides of the traditional passages and small gallery interludes would be designed away in the renovation. Ten years later, I was back in the much-transformed Louvre. The entry experience was vastly different this time, my impressions described in the article, 'Postmodern museum space' (Diket 1998; for an additional commentary on the logic of the museums industry of this period, see Krauss 1993). On this trip, I was looking for specific objects and intent on photographing the new exhibition spaces containing those objects. Paris was a final destination in my European journey that summer. Already, I was aware of a dissonance and sameness in reworked gallery spaces that I encountered across Europe and America. I noted then that the viewer in today's museums faced the art and its physical environment unaided by grand narrative, putting the patron in self-conscious juxtaposition with the historical objects on display. I noted that museum visitors were keenly aware of others in the rooms. Because the new gallery spaces were so open and spare, rooms bounded the art on view less thematically or chronologically. I was particularly struck by the Egyptian gallery created in the medieval bowels and foundation of the Louvre. The juxtaposition made me link histories together. I sought other ways to understand the impressions of my visit, particularly through the Critical Common-Sensism of Charles Pierce. I wrote:

> Common-Sensism includes discernment of consciousness, inventive originality, generalizing capabilities, subtlety, critical integrity and factual basis, systematic procedures, energy, diligence, persistence, and devotion to philosophic truth ... Peirce's phenomenological driven act requires an isolation of arbitrary and individualistic components of thought, leading to systematized discernment of communal experience.
>
> (Diket 1998: 47)

To my mind, the business of finding meaning had been given over to the viewer. Clearly the didactic, teaching museum was gone; my own response was to try

harder, to experience more consciously and to map meaning onto observation. There were exceptions to the sameness. I found exterior entrances and entryway sculptures highly readable, with unique statements for each museum.

It might be said that the Grand Louvre was redesigned for two types of viewers, the connoisseur and the occasional visitor. If serious patrons experienced some loss of continuity in the expansive exhibition spaces of the Louvre, then the recreational visitor must have felt dissonance as well. Amid the competing wings, each wooing attention in the new Louvre, one found familiar commercial establishments – shops, food courts, and museum vendors. Some visitors found it easier to retreat into familiar consumerism than to grapple with the abstract meaningfulness of so much art. Looking back on the experience, I find distinct parallels to the dilemma present in organisational spaces today, and to the ways in which individuals try to make sense of it all:

> To see beyond the individual's perspective is to engage with the world from a participating consciousness rather than an observing one. The model of distanced, objective knowing, removed from moral and social responsibility, has been the animating motif of both science and art in the modern world. As a way of thinking, it is now proving to be something of an evolutionary dead end.
>
> (Gablik 1993: 307)

Today, I can see more of what I. M. Pei did with his architecture. He opened history up for the post-modern viewer, guiding viewers through culture using portals, passages, and pathways filled with light and predicated on their own choosing. His architecture provides safe passage through history for the museum's visitors, without the imposition of distinct meanings. The post-modernist Louvre embraces multivocity and pluralism, and encourages 'a direct and self-conscious openness to and engagement with history' (Magnus 1995: 635). Leaders can take lessons from Pei's design – to open history and to welcome multiple meanings is an initial step. To move awareness to consciousness requires human exchanges dedicated to responsible acts. This is where the Louvre's design falls short as a complete metaphor for transformational leadership. Leaders must build and sustain designs for organisations with an eye toward meaningful action by the familiars of those architectures. In addition, there must be a sense of connection to what lies beyond the walls.

Sheri at The Museum of Cultural Anthropology, Vancouver

Upon entering the glass-walled exhibit hall at the Museum of Cultural Anthropology at the University of British Columbia campus in Vancouver, I was struck with the power of the 15- to 20-foot Haida totems both inside and outside the museum. The glass wall permitted a rather seamless way to envision the natural state for these totems and their place in the landscape. With the mountains in the distance, blue skies, and the monumental, carved totems, I felt

the presence of a huge mystery. Trying to imagine what the space might have been like without a glass wall, without connection between interior and exterior worlds, it would have felt a bit stifling. The architect's decision to respond to the landscape by letting it in the museum space enables viewers to see the totems in the context of the environment where they would naturally reside. It also allows viewers to dream out into a space so vast, beautiful and mysterious that the First Nations' people understood so well. If this space could be a metaphor for leading, I would say it was so because it allows for dreaming the dream, and finding the spiritual in the everyday lived world; that leading individuals must embrace the spirit of participants, and the organisation. The architect's use of the glass wall to both extend and frame the space can be a metaphor for leadership. Leaders, too, can create transparent dividers that do not block out views and positions of participants, but enable the extension of participants' perspectives, and allow for spaces for dreaming and envisioning.

Working to lead, leading to work

If leaders are to be less like managers, and more like visionaries of change who create portals and paths, then expecting and working through resistance to change must be a consideration in leading. How leaders, participants, and critics deal with change is an important consideration in the field. As Gardner challenges, and rightly so, 'one should always remain open to changing one's mind' (2004: 127). Gardner (2004) proposes three ways in which an artistic master, or in our case, an innovative leader, may influence others: (1) expanding the notion of what is possible with media and by educating the audience to appreciate new forms; (2) employing new themes that aid in the exploration of previous unknowns, especially by deviating from conventional treatments; and, (3) embodying the spirit of our times. Leaders as architects can alter spaces and beliefs about the way people view themselves, others, and society. Gardner suggests that architects (recognised in their own time) are those who can break through resistance to change while somehow neutralising resistance from participants or audiences.

Leaders must work to understand the emotional and psychological dynamics of those involved in an endeavour. For example, are participants swayed by logic, or emotion? How much conflict is acceptable? Leaders must also gauge the barometer of external conditions as these also enable changes, force detours, and necessitate adjustments.

Architecture as a metaphor for leading

Using the process of architecture, we suggest that leading can be likened to thinking about spaces-in-progress, groundbreaking, withholding judgements, extending conversations, and building hopeful spaces. The leader who has 'mastered' his or her craft, reflected on his/her beliefs, and conveyed a vision and a view of possibilities yet unrealised may be called an architect of hope.

Thinking spaces-in-progress

Architects frequently visit the site during the construction process, talking with builders, suppliers, and participants. This is a flexible and malleable time in which modification can still be feasible, even desirable. Views (interior and exterior) should be examined carefully as to functionality and aesthetics. This same idea is applicable to organisational spaces. The leader must continually communicate design changes and building progress with all participants. How will these work in daily use? Are the paths easily negotiated for those who must move about? Are support facilities too distant from participants? Many of the questions have to do with the aesthetic – the structural, or the yet unnamed. Leaders must be able to 'feel' the spaces and 'get in the shoes and heads' of the users. They must exercise flexibility and practicality, always going back to the mission and spirit of the project. Organisational building requires more than one head, and is sustained by many hands and hearts. Leadership is a process that begins with thinking about spaces as works-in-progress.

Beyond the vision: groundbreaking

First, the landscape (and the mind) must be opened sufficiently to enable a groundbreaking. Leaders must consider the particularities of a site, anticipate the acquisition of materials and funds needed for building, and think through future stresses on what is to be built. On a conceptual level, leaders may be termed 'groundbreakers' in terms of their innovations within an organisation. Leaders can engage in groundbreaking theory and fail in their articulation to others. Leadership has no positive effect if designs are superficial or ill-conceived, or if the leader is not careful, caring, and practical. Transformative leaders must be grounded in theory to be able to actualise their vision. Some qualities that we see artful leaders embodying can be nurtured though what Gardner calls, 'the seven layers of mind change' (2004: 140-2). The seven layers include: telling stories and using narrative, working with data and quantitative information, employing logic, asking the big life questions, capturing examples in art to illustrate points, building hands-on, and engaging others in projects where they can see the result for themselves.

Withholding judgements and extending conversations

Architects need time to review initial surveys and external information relative to a building site. This can be accomplished in the form of 'what if' sketches, like drawings on a napkin of potential ideas and inspirations. Artful leadership is achieved from seeking good council and making liberal use of discussion to find out where others' ideas may differ. Discourse serves several purposes: it is educative in nature and a means for aligning participants' ideas and allegiance to the whole enterprise.

   Transformative leaders must exert the ability to withhold premature judgement of ideas and participants, while extending conversations. They have to care

for others, they must implore the ethical, be imaginative and hopeful while framing and reframing important questions.

Maintaining professional standards

Some leaders lose their connection to ethical practice as their power grows. Leaders, as architects of change, should not lose their sense of responsibility to others that can muddle the focus of a project. Leadership is determined in large part by the way in which organisational participants interact, are treated, respected, and valued. Regardless of the mission and goal statement, if leaders engage in conduct that dismisses the written statements and input of colleagues, participants will lose respect for their leadership and become disillusioned and unmotivated towards the enterprise. Reflection is intrinsic to the work of artists, designers, and architects, and creative people who seek to change situations. Reflection by leaders must include a continuous review of ethical matters and dilemmas.

As the project assumes a physical form, on paper or in space, the leader must resolve those ideas found to be less desirable to others in the group. Foundations are built by consensus, and transformational leaders must establish structural integrity to support the superstructure and to weather external conditions.

Building for change is slow, and that is a root cause for frustration among participants, especially in educational contexts. Many stakeholders would prefer to continue the status quo because it is familiar; others value collaboration, innovation and new possibilities. While it might be easier to tear down the old and build new, the old foundation remains. Often, as shown in antiquity, materials are simply recycled into 'new' buildings. It is the constant reiteration of foundation structures that ensures the strength of the edifice under construction. This approach can be followed in the great cathedral designs in Europe and elsewhere where building rises from the soul.

Building hopeful spaces

Maintaining professionalism and high standards is an expectation for both leaders and architects who are responsible for an environment. The idea of building with hope is an old one, again dating back to the ancients. Many great ancient structures continue to inspire us today and these help us build hopeful spaces today. We can also look to the history and tradition of hand-built architecture as a grassroots form of building that may have implications for 'grassroots leading'. A discussion of creating spaces of hope and possibility would not be complete without paying homage to utopian architects, communities, and structures created on a premise of hope.

In *Home Work: Handbuilt Shelter*, Kahn describes how people all over the world have responded to the need for shelter, that is 'more than a roof overhead' (2004: v). He documents hundreds of examples of homes made by everyday people. These include teepees, tree houses, yurts, barns, houses on rocks, on boats, in

trucks, with lighthouses, made from driftwood, stones, tin, and everything in between. What characterises these unique, one-of-a-kind houses are the following: each was built with love, care, and commitment.

Kahn writes that his criteria for documenting hand-built structures included the following: 'showed craftsmanship, was practical, simple, useful, and economical, used resources effectively, was "tuned" into the landscape, was aesthetically pleasing and radiated good "vibes," showed ingenuity in design and execution, and/or was wildly creative' (2004: iii). Hand-built structures are the most accessible analogy for educational contexts. One of the key elements found in such structures is evidence of creativity and imagination. These elements appear sorely lacking in leadership and in education today.

Lessons drawn from the grey cloth

We need leader–architects now more than ever who embody creativity and imagination and who are able to foster and value it in others. *The Gray Cloth* by Paul Scheerbart (1915 [1863]) is a novel on glass architecture set in the mid twentieth century. The central character, Edgar Krug, architect, travels the globe constructing coloured-glass buildings. The irony is that his wife wears all grey clothing with the addition of ten per cent white. Stuart writes: 'The ten percent formula alludes to the mathematical efficiency associated with functional architecture' (1915: xxxv). This demand by Mr Krug for his wife to wear grey with ten per cent white brings him fame and fascination. This contrast may serve as a metaphor for leaders as architects; that leaders as architects need to be both functional/practical as well as imaginative/spiritual. Leaders as architects support an aesthetic and holistic way of viewing leadership.

Scheerbart was a visionary author, inventor, and artist who 'expressed his conviction that the widespread use of coloured glass [in architecture] would transform civilization spiritually and globally...' (Stuart 2001: xix). Scheerbart actually produced a Glass House with Bruno Taut at the Cologne Werkbund Exhibition in 1913, lauded by German expressionists. Scheerbart's writing is a poetic, humorous, fantastic yet convincing tale of the relationships between architecture and fashion, nature and architecture, and architecture and spirituality, where glass is the redeeming quality of architecture embodied in coloured light that filters through space all its lustre and variety. Edgar speaking on the power of colourful windows:

> I too want something simple. But simplicity can be colorful. For centuries, old church windows have had a calming influence on human optic nerves.
>
> (1915: 18)

> That you make do here without glass architecture, that is my deepest anguish.
>
> (1915: 2)

> Looking at his Tower of Babel, he decries, 'Dragonfly wings! Birds of paradise, fireflies, lightfish, orchids, muscles, pearls, diamonds, and so on. And we find it again in glass architecture. It is the culmination – a cultural peak'.
>
> (1915: 123)

Considering a utopian model of leadership

Utopia implies an imagined alternative to what exists. Terry Eagleton argues that maybe the point is not to go elsewhere, but to use elsewhere as a reflection on where you are (2000: 33). Where we are now is certainly a starting point. Building for change requires illumination of a shared set of beliefs and aims that guide people in their individual and mutual construction of worlds. The architects Edgar Krug in the *Gray Cloth,* and I.M. Pei and the architects of the hand-built houses remind us that imagined alternatives are not far away, and they are within reach for those who seek another way.

Halpin writes: 'The gap between "reality as it is" and "reality as one would like it," it seems, provides the necessary creative tension that is a source of institutional hopefulness and a means to transform the present' (2003: 76). In his view, leadership implies supporting change, encouraging risk taking, acknowledging the expertise of others, trusting and fostering trust with others (2003: 82-4). A utopian leadership can be a model of hope in leading that fosters new visions. This requires a different kind of leader whose sole aim is not control and maintaining the status quo, but a more humane, democratic, human-centred approach to leading, and living. This is possible if those who are in positions to hire leaders value these qualities in educational leaders, and are not threatened by them. The transformative leader/architect embodies these qualities and dispositions. Viewing leaders as architects holds promise for envisioning what Halpin calls 'spatial utopias', or special communities within educational contexts.

For what may we hope? We suggest that leaders as architects can envision new possibilities for leading and shaping educational spaces through the creation of paths, portals, and windows for transformation. Leader/architects must understand and value psychology, human desire and needs, the architecture of the past and present, the role and promise of aesthetics for daily living, and leadership as both process and product. Heart-felt and hand-made visions take time, like a work of art, or the creation of a new building. We hope leaders can start thinking more like architects to transform spaces for leading in ways where hope and possibility can thrive.

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8   The Victorian hangover

Colourful headmasters in the works of Mr Dickens and Ms Brontë

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The aesthetics of literature form sub-strata of cultural memory that manifest themselves as a shared recognition of common constructs implicit in our understanding of the world around us and those with whom we interact. Any teacher of literature knows that it is always possible to find plots and characterisations that are so pervasive in a given culture that they can be used to scaffold student learning based on shared experience. *A Christmas Carol*, for example, has a demonstrable propensity toward near-universal recognition. Being simplicity itself, thanks to its economic plot construction, Dickens's ubiquitous ghost story is an ideal vehicle for discussing authorial techniques. Ebenezer Scrooge is the archetypal villainous miser, and his characteristics are confirmed and culturally reinforced by the many subsequent iterations of him that are delivered to us through a diverting array of media re-creations. Using the Scrooge character as a basis for lectures, students comprising diverse multi-ethnic and cultural groups have told me that they are intimately familiar with him either from the original short story (still – and rightly so – a staple of many school, college, and university reading lists) or from a broad range of film and television adaptations. (The latter go beyond the singular good version with Alistair Sim to include loose re-castings of the character in countless radio and television commercials, and perhaps most troublingly of all, the 'Scrooge McDuck' interpretation inflicted on us by the pop-culture iconoclasts at Disney.) Interestingly, it doesn't seem to matter where the understanding of the character was bred; it is simple enough and has such sharply defined traits that it withstands the manifold distortions of all efforts to reinterpret it and emerges intact, even through the beak of an animated duck. It is the power of Dickens's aesthetic that makes this possible, one that evokes human emotion through his vast and rich descriptive palette.

In an attempt to avoid a 'dry' chapter, let me begin with something wet. I recently attended a ground-breaking ceremony for a new public facility. Appropriately for my subject, the entire affair took place under aesthetically suitably Dickensian conditions in a secluded location that was uncompromisingly reminiscent of a blasted heath. In the middle of nowhere, on a road signed 'Resume Speed', a tangle of trees had been cut over several acres that looked as if they had been less cleared than subjected to a sustained campaign of strategic bombing. In a relentless torrential rainstorm on a cold winter day, the whole had

been pummelled into a muddy quagmire that was six inches underwater by the time the ceremony was scheduled to begin.

A bedraggled clutch of committee members, district officials, local community elders and junior press-men clustered under hastily collected umbrellas and had plenty of time to reflect on their bleak surroundings before the minister's regally late arrival. Eventually, a government car drew up and ministry officials poured out of it, glancing with shared distaste at the leaden sky before smiling for the cameras that had not already been taken home. Any enthusiasm the minister might have been secretly harbouring rapidly dissipated as it became clear that his duty of office required him to plod ankle deep through what looked like raw sewage to the distant roped-off square where the official sod-turning spade awaited. (The ground-breaking itself was originally to have been undertaken by a small, remote-controlled backhoe, but during an earlier trial it overturned in the mud and partially sank, leaving the minister and his entourage to fend for themselves.) The wading was waded, the sod was turned, and bright orations about corporate partnerships with government were heard over the constant static of the rain. A few huddled conversations later, the official car receded into the distance and left us, sodden, and probably a heartbeat from hypothermia, to our own devices.

On later reflection, a contingent of well-wishers were trying to find an appropriate description for one of the more curious dignitaries who had been, in some immeasurable way that one couldn't put one's finger on, intensely disagreeable. Various descriptions were bounced around until someone suggested 'Uriah Heep'. Most satisfactory. This was, without a doubt, a suitable epithet. There had been the worming quality, the damp hands (although perhaps excusable in the downpour), the invidious, ingratiating, obsequious writhing served with each snippet of conversation, each contributing to an inexplicable and somehow offensive false humility. More to the point, this analogy met with unconditional approbation from all concerned. Whether they had read *David Copperfield* or not, the common conception of the 'Uriah Heep aesthetic' had made the connection between a modern figure in public administration and the hearts and minds of the huddled masses – with the exception of one geographer who was thinking of the 1970s rock band of the same name, and thus missed the point of the discussion entirely.

References to Victorian literature are ubiquitous in Western society even after more than a century of literary forgetfulness. Educators are especially fond of them, and yet the use of literature in the discussion of educational leadership has been largely overlooked and can hardly even be classified as an emergent field. Many authors, such as Collins (1963), Hughes (1902), and Manning (1959) have used novelists such as Dickens and his contemporaries to explore the history and evolution of education, while there is an increasing trend towards the use of literary sources for the exploration of administrative theory. Public administration authors have drawn on literature either to question assumptions critically or to examine specific characteristics of the field based on the work of individual authors or particular novels to examine pedagogy, administrator traits,

managerialism, discipline, organisational structure of schools and other areas that elide efficient direct analysis.

A few good examples of this type of scholarly writing include Bivona's (1993) examination of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* and its implications for the theoretical approach of agency and bureaucracy, Dobell's (1988) analysis of John Le Carré's discussion of the characterisation of espionage in public service, Marini's (1992) use of classical works for ethical domains in public administration, and Whitebrook's (1996) assessment of the broader implications of the novel for political science. Other authors have explored the integration of literature more specifically as a source for educational administration, such as Breischke's (1990) work on employing administrative characterisations for teaching purposes.

The texts that will be used as primary sources in this chapter are now more that 150 years old yet do not present problematic hermeneutical implications under analysis. As Anderson, Hughes, and Sharrock noted of the initial problems faced by this science:

> Unwrapping and recovering the 'original meaning' of the text became a delicate process ... such texts were also historical documents in their own right. They reflected societies and cultures which were very different to those of the scholars who sought to understand them. Any attempt to penetrate to the meaning of the text and get some kind of 'objective' understanding of it would have to overcome the linguistic problems of translation and language change, the revisions and reconstructions by successions of authors, as well as grappling with the fact that the texts were part of ways of life no longer directly accessible to us except through other texts and similar 'archaeological' remains.
>
> (1986: 63)

In a broad sense, no great difficulty is posed by these English novels in that no language boundary need be transcended, and the cultural constructions on which characterisation and action are founded are still familiar to us. It is possible to trace the lineage of the works being evaluated and obtain uniformly edited editions that are faithful to definitive first impressions.

As for whether or not the ways of life discussed are directly accessible to us, a short walk through any modern high school setting should be enough to convince even the most ardent sceptic that we have not travelled far enough away from the Victorian conception of education for that to cause any significant interpretive dissonance; concurrently, we have at least progressed far enough to be able to effect a new interpretation of these texts to inform the belief systems that surround current research in educational leadership.

Recalling Matthew Arnold's assertion that David Copperfield's 'Mr Creakle and Salem House are immortal' (1906: 318), I would suggest that what he is effectively doing is equivalent to collecting data conforming to the construction of a Weberian ideal type. Whether such typing is coincidental, such as when a group gathers around after a wet ground-breaking ceremony and likens a ministry official to one of the most hated characters in creation, or explicit, when Arnold

suggests of Mr Creakle that 'The type, it is to be hoped, will perish; but the draw-ing of it will not die' (1906: 318), it provides a useful instrument for the evaluation of educational leadership figures. The inherent flexibility of Weber's theory of ideal typologies provides a framework suitable for addressing thematic understandings within the scope of literary analysis:

> An ideal type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a uni-fied *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*.
>
> (Weber 1949: 90)

To clarify further, Cahnman suggests that:

> The ideal type, then, is not a description of concrete reality, or even of the essential features of such a reality (*eigentliche Wirklichkeit*); it is not a hypoth-esis; it is not a schema under which a real situation, or action, is subsumed as one instance; it is not a generic concept or a statistical average. Rather, it is 'an ideal limiting concept with which the real situation, or action, is com-pared', so that it may be properly appraised in line with the categories of 'objective possibility' and 'adequate causation'.
>
> (1964: 116)

Thus, from the action and characterisation in the Victorian novels within this chapter, a construct of types may be extracted from which to draw comparisons to real situations and actions that are presently encountered in the field of edu-cational leadership. As Burger contends:

> 'Ideal' means that the conceptual content is abstracted from empirical real-ity in an idealizing or exaggerated fashion. It means that the constellation of facts described in the definition of an ideal type would characterize to an equal degree the phenomena to which the type refers, if empirically certain – ideal – conditions were fulfilled.
>
> (1987: 154)

As people cannot be relied upon to act in a consistent manner even in stable cir-cumstances, and even stable circumstances are to some degree fluid, the notion of the ideal type must be understood as a theoretical abstraction describing con-ditions that would frequently exist could those conditions be met. Given this abstruse connection to reality, the novel seems to be an excellent conceptual proving ground for ideal typology, as the action and characterisation is controlled by authorial tendency and technique and thus exempt from the fluctuations of

circumstance caused by random behaviour and circumstantial change in the accepted reality against which comparisons must be drawn.

Continuing his discussion of the 'type' presented by Mr Creakle in *David Copperfield*, Matthew Arnold presents a case to prove how prevalent such characters were in England at the time of writing by entering into a discussion of German experiences with English schools:

> With one voice they tell us of establishments like Salem House and principals like Mr Creakle. They are astonished, disgusted. They cannot understand how such things can be, and how a great and well-to-do class can be content with such an ignoble bringing up. But so things are, and they report their experience of them, and their experience brings before us, over and over again, Mr Creakle and Salem House.
>
> (1906: 319)

Travelling along this road of discourse at great length, and, perhaps realising that he is running a significant risk of systematically alienating his readership, Arnold is quick to point out that noble Englishmen are yet bred from such establishments, notwithstanding their sadistic nature and manifold secondary flaws. After a quick unfavourable general comparison of the English constitution to the Irish (it is in *Irish Essays* after all), in which he contends that the Irish look at English schoolmasters and note, 'They are all tarred with one brush, and that brush is Creakle's' (1906: 321), he returns to the discussion of *David Copperfield* as a novel which provides 'types' from which to draw comparisons with the reality of schooling in England:

> We may go even further in our use of that charming and instructive book, the *History of David Copperfield*. We may lay our finger there on the very types in adult life which are the natural product of Salem House and of Mr Creakle; the very types of our middle class, nay of Englishmen and the English nature in general, as to the Irish imagination they appear.
>
> (1906: 321)

The impact of the 'type' of education leader drawn by Dickens in *David Copperfield* was clearly recognised by Arnold in 1882, with Creakle already deeply entrenched as a cultural icon more than forty years after the initial publication of the novel. The character that Dickens created for the headmaster of Salem House was powerful because it was so readily identifiable with an aesthetic that all clearly understood. Although Creakle was a broad literary caricature, comprised of a constellation of attributes that are unlikely to be aggregated in any one real person outside prison, and Salem House was a school of imagination based on Dickens's own experiences that pulled together the least favourable elements of many schools, the type that can be constructed from analysis of him is one that scores enough hits in our conscious interpretation of how bad schools and headmasters can really be that the affective recognition is profound, intimate, and disturbing.

The Salem House of *David Copperfield* represents all that was reprehensible about the worst of schooling in the Victorian era. Cruelly managed, or mismanaged, the children sent to learn within it are subject to the relentless despotic tyranny of their headmaster, Mr Creakle. Dickens's aesthetic technique for the establishment of his fictitious schools are fairly consistent throughout his novels; mood and tone are functions of his elaborate settings, which commence, in this case, with the young David Copperfield's first impressions of the dreary atmosphere of Salem House itself under the stewardship of a master, Mr Mell:

> I gazed upon the schoolroom into which he took me, as the most forlorn and desolate place I had ever seen. I see it now. A long room with three long rows of desks, and six of forms, and bristling all round with pegs for hats and slates. Scraps of old copy books and exercises litter the dirty floor. Some silkworms' houses, made of the same materials, are scattered over the desks ... There is a strange unwholesome smell upon the room, like mildewed corduroys, sweet apples wanting air, and rotten books. There could not well be more ink splashed about it, if it had been roofless from its first construction, and the skies had rained, snowed, hailed, and blown ink through the varying seasons of the year.
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> (*Copperfield*: 129–30)

The image conveyed is dark and mournful, hardly consistent with a pleasant learning environment, but nonetheless recognisable today in a diminished form. This type of intense and sensual description is characteristic of the complex background development that Dickens undertook in order to set the scene for the action of plot and character revelation, both of which either fit comfortably with their surroundings or contrasted to them dramatically.

Mr Creakle, the headmaster of Salem House, is introduced by the narrator thus:

> I heard that Mr Creakle had not preferred his claim to being a tartar without reason; that he was the sternest and most severe of masters; that he laid about him, right and left, every day of his life, charging in among the boys like a trooper, and slashing away, unmercifully. That he knew nothing himself, but the art of slashing, being more ignorant (J. Steerforth said) than the lowest boy in the school ...
>
> (*Copperfield*: 138)

The characteristics of cruelty and ignorance are often found together in leadership figures in Dickens' work, and the physical descriptions of them only serve to reinforce the impression:

> Mr Creakle's face was very fiery, and his eyes were small, and deep in his head; he had thick veins in his forehead, a little nose, and a large chin. He was bald on the top of his head; and had some wet looking hair that was just turning grey, brushed across each temple, so that the two sides interlaced on

his forehead. What impressed me most, was, that he had no voice, but spoke
in a whisper. The exertion that this cost him, or the consciousness of talking
in that feeble way, made his angry face so much more angry, and his thick
veins so much thicker, when he spoke, that I am not surprised, on looking
back, at this peculiarity striking me as his chief one.

(*Copperfield*: 134)

It is difficult to draw Creakle out of context; he is the ideal headmaster for Salem
House, and Salem House is a school as corrupt as rust in the imagined world of
Charles Dickens. It is the confluence of characterisation, setting, and action that
render this school vignette so memorable. Creakle has all of the qualities that one
would hope would not be attributed to an educational leader: he is vindictive,
arbitrary, and, seeming to rankle most with the narrator, pathologically unfair:

I should think there never can have been a man who enjoyed his profession-
more than Mr Creakle did. ... I know him to have been an incapable brute,
who had no more right to be possessed of the great truth he held, than to be
Lord High Admiral, or Commander-in-Chief: in either of which capacities
he would have done infinitely less mischief.

(*Copperfield*: 141)

The relationship of Mr Creakle to the boys in his charge does not differ greatly
from his interactions with the teachers in his employ. The hierarchy of power
might be graphically represented as a thumbtack sitting upside down. At the
uppermost point of the inverted tack we find the despot headmaster, and after a
sheer vertical drop of great distance, we arrive suddenly at the masters and boys
together at the same hierarchical level beneath them. In *David Copperfield* the
teachers fare little better than the children:

I heard that Mr Sharp and Mr Mell were both supposed to be wretchedly
paid; and that when there was hot and cold meat for dinner at Mr Creakle's
table, Mr Sharp was always expected to say he preferred cold; which was
again confirmed by J. Steerforth, the only parlour-boarder. I heard that Mr
Sharp's wig didn't fit him; and that he needn't be so 'bounceable' – some-
body else said 'bumptious' – about it, because his own red hair was very
plainly to be seen behind.

(*Copperfield*: 139)

One of the interesting features of the power relationship in *David Copperfield* is
the extent to which the boys, themselves victimised, in turn harass the masters
who in so many respects share the common burden of poor treatment at the
hands of the headmaster. Instead of developing a sense of camaraderie, which
might be expected (and indeed can be seen in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*),
they turn on them whenever circumstances or demonstrated weakness provides
them with an opportunity. This is portrayed as a packing mentality by Dickens,

whose individual characterisations of the boys are otherwise quite favourable. It is Mr Mell, the junior teacher, who suffers the most in this novel, and yet the portrait of him in the classroom must seem fairly familiar to anyone who has ever taught a class on a Friday afternoon right before the end of school. Certainly, in my mind, it brings a sudden recollection of a particular class of grade eight English students that I used to teach in that time slot some years ago:

> If I could associate the idea of a bull or a bear with anyone so mild as Mr Mell, I should think of him, in connexion with that afternoon when the uproar was at its height, as one of those animals, baited by a thousand dogs … there were laughing boys, singing boys, talking boys, dancing boys, howling boys; boys shuffled with their feet, boys whirled around him, grinning, making faces, mimicking him behind his back and before his eyes; mimicking his poverty, his boots, his coat, his mother, everything belonging to him that they should have had consideration for.
>
> (*Copperfield*: 148)

This is a pivotal scene in the novel, as Mr Mell's authority is challenged by a favoured boy of Mr Creakle's (the ill-starred J. Steerforth, who goes on to cause nothing but trouble for the rest of the novel), forcing Mell to defend himself against Steerforth's allegation that he is unfit to teach because of his mother's poverty:

> – 'To insult one who is not fortunate in life, sir, and who never gave you the least offence, and the many reasons for not insulting whom you are old enough and wise enough to understand', said Mr Mell, with his lips trembling more and more, 'you commit a mean and base action …
>
> (*Copperfield*: 150)

A variety of factors are worth consideration in this scene, such as the discrimination based on financial disparity and the similarity of punishment methods used by the headmaster on both the boys and the teachers, but perhaps the most relevant lesson is that what really disturbs the protagonist in this scene is not the action of the plot itself, but the obvious unfairness of it. In fact, this remains a common complaint among students everywhere; the most popular leaders in education are sometimes those who are very strict, so long as they are perceived as clearly fair in the administration of their authority. In *David Copperfield*, those who succeed either as students or masters are those who manage to retain a low profile in relation to the despots over them.

Mr Creakle's administration is characterised by the retention of power through brute force, misplaced values, and the willingness, which is worse, to warp the hierarchy when it suits his needs, thus creating a wholly unstable environment. This imbalance is primarily instigated by the maintenance of favourites within the system, and the advancement of their agendas before all others. As Altick notes, schooling was not at a glamorous point in its development during

the mid-nineteenth century, as 'the atmosphere in most public schools had degenerated into an evil combination of somnolence, brutality, and anarchy' (1973: 253). A description that is well borne out by Salem House.

Mr Creakle and Salem House, as reprehensible as they may appear in *David Copperfield*, actually represent an intermediate evolutionary stage in Dickens's development of the educational leader in his fiction. While Mr Creakle is perhaps the most memorable character, his prototype was presented a decade earlier in the form of *Nicholas Nickleby*'s Mr Squeers, the headmaster of Dotheboys Hall in Yorkshire, a caricature based directly on Dickens's investigative journalism into the corruption that was rife in those institutions (see Hughes 1902).

Nicholas Nickleby, the protagonist, provides us with an especially useful lens through which to examine the school and Squeers, as he as posted there as a master and offers an additional professional perspective that is lacking in *David Copperfield*. Having an omniscient point of view instead of the first person employed by *David Copperfield* also provides a less intimate tone, but at the same time it is more analytical and allows Dickens to range freely through interpretive discussions of the various characters.

The headmaster operates the school largely for the benefit of parents who wish to have their children unseen and unheard for years at a time, and the squalor of it more than matches its successor Salem House. Another similarity between the institutions is that in both cases the headmaster demonstrates unfair treatment of favourites, with those being presented as a contrast foil for the treatment of the learners, inasmuch as that term can be applied to an institution like Dotheboys Hall, where, as Squeers notes, the boys are kept 'Just as long as their friends make quarterly payments to my agent in town, or until such time as they run away...' (*Nickleby*: 95). The same notion of the inequity of treatment is forwarded in both books; in the less complex action of *Nicholas Nickleby* this takes the form of nepotism.

The introduction to the character of Squeers takes place during the negotiation with a step-father who wishes to have his two sons sent to Dotheboys Hall:

> 'The payments regular, and no questions asked', said Squeers, nodding his head.
> 'That's it exactly', rejoined the other. 'Morals strictly attended to, though'.
> 'Strictly', said Squeers.
> 'Not too much writing home allowed, I suppose?' said the father-in-law, hesitating.
> 'None, except a circular at Christmas, to say that they never were so happy, and wish they may never be sent for', rejoined Squeers.
> 'Nothing could be better', said the father-in-law, rubbing his hands.
>
> (*Nickleby*: 96)

These contracts of mutual convenience represent the foundation on which Dotheboys Hall is built: the elimination of a pest for the parents on the one hand, and the latitude to deprive the children to the most shocking degree on the other.

Note that other than morality, no educational requirement at all is specified, although it is the one characteristic conspicuously lacking in the adults.

Wackford Squeers differs from his counterpart in *David Copperfield* in being a more comical characterisation. He has a sense of humour (albeit black) and a rather festive cruelty more apt to favour the infliction of emotional, rather than physical, damage on the boys in his charge; this is not to say that he does not employ physical punishment as well, merely that it appears farther down on his list of priorities. Rather than being openly despotic, his preferred style of administration is to practise a habitual deceit, veneering his cruelty with the semblance of a professional demeanour.

The Squeers establishment is founded on much the same principles as that of Creakle; there is a clear, inescapable hierarchy and no deviation from utter obedience to the higher authority is anticipated or tolerated. Dickens summarises the Squeers philosophy of educational administration as follows:

> Now, the fact was, that both Mr and Mrs Squeers viewed the boys in the light of their proper and natural enemies; or, in other words, they held and considered that their business and profession was to get as much from every boy as could by possibility be screwed out of him. On this point they both agreed, and behaved in unison accordingly. The only difference between them was, that Mrs Squeers waged war against the enemy openly and fearlessly, and that Squeers covered his rascality, even at home, with a spice of his habitual deceit, as if he had a notion of some day or other being able to take himself in, and persuade his own mind that he was a very good fellow.
>
> (*Nickleby*: 150–1)

This is notable in that this quality of self-deception is one that is all too familiar to anyone who has worked in education long enough to get a good feel for the variations of management style that persist in public education. The reflection of it in Dickens is unpalatable to our sensitive dispositions, but to refute that it is still commonly present is as futile as disputing human nature itself.

Like Salem House, the aesthetic of Dotheboys Hall is rich and complex:

> It was a crowded scene, and there were so many objects to attract attention, that at first Nicholas stared about him, really without seeing anything at all. By degrees, however, the place resolved itself into a bare and dirty room with a couple of windows, whereof a tenth part might be of glass, the remainder being stopped up with old copy books and paper ... The ceiling was supported like that of a barn, by cross beams and rafters, and the walls were so stained and discoloured, that it was impossible to tell whether they had ever been touched with paint or whitewash.
>
> (*Nickleby*: 151)

This example is redolent of the broadcast pathos of which Dickens was so indisputably fond, and which might now be considered rather melodramatic. As with

his character development, it has an excessive sentimentality not geared toward a more minimalist modern taste in literature. As Collins notes of Dickens:

> ... his books and periodicals and his life display that earnest concern for the poor and deprived, which led him energetically if sporadically to urge reforms, and to busy himself with various practical schemes for improving the condition of afflicted groups and individuals. All these features of his outlook help to shape his ideas on education, in their strength and their weakness.
>
> (1963: 22)

Whether or not his renditions can be thought of now as somewhat heavy handed, they were drawn with the best of intentions and a noble purpose. This is similar to reform efforts today: there is no lack of positive intent among those who seek to reform education, even if there is a frequent conflict of values.

In a manner to be echoed in the altogether more serious *Hard Times*, Dickens offers a scathing look at the instructional methodology offered in such schools. The headmaster sets the educational philosophy for the school and dictates it to his subordinates, who have no professional autonomy whatsoever (nor could we expect them to have) under such circumstances. In *Nicholas Nickleby*, the order of the day includes classes such as 'English spelling and philosophy' (155) of which highly-suspect components are disseminated through didactic instruction and retained through rote memorisation, much as they are to this day in so many enlightened classrooms.

As an aside, it is interesting to note that, for whatever reason, Dickens saw fit to repeatedly use the definition of the word 'horse' and the reference to students by number (to demonstrate ambivalence in one case and utilitarian depersonalisation in the other) as a vehicle for conveying this instructional strategy, both in *Nicholas Nickleby* and *Hard Times*.

As the protagonist of *Nicholas Nickleby* assumes his duties, he undertakes a reading class for the younger boys at the instruction of the headmaster, in which

> The children were arranged in a semicircle round the new master, and he was soon listening to their dull, drawling, hesitating recital of those stories of engrossing interest which are to be found in the more antiquated spelling books.
>
> (*Nickleby*: 156)

Again, still a strategy of great utility to the present day, revitalised by the upsurge of 'literacy' initiatives, which seem, for all intents and purposes, to be the most retrograde and Dickensian programmes available, although praised for their 'back-to-basics' utility. Such programmes are touted widely for their simplicity (or single-mindedness, depending on your perspective) and appreciated by teachers for the accountability they provide and the convenience of their delivery.

Another aspect of Squeers' administration in *Nicholas Nickleby* is that he is intensely protective of his establishment, of which he is unaccountably proud,

although it is inferred that this refers more to his capable management than the service that is provided to the boys. Given this, he also jealously guards his authority and is incensed when the younger schoolmaster in his employ rapidly gains influence over the boys, especially in light of the fact that he does so using compassion, reason, and the respect for individuality as the tools of his trade.

Shot through with inequity and injustice, Mr Squeers and his employee resolve matters most satisfactorily when Nickleby beats the tyrannical leader half to death before taking his leave of him. A pleasingly implausible situation more in keeping with the younger Dickens's flights of fancy, rather than the elder's greater attention to realism in social commentary.

In both of these novels, the boys themselves, especially in the characters of Smike in *Nicholas Nickleby* and Steerforth in *David Copperfield*, demonstrate the perils of an educational system gone terribly awry. Smike, a victim of constant cruelty and neglect, devolves into a sub-human character unable to express his own personality except in deference to those who protect him, while Steerforth, the archetypal headmaster's pet, becomes a vain and immoral young man, suffering deep internal conflict about his relationships to his peers and following a path of psychological self-destruction until his eventual death.

'In his novels, most of the schools are bad, though their organisers may be well-intentioned' (Collins 1963: 6). This is important to bear in mind in examining *Hard Times*, a novel originally dedicated to Thomas Carlyle. It is characteristic of Dickens's later, more serious social criticism, and differs from *Nicholas Nickleby* and *David Copperfield*, but *Dombey and Son* is remarkably similar to *Hard Times* in plot construction, setting, and intent, in that the organisers operate their school not for the naked acquisition of wealth with the spice of power, but with the serious intention of doing good in the community. It is Dickens's attempt to look at the ills that might befall a system of education, even were it to be reformed, and it is largely comprised of an unforgiving examination of the utilitarian educational philosophy being dogmatically expanded in the new urban industrial centres of England. Having said that, the educational component, complete with the usual cast of colourful characters, remains as comic relief in a novel that is otherwise short, dark, and reflective.

Throughout *Hard Times*, Dickens weaves the theme of industrialisation throughout his discussion of education, which reflects many of the same themes as we see in the current corporatisation and commercialisation of education in North America. It has been said of the novel's examination of the hardships carried forth by industrialisation that:

> The stress on schooling is certainly no evasion. This linking of classroom and mill turns out to be one of Dickens's most telling ways of composing his sense of English civilization into a coherent, many-sided image. Both school and town were owned, or at least controlled, by the same men, the masters, some of whom were fanatically eager to try out on the populace the theoretical social systems which they had drawn up on strict Utilitarian principles.
>
> (Calder 1971: 20)

As with his other novels, Dickens follows his conventional pattern of offering a deeply descriptive paragraph, each dealing with the school in question and its headmaster. As *Hard Times* opens, Dickens, uncharacteristically, begins with the dialogue of the headmaster:

> 'Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children. Stick to Facts, Sir!'
>
> (*Hard*: 47)

Beside the point that this sentiment would no doubt find great favour with many North American ministries and departments of public education, this speech is unique for two reasons. In the first place, it actually has an articulated philosophy of education as opposed to the haphazard and morally oriented foci of Dickens' other schools, allowing the author to comment to a far greater degree on the attributes of the instructional method. In the second place, it considers the possibility that children might in fact be reasoning creatures, who would respond to intellectual stimulation as well as the strap.

The ruthlessly one-track preoccupation with the empirical is not lost on the reader, but at least it is an improvement over the brutality of the other novels' environments, even if the children are viewed as 'little vessels then and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until they were full to the brim' (*Hard*: 51). At least there's a long-term vision.

The aesthetic conception of the classroom could not be any more different from those in *Nicholas Nickleby* and *David Copperfield*. It is brightly whitewashed, immense, full of sunlight, neat, and well-organised – clinical, perhaps. The squalor and pestilence of previous iterations has departed, to be replaced with a room doubtless intended to convey a sense of the mill rather than the school.

Thomas Gradgrind, the benefactor, is full of enthusiasm for the utilitarian principle to be propagated by a new type of education:

> Indeed, as he eagerly sparkled at them from the cellarage before mentioned, he seemed a kind of cannon loaded with facts, and prepared to blow them clean out of the regions of childhood at one discharge. He seemed a galvanizing apparatus, too, charged with a grim mechanical substitute for the tender young imaginations that were to be stormed away.
>
> (*Hard*: 48)

There is nothing immediately hateful about Gradgrind; he is not the tyrannical oppressor of Salem House, nor the self-deceiving despot of Dotheboys Hall. A function of his philosophy, he is delighted with what he has achieved, which he perceives to be a radical breakthrough in education. 'It was his school, and he intended it to be a model. He intended every child in it to be a model – just as

the young Gradgrinds were all models' (*Hard*: 53). He is, in fact, defined primarily by the humanistic attributes that he lacks and blinded by his own belief in the pre-eminence of his theory.

Among the memorable scenes in *Hard Times*, the fact that Sissy Jupe (or 'Girl Number Twenty') is unable to define a horse has long since fallen into social memory. The boy who can do so, Bitzer, is more difficult to recollect yet more important for the discussion of educational issues; despite his rather comprehensive ability to hit the books and describe a horse thus:

> 'Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth'.
>
> (*Hard*: 50)

Bitzer has the same function in *Hard Times* as Steerforth in *David Copperfield* and Smike in *Nicholas Nickleby*. Raised on a diet of facts, he evolves into a morally destitute character, with no convictions to support him in adulthood beyond a calculating avarice.

In the same way that we see a new and more subtle type of inspiration for educational leaders in Mr Gradgrind, so do we see a new teacher in the form of the charmingly named Mr M'Choakumchild, who comes from a very different background than the eclectic masters in earlier novels, as Dickens explains:

> He and some one hundred and forty other schoolmasters, had been lately turned at the same time, in the same factory, on the same principles, like so many pianoforte legs ... He knew all about all the Water Sheds of all of the world (whatever they are), and all the histories of all the peoples, and all the names of rivers and mountains, and all the productions, manners, and customs of all the countries, and all their boundaries and bearings on the two and thirty points of the compass. Ah, rather overdone, M'Choakumchild. If only he had learnt a little less, how infinitely better he might have taught much more!
>
> (*Hard*: 53)

One might be excused for beginning to form the impression that Dickens is tricky to please; on the one hand he abhors the lack of structure and inhumanity that made victims out of students and masters alike in his early novels, while in his later ones he rails against the imposition of structure and excessive rigidity of training. Naturally Gradgrind sees the error of his utilitarian ways as he grapples, later in the book, with the impact of the philosophy on his own family, but the enthusiastic observer is left at a loss for what type of reform solution Dickens might actually propose.

Obviously, Dickens was not the lone voice urging educational reform in the Victorian era. Among the others was Charlotte Brontë, who provides us with

unique insight in that she portrays the Lowood Institution in *Jane Eyre*, modelled on her own experiences at a religious school, both before and after significant reform. Brontë's aesthetic, after Dickens's, seems altogether more businesslike and less melodramatic:

> ... seated all round on benches, a congregation of girls of every age, from nine or ten to twenty. Seen by the dim light of the dips, their numbers to me appeared countless, though not in reality exceeding eighty; they were uniformly dressed in brown frocks of quaint fashion, and long Holland pinafores. It was the hour of study; they were engaged in conning over their to-morrow's tasks, and the hum I heard was the combined result of their whispered repetitions.
>
> (*Eyre*: 76)

The classes in the Lowood Institution are conducted on the monitorial principle, and again, a strict hierarchy is observed among the teaching staff, which is divided into junior and senior mistresses, a superintendent – the voice of compassion in the novel – with Mr Brocklehurst, treasurer and manager, at their head. Brocklehurst is a complex character, and when the protagonist asks, 'Is he a good man?' the response is, 'He is a clergyman, and is said to do a great deal of good' (*Eyre*: 83). Naturally, Brocklehurst is anything but a good man, or at least as the reader might be expected to conceive one.

Characterised by extreme parsimony, religious fervour, officiousness and a bombastic nature, Brocklehurst is vastly hypocritical, in that he insists on any number of petty economies for the school and its students, strictly reprimanding the teachers for over-expenditure, while at the same time indulging his own spoiled daughters with every extravagance.

In common with all of the educational leaders observed in this chapter, Brocklehurst is inherently superficial, self-absorbed, and unable to gain any real insight into the affairs of his school.

As Brontë's Brocklehurst lectures the superintendent:

> 'Madam, allow me an instant. You are aware that my plan in bringing up these girls is, not to accustom them to habits of luxury and indulgence, but to render them hardy, patient, self-denying. Should any little accidental disappointment of appetite occur, such as the spoiling of a meal, the under or over-dressing of a dish, the incident ought not to be neutralized by replacing with something more delicate the comfort lost, thus pampering the body and obviating the aim of this institution; it ought to be improved to the spiritual edification of the pupils, by encouraging them to evince fortitude under the temporary privation.'
>
> (*Eyre*: 95)

One of the most distinctive differences between Dickens' aesthetic treatment of leadership figures and Brontë's is that while his characters instil fear and

loathing in their subordinates, hers do not. Brocklehurst is clearly the subject of wry humour to both the staff at the Lowood Institution and the girls in their care. In addition to the relative lack of brutal corporal punishment, those lower on the hierarchy do not evince any great terror of their benefactor, keeping their contemptuous glances well hidden from him; as the author notes, '… it was a pity that Mr Brocklehurst could not see them too; he would perhaps have felt that, whatever he might do with the outside of the cup and platter, the inside was beyond his reach' (*Eyre*: 96). Despite this, Brocklehurst still employs the time-honoured weapons of isolation and public ridicule to deal with the girls; the difference is that at the Lowood Institution, being singled out for such treatment is a badge of honour which marks the victim for special respect and caring treatment from the other students. As Jane Eyre is told when she asks about the tacit support she received while being forced to stand alone on a stool in the schoolroom,

> 'Mr Brocklehurst is not a god: nor is he even a great and admired man: he is little liked here; he never took steps to make himself liked. Had he treated you as an especial favourite, you would have found enemies, declared or covert, all around you; as it is, the greater number would offer you sympathy if they dared …'
>
> (*Eyre*: 101)

The students of the school are shown to have a much clearer understanding of the leadership qualities of their benefactor than he has of himself.

In *Jane Eyre*, reform of the school is only achieved after a catastrophic outbreak of typhus caused numerous fatalities, '… till its virulence and the number of its victims had drawn public attention on the school. Inquiry was made into the origin of the scourge, and by degrees various facts came out that excited public indignation in a high degree' (*Eyre*: 115). In response to public pressure, the Lowood Institution is rebuilt in a better location, and new leadership figures are installed:

> Mr Brocklehurst, who, from his wealth and family connexions, could not be overlooked, still retained the post of treasurer; but he was aided in the discharge of his duties by gentlemen of rather more enlarged and sympathizing minds: his office of inspector, too, was shared with those who knew how to combine reason with strictness, comfort with economy, compassion with uprightness. The school, thus improved, became in time a truly useful and noble institution.
>
> (*Eyre*: 115)

And so, at least in one novel there is a happy ending as a result of enlightened intervention into otherwise damning circumstances. From these figures we can construct aesthetic 'types' of educational leadership figures that inform our understanding today. As Samier notes:

> In general terms, then, literature both provides a descriptive account of how administrative life is led, as well as an interpretive and critical account of how administration should be carried out, including ethos, ethics, interpersonal relations, the qualities of judgement, and policies as expressions of value.
>
> (2005: 3)

The aesthetic of the Victorian novel is a rich and expansive one that inspires imagination by reflecting a world that seems to exist on a different, yet parallel, plane than ours. It is, however, so detailed and vivid that we recognise it as something that could exist, and does in the aggregate of our own experience. While the exaggerated nature of administrative caricature in Victorian novels seems hyperbolic, it provides a cautionary reminder that all narrative is based on observation of reality.

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9 A narrative looking glass for leadership studies in administration

Cinema and literature as source and reflective medium

Julie Stockton

> 'I don't believe there's an atom of meaning in it ... If there's no meaning in it,' said the King, 'that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any. And yet I don't know', he went on, spreading out the verses on his knee, and looking at them with one eye; 'I seem to see some meaning in them after all.'
>
> (Carroll 1998: 106)

Like the King of Hearts in *Alice in Wonderland*, reaching the conclusion that some meaning can indeed be seen in the text before him, I believe there is meaning in literary and cinematic media with respect to the study of leadership and administration. I suggest that literature and cinema are an innovative source for providing meaning to leadership concepts in administration and for the advancement of leadership studies in general. Our understanding of leadership is both informed and illuminated by the books, theatre and film to which we have been exposed and socialised. Because of the way organisational theorists have typically explored organisations, I believe there are tacit elements that we have not yet seen. If we were able to see and describe them, we might be encouraged to do things differently, particularly with respect to how we approach leadership studies and development.

This chapter examines the limitations of the orthodox approach to organisation and leadership studies followed by an account of the growing tradition of using literary text as both representative and informative of social reality and leadership, drawing on a small body of aesthetics literature that uses literary references as a source for the study of administration and leadership. The last section explores the ways in which an aesthetic approach to cultural analysis of organisations could be fruitful in revealing aspects of organisational life and leadership practice that have not been fully appreciated and researched.

Much of the scholarly discourse on leadership for the past forty years has assumed that there is a common working definition of leadership and that if one follows the basic principles outlined in any particular theory that leadership can be achieved. However, as Rost cautions us:

> The second problem with leadership studies as an academic discipline and with the people who do leadership is that neither the scholars nor the

practitioners have been able to define leadership with precision, accuracy, and conciseness so that people are able to label it correctly when they see it happening or when they engage in it ... There have been no criteria established to evaluate leadership definitions ... leadership studies as an academic discipline has a culture of definition permissiveness and relativity.

(1991:6)

Kets de Vries echoes this analysis, likening the literature on leadership to a labyrinth where 'there are endless definitions, countless articles, and never-ending polemics' (1997: 250). Like Alice, falling down the rabbit-hole, I have found myself as a practitioner caught in this labyrinth of organisation and leadership theory, attempting to apply scholarship in the field and finding that while it sometimes helps individuals 'doing' leadership, it often fails to capture the complexity and ambiguity of 'being' in leadership relationships.

What then can an aesthetic approach tell us about organisational life or about leadership in organisations that the more traditional or conventional studies have not been able to reveal? Taylor says of the heart of the modern epistemological project that:

... our propositional knowledge of this world is grounded in our dealings with it; and there can be no question of totally objectifying the prior grasp we have of it as agents within it ... there is no knowledge without a background, and that background can never be wholly objectified.

(1987: 461–2)

And yet most organisational researchers, adopting a functionalist approach, have attempted to engage and understand organisational life and leadership by trying to attain this objectivity. On the other hand, literature, including the genres of fiction, theatre and film, has the illustrative ability to capture the inner world of subjectivity, of doubt and dilemma, allowing the viewer/reader to identify more deeply with the paradoxical and ambiguous nature of organisational leadership. This perspective creates the space for a narrative and dialogue that is not readily accessible within more traditional approaches and provides a window to subjective meaning.

The meta-narrative of leadership theory

Of course the first thing to do was make a grand survey of the country she was going to travel through. 'It's something very like learning geography', thought Alice, as she stood on tiptoe in hopes of being able to see a little further. 'Principal rivers – there *are* none ...'

(Carroll 1998: 145)

Just as Alice in *Through the Looking-glass* examines the terrain, listing what is available to help guide her and provide a sense of direction as she moves forward,

and finding some of the essential landmarks to be missing, I find that the 'meta-narrative of leadership' (Rost 1991: 27) has provided a direction as well as a distinct terrain of leadership theory that is missing the critical factors of individual relationship and subjective meaning.

The story of the social sciences has been predominantly told using the language of empirical theory (Morrow and Brown 1994: 41–7). On the other hand, the world of literature, and the arts in general, evoke subjective multiple meanings. To attempt to link the world of these 'literary texts'[1] to that of the social sciences such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, politics, and history, requires an elicitation of the philosophical and methodological assumptions on which such research is based (Morrow and Brown 1994: 42, 61). An exploration of what aesthetics brings to theoretical and substantive issues in social science fields needs to be framed *metatheoretically*.

There is a general level of agreement that the systematic study of organisations and how people behave and interact within them is a relatively recent twentieth century phenomenon (Rubenstein and Haberstroh 1960: 2; Rothwell *et al.* 1995: 14–17). There is, however, substantially less agreement about a consistent or 'unified organisational theory', or for that matter, theoretical foundation or intellectual tradition, from which principles of organisation and leadership can be determined (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 118–20; Rubenstein and Haberstroh 1960: 1; Ullrich and Wieland 1976: 13–14).

During the early stages of organisational and leadership studies, theorists tended to adopt theories and models of organisational functioning, and to focus on areas of empirical investigation, that are highly oriented towards managerial conceptions of organisation, managerial priorities and problems, and managerial concerns for practical outcomes (Salaman and Thompson 1973: 1). Theorists studying management, administration, and leadership (often without differentiating between them) have focused their attention on the regulatory aspects of social order. 'The thesis that sociology is centrally concerned with the problem of social order has become one of the discipline's few orthodoxies' (Dawe 1970: 207). I would venture that the search for order has also become one of organisational theory's orthodoxies, thus impacting the aspects of leadership that have been studied. Research within the school of organisational structuralist functionalism, the scientific school of behaviourism and social systems change theory, and even branching further out to the functionalist cultural analysis, are what I would classify as the 'orthodoxy' or 'cultural capital' of the field of organisation and leadership theory.

Until as recently as 20 years ago, most North American organisational theorists have approached the analysis of organisations predominantly from either the functionalist or scientific behaviourist viewpoints (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 49). Influenced by structural functionalism, behaviourism or systems theory, organisational analysis has focused predominantly on causality and 'the search for predictable means for organisational control' (Smircich 1983: 347).[2] The functionalist tradition of organisational research also maintains an ontological bias to objectivity and regulation, therefore, much of the leadership literature in

this genre has focused on means to achieve control and predictability. In coun-terpoint to all of these, I locate the symbolic and aesthetic schools of organisational cultural analysis, influenced more by the German idealist move-ment than the lens of Taylor, Fayol, *et al.*

In his chronological overview of management theory, Wren (1972) suggests that economic, political and social elements constitute essential aspects of our culture and have impacted how we study organisations along with management and leadership.[3] At the same time, he acknowledges that these elements change over time as do the inherent assumptions about the nature of man that are then reflected within our attempts to manage these elements. With respect to the social element, he notes that 'values shift from one period to another and from one culture to another', and therefore, the management role within the social element has been impacted by the various relationships associated with these values (Wren 1972: 6–9). Grint similarly cautions us that although we have sometimes adopted the theory that leadership is contingent upon the context and circumstances surrounding the leader, that it is more likely that our under-standing and 'assumptions about what makes a good leader change radically across time' (1997: 226).

Rost (1991: 185) challenges us to develop new research strategies that will enable us to determine more clearly what leadership is and how it brings about change. He has suggested that only a 'paradigm shift in leadership studies as an academic discipline' will allow us to explore a consistent definition of leadership out of which new theories and models as well as new leadership practices will emerge; new leadership practices that will reflect the needs of a post-modern society (1991: 181).

With respect to the use of 'literary texts' in organisation and leadership stud-ies, the fundamental approach and questions will differ based on whether one's worldview perceives culture developing as a result of adaptation to survive (the functionalist perspective), or as an ever-changing, emergent reality through which organisational members create meaning (a hermeneutic construct). In theory, we could approach literary texts *nomothetically* using analysis protocols of the structuralists and attempt to establish regulatory rules of causation. However, my purpose for using literary texts as a methodology is *ideographic* (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 7; Morrow and Brown 1994: 56), to determine how aesthetics both represents an aspect of culture and at the same time is informed by it, how 'literature is a cause in sociation as well as a result' (Duncan 1953: vii).

The underlying assumptions of this methodology are unified ontologically and epistemologically, stemming from Weber's 'theory of action', the interactionist theories of Schutz, as well as the existential hermeneutics of Heidegger (Morrow and Brown 1994: 116–22).[4]

If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality, which stresses the importance of the subjective experience of individuals in the creation of the social world, then the search for understanding focuses upon different issues and approaches them in different ways. The principal concern is with an

understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies and interprets the world in which he or she finds himself.

(Burrell and Morgan 1979: 3)

Ontologically, I am looking at literary texts from a nominalist perspective, with respect to the linguistic and contextual basis of meaning in culture. Epistemologically, literary texts generate knowledge experientially by providing an avenue to interpret the meaning and consciousness of our actions (and those of others) hermeneutically (Morrow and Brown 1994: 53–6, 116–21).

> Literature does not exist in a vacuum. It grows out of and is a part of human culture, and can only be understood against the background of its cultural matrix ... Literature does not exist in isolation from either life or language: it derives certain of its basic characteristics from the latter, and has an intimate, essential relationship to the former.
>
> (Hall 1963: 9–12)

A literary narrative of leadership theory

> 'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to', said the Cat.
>
> (Carroll 1998: 56)

The distinction between a functionalist and interpretive aesthetic study of organisational cultures and leadership lies in the fundamentally different ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which they are based (Morrow and Brown 1994: 46–8). In very simple terms, the major approaches to leadership theory can be viewed from two perspectives. 'What is the best way to organise? What are the characteristics and traits of an effective leader/manager? What factors allow us to lead more effectively?' These are the questions of a functionalist research project. 'What does it mean to organise? What does it mean to provide leadership? What is the essence of that leadership? Or what are the underlying power dynamics embedded in our organisation structures, leadership positions and communication systems?' These are the questions that interpretive approaches are seeking to answer. If we fundamentally believe that truth lies outside our subjective experience of it and that we need to regulate human interaction to achieve order, we will be concerned with answering the first two questions. If, however, we believe, as I do, that the meaning of reality is socially constructed and the purpose of research is to understand how we create and sustain these shared meanings (whether from a phenomenological or critical theorist perspective) then the latter questions become significant.

The erstwhile primary reason for conducting research in the area of organisational culture, as 'a means of promoting more effective managerial action' (which clearly falls within the functionalist perspective),[5] has started to give way to a view of culture 'as a point of entry for a broader understanding of and critical

reflection upon organizational life and work', more closely aligned with a phenomenological perspective (Alvesson 2002: 12). Chapman notes a growing movement in business studies to 'something oddly like a shift from function to meaning' (2001: 21).[6] A symbolic interactionist approach to organisational theory, such as the cultural analysis research agenda of Smircich to 'explore the phenomenon of organization as subjective experience and to investigate the patterns that make organized action possible' (1983: 348), has started to capture new information about organisational culture, change and leadership. With the rise of phenomenological symbolic interactionist analysis and the study of metaphoric systems in organisation theory, narrative and discourse are becoming established as valid phenomena of organisational life. Researchers are starting to explore new methodologies and literary texts are seen as a legitimate source of organisational data.

The exploration of the humanities (literature, art, cinema) and the hermeneutic text as a whole, is perhaps more familiar within the European tradition of organisational studies than the American tradition. Koza and Theonig (1995: 6) suggest that organisational theory has been at a crossroads, where increasingly more of the interpretive work of the European tradition, designed for understanding or *verstehen* of meaning, has started to influence the essentially 'managerial approach' of American organisational analysis, designed for explanation or *erklären* of cause. 'The aesthetic dimension of organizational life', broadly defined as 'the simultaneous, and unified, engagement of the mind, body, and sensibilities', is slowly becoming a more legitimate form of organisational theory, although this has not always been the case (Gibb 2004: 67).

The introduction of literary texts into organisation and leadership theory has been an evolutionary process. Burns's (1978) seminal text on the principles of transformational leadership drew on the real-life examples set by political leaders. This subsequently led to the study of biographical accounts of political leaders such as Churchill, Kennedy, Ghandi and Martin Luther King to draw out and categorise those ideal qualities that could be emulated by management and executives. More recently, this literature has been augmented by the biographies of successful organisational leaders like Lee Hock (1999), Max DePree (1989), and Arie de Geus (1997). While these accounts have proved inspirational and stimulating, they have not succeeded in demonstrating the 'lived experience' of leadership in the same way that fiction and film have been able to achieve.

Rost contends that of the academic world only the critical theorists such as Foster and Smyth are able to move beyond the dominant paradigm to a transformational conceptual framework; to a view that leadership must be socially critical and 'resides in the relationship between people, rather than in a single individual, and is oriented to social vision and change, not just organizational goals' (1991: 83, 87). While I do not contest Rost's conclusion, I would add that the literary and cinematic world is also able to present such a view, and does so in a way that moves us beyond theory to practical application.

Organisational storytelling and ethnographic narrative have been used to illustrate organisational life from a more phenomenological perspective.

Czarniawska-Joerges notes that 'organizational stories capture organizational life in a way that no compilation of facts ever can; this is because they are carriers of life itself, not just "reports" on it' (1997: 21). Theorists are starting to reach out to the methodologies of literary theory and criticism to tap into their experienced approach to metaphoric and symbolic analysis as this form of organisational research evolves.

It has been suggested by Strati and Guillet de Monthoux (2002: 756) that there are three basic approaches to exploring the aesthetic dimension of organisational life. The first of these is the 'archaeological approach' (attributed to Berg), investigating values and symbols 'which highlight key aspects of organizational cultures' (Strati and Guillet de Monthoux 2002: 756). This approach involves the analysis of those values, stories and artefacts that represent the aesthetics of organisational life. The second is the 'empathic–logical approach' (stemming from Gagliardi 1996), involving observation, interpretation, and reflection that are then synthesised into a logical, rational, overall picture of the organisation. Finally, there is the 'empathic–aesthetic approach' (based on Strati 1992) where the subject investigated is based on the researcher's personal and thorough observation, dialogue, and interaction.

Gagliardi talks about his discovery of an underlying metaphor at play in an organisation and the impact it has had on his research. He relates this incident in the form of a narrative and speaks of the image of a fortress as an underlying metaphor that had become codified:

> Then I suddenly understood: the fortress was the underlying metaphor, the concrete image hidden perhaps in the collective unconscious, perhaps taken in through the old people's stories, certainly incorporated and expressed in perceptible manner in the artefacts ... The fortress was the code in operation, acting according to the syntactic principle of parallel repetition '... shaping the physical and organizational structures with the cogency of a seal moulding wax'.
>
> (Gagliardi 1990: 24)

Reading this passage, one wonders how was he able to make these observations about the organisation and interpret the artefacts in this way? In other words, how does Gagliardi 'know' these things about the 'fortress metaphor' unless through a hermeneutic understanding from all that he has known and currently perceives about the nature (in this case, function) of fortresses – some of which, I contend, is present in our cultural understanding – reflected and shaped by 'culture' in society at large as manifested in literature, cinema, and art.

I contend that literature, like all art, represents and is informed by social reality, thus both reflecting and shaping culture. 'Language, any language, has a dual character: it is both a means of communication and a carrier of culture' (Ngugi 1986: 13). Hall (1963) speaks to the capacity for a writer to represent aspects of his/her society and culture in the creative enterprise. That one does so by the very nature of being a member of that society can result in the unconscious

depiction of deeply rooted problems or beliefs faced by that culture. One often reflects these problems symbolically or metaphorically without conscious awareness. 'In fact, it would seem reasonable to assume the opposite: that the deeper and more fundamental the cultural phenomenon symbolized, the less conscious the artist is likely to be' (Hall 1963: 162–3). Therefore, while the author is writing about his or her current understanding of the culture, they are also expressing underlying beliefs, either prevalent or dormant, within that society as a whole:

> A work of literature can reflect its culture in many different ways – not only by direct representation of the contemporary scene, but also in less obvious manners. It may symbolize various aspects of human behavior and character by indirect representation.
>
> (Hall 1963: 13–14)

I believe that the tacit assumptions and beliefs embedded in society are represented metaphorically and symbolically in our literary texts.

Tales of leadership

> 'Manners are not taught in lessons', says Alice. 'Lessons teach you to do sums, and things of that sort'.
>
> (Carroll 1998: 221)

Alice responds in this fashion to the Red Queen's admonition that she should have been taught the lessons of manners. Her point is that aspects of character, attitude, ethics and morals cannot be taught in a classroom; a response that is equally true with respect to leadership studies. Leadership cannot be wholly taught in a classroom with lessons as transactional steps to be mastered, but needs to be explored experientially as complex aspects of purpose, intent and action in relationship with others.

There is a growing movement towards a concept of transformational leadership where values are paramount. Values such as '... collaboration, common good, global concern, diversity and pluralism in structures and participation, client orientation, civic virtues, freedom of expression in all organizations, critical dialogue, qualitative language and methodologies, substantive justice, and consensus-oriented policy-making process' (Rost 1991: 181).

Increasingly our current value system around leadership, principally in North America and some parts of Europe, is linked to democratic principles and the associated belief that 'undesirable outcomes' are a consequence of undemocratic leadership behaviour. 'In addition, undemocratic leadership undermines the pursuit of ethical ideals, such as self-determination, personal development, and democratic decision-making' (Gastil 1997: 156). Theorists like Rost believe that we need to create a 'new moral language'. He wants us to recognise that 'Leaders and followers who use mythological understandings of leadership are at a distinct disadvantage in practicing leadership' and to understand that the 'reality that

leaders and followers face in their organizations and societies is much more complex than the simplistic notions of leadership handed down in the mythology would have us believe ... ' (Rost 1991: 98).

Much of the current mythology of leadership in America, that of the popular action hero, has been illustrated and perpetuated by mass media. Blockbuster movies now reach well beyond 43 million viewers[7] and 'to a greater extent than we may realize' can exert 'great influence on mainstream culture' (Harper 2001: 238–40). It has been estimated that globally more than 33.5 billion hours a day are spent watching television. The impact of this medium and its 'powers to inform, entertain, socialize and educate' can not be underestimated with respect to the sociation and reflection of culture (Vande Berg *et al.* 2004: 221).

Just as we can sometimes reflect culture unconsciously, we can similarly shape it without express intent. As Hall (1963: 52) notes, just because our beliefs may be tacitly held, it somehow does not stop us from being able to express them as standards to be maintained, and these expectations are communicated symbolically through our literary texts. It is a little startling to think that a *Business Week* survey on leadership styles resulted in Colonel Potter from television's 'M.A.S.H.' being selected as the manager for whom most people would prefer to work, 'above Lee Iacocca' (Sargent and Stupak 1986: 74). Or that in 2000, 'more votes were cast for the candidates for the television show "*American Idol*" than for the candidates for U.S. President' (Galician 2004: 143). These examples would appear to be cases of fiction merging with reality.

In their introduction to *Organizational Reality*, Frost, Mitchell and Nord (1986: xiii) ask a provocative question. If you were from another planet and wanted to know about organisational life, would you purchase one of the leading textbooks in the field by an organisational theorist, or would you 'bring back articles, short stories, and plays about life in organizations?'

Three modes of literary text

Within literature itself, there are three primary ways in which texts can be used in leadership theory. The first of these focuses on the use of classic literary texts, while the other two involve current or popular fictional genres. The use of classic literature as a source for understanding leadership is hardly new. Machiavelli's *The Prince* or any of Shakespeare's Histories and many of the Tragedies have been studied for years as examples of leadership decision-making in action.[8] Researchers like Clemens and Mayer (1987: xvi), having grown weary of the prescriptive texts on leadership theory, are seeking alternatives to understanding organisational life, believing that '... the great literature can help, because it inevitably tells stories *in context*, stories of people dealing with people, struggling toward goals – sometimes succeeding, often failing, but constantly striving'.

Clemens sees classic literature offering 'rich perspectives' and a 'unique source of wisdom', and contends that the issues central to good leadership are universal human issues that have been around a long time and have been reflected in the classic literature of the last three millennia. It is in this respect that Adams and

Pugh have introduced the use of literature into their courses on public adminis-
tration, in 'an attempt to link 'real life' experience as depicted in imaginative
literature with the problems and issues encountered in government' (1994: 63).
In a similar vein, another researcher believes that themes in classic literature,
such as *Antigone*, can highlight and help us to understand the complexities of
administrative decision-making (Marini 1992: 420).

Collins (1996) refers to classic texts as 'canonical'. As a critical theorist, he
has researched the Greek Tragedies to develop an understanding of the dimen-
sions of authority and the characteristics of 'authority figures':

> My conclusions on how people in a particular part of the world some two to
> three millennia ago conceptualized authority are built not upon archeologi-
> cal or sociological data, but upon imaginative data, that is, upon texts in
> which the exercise of authority is portrayed in fictional narratives.
>
> (Collins 1996: xi)

He continues to talk about our understanding of authority figures having been
'enshrined' in our literature and 'bequeathed' to our culture through these
canonical texts, 'where they continue to affect political discourse at every level'
(Collins 1996: xiii). This is particularly significant for today's leadership studies
given the already-mentioned sensibility for democratic leadership in this current
era. We are appalled by the autocratic and cold behaviour of the character Creon
and yet at the same time, we hear the 'internal dialogue' (Collins 1996: 108) of
his love for his niece, and future daughter-in-law, Antigone, counterbalancing
his anger at her stubbornness, and the pain and loss his decisions are costing him.

> It is true enough; and my heart is torn in two.
> It is hard to give way, and hard to stand and abide
> The coming of the curse. Both ways are hard.
>
> (Sophocles 1964: 155)

This battle between the ideologies of autocratic and democratic leadership is one
that plays out daily in organisational life and is illustrated for us in the literature
we read and the films we view. Films such as the political classic *Advise and
Consent* (Mayes 1962) or more recently *Primary Colors* (May 1998) provide an
intimate look at the darker side of public office, even though many of the indi-
viduals involved are working with honourable intent. These films not only
reflect our beliefs (and those of the respective directors), but inform them, and
have helped to create expectations about leadership behaviours. I believe that all
fiction, whether we access it through the medium of print or film, whether it is
classical or contemporary, has this capacity to impact our social reality in this
manner.[9]

> The concepts of leadership are contained within 'a vast background of cul-
> tural presuppositions, that are created by how we conceptualize our

> experience of the world – those underlying assumptions and beliefs that are so embedded that we accept them as reality, and as beyond choice.
>
> (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 57–9)

The second type of literary text involves a small body of twentieth century literature and cinema such as Kafka's *The Trial* (1956; Welles 1963), *Swimming with Sharks* (Huang 1992), *Jerry McGuire* (Crowe 1997), or Heller's *Something Happened* (1974), in which organisational life is graphically depicted, although it may not have been the intent of the author to write a book on the subject of organisations. Nonetheless, we are left with a description of bureaucracy and office politics that evokes a compelling story of everyday lived experience in organisational settings.

I am primarily interested in exploring the third approach to literary texts, involving the symbolic use of popular fiction genres as a source for organisation and leadership theory. There are a few theorists consistently working in this realm. Clemens (Clemens and Mayer 1987; Clemens and Wolff 1999) and Harper (2001) study the symbolic images of contemporary cinema. Waldo is interested in the 'psychological and moral aspects of administrative decision-making' (1968: 8), and looks to literary texts as a means to their disclosure. Kuzmics (1994) uses fiction as a prime source of data for the study of organisations 'because of fiction's unique capability to show "affects", "inner experience", and details of interactions in their "natural" environment'. Gormley examines contemporary mysteries as a source of insight into the ethical dilemmas that bureaucrats face at work. 'In mysteries, unlike in real life, we have access to the most private thoughts of bureaucrats: doubts, values, beliefs, prejudices, and moral impulses' (2001). He goes on to remark that the only thing that separates the intimate thoughts of these fictional characters from those of actual administrators, is that the fictional characters are often more transparent. It is this fundamentally subjective view of the complexity of the human experience that fiction is able to capture and that provides us an intense glimpse into the inner workings of everyday organisational life.

Definitions of the contemporary leadership narrative

Rost encourages us to 'reach a consensus on a clear, concise, easily understandable, researchable, practical, and persuasive definition of leadership' (1991: 8). I offer a series of leadership definitions he provides and examine these in light of current fiction and film to demonstrate how these aesthetic media help us to see observable, clear and practical examples of leadership in the light of these definitions. Expanding on Burns' (1978) concept of transformational leadership, Rost defines leadership as 'an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes' (1991: 102–3). Within this definition there are a couple of key concepts. First, the relationship between leaders and followers is based on multi-directional, non-coercive influence and authority is something that is mutually negotiated (1991: 111).

Second, this relationship exists for the mutually agreed-upon purpose of intending substantive change. Rost stresses that the purpose (i.e. an intent to bring about change) is more important than the achievement of the goals associated with that purpose. Purposes allow for the development of more mutuality; goals tend to be more fixed and rigid. Mutual purposes become common purposes because followers and leaders engage in leadership together. Independent goals mutually held do not qualify for what is meant here as mutual purposes. Mutual purposes are common purposes held by a community of believers. Ultimately, it is not important that the final purpose be realised. 'The intended changes reflect, not realize, their purposes' (1991: 123).

In other words, the significance of transformational change, and inherently transformational leadership, is acknowledged as a process and not an outcome. If this is the case, any documentary evidence that characterises the dilemmas encountered by those undertaking leadership during this process, as opposed to examining the artefacts of the outcomes of leadership, are beneficial to advancing our understanding of leadership in action. Nowhere is this truer than in moral dilemmas encountered during the process of transformational change.

A classic example denoting all aspects of the kind of transformational leadership that Rost is encouraging is the film *Spartacus* (Trumbo 1960) and yet, released as an American epic in 1960, starring the heart-throb box office star, Kirk Douglas, it has also been extraordinarily influential in creating the kind of leadership mythology of which he is so critical. Set in the Roman Republic, standing at the forefront of civilisation, the mythology is that of the heroic leader, inspiring a slave uprising, and leading his army against the might of a corrupt Roman empire. Juxtaposed against the political machinations of the Republican Senator Dracchus and the patrician cruelty and abuse of Marcus Lucinius Crassus, he represents the American heroic ideal, fighting for a democratic and free society. At the same time, each of the criteria in Rost's definition of leadership is demonstrated in observable behaviour, complete with all the psychological and emotional elements of the human experience, allowing us to view specific examples of moral leadership in action.

Spartacus exhibits the behaviours of both management and leadership, for which there was little distinction at the time this film was made. He ensures that his followers are prepared, providing them with training, resources, and sound strategies for plans of attack. More importantly, however, he creates an environment that fosters the development of mutual purpose. He consults with his followers, gathers intelligence from them, recognising their inherent skills and talents and listening to their suggestions. He settles differences collaboratively and encourages his followers to celebrate and value the contribution each brings. When his men argue about which region makes the best wine, he settles the matter by declaring, 'You're all wrong; the best wine comes from home, wherever it is' (Trumbo 1960).

The two styles of leadership are revealingly juxtaposed during the preparations for battle. The autocratic Crassus promises the Roman troops they will be victorious, destroying the slaves and restoring order. He concludes with a command to

vanquish the enemy of Rome. As Spartacus addresses his army, he is thoroughly transparent, explaining the risks involved, speaking of their journey together to this point, and making no promises for the future. He concludes his speech with the statement, 'I do know as long as we live, we must stay true to ourselves'.

Throughout the film, men are challenged with moral dilemmas and we are able to reflect on the decisions each makes in these moments of crisis. While still a slave, Spartacus is forced to consider whether he would sacrifice himself to save a fellow slave/gladiator. He admits, that given these circumstances, he would save himself at the expense of another's life. Yet when faced with the reality of being slain by the rival Ethiopian, he is shown a different path. Because the Ethiopian has made a prior decision that he will not take the life of another slave again, he spares Spartacus' life and chooses instead an honourable death trying to kill the Roman who enslaves him. Spartacus then leads others by this value. He will not allow the slaves to torture Roman captives by forcing them to kill each other in combat. 'I made myself a promise. I swore I would die before I ever watched a man fight to the death again' (Trumbo 1960). Instead he provides his followers with an honourable alternative. On multiple occasions, he demonstrates a higher moral value system in his decisions, ensuring that values are not compromised. The final moral dilemma he faces comes during the enforced combat with Antoninus. Having previously heard Antoninus confess his fear of death, and in spite of his vow to never take the life of another again in combat, he makes the decision to kill Antoninus, sparing him the prolonged death of crucifixion. However, we are also able to see the moment of indecision and doubt prior to his choice and the subsequent emotional cost of that decision.

The film also captures the nature of those who are willing to follow. When faced with the corrupt offer of Crassus, and in the face of threatening power should he refuse to succumb, Antoninus chooses to escape rather than follow such a man. The ultimate example of Rost's definition of followership is provided at the end of the film. When asked which is Spartacus, every man stands and declares himself to be him so as to save their leader, but also because they really are all a part of the larger purpose to achieve substantive change, their lasting freedom. Spartacus's purpose to achieve change is equal to theirs and even though they do not achieve it, their every effort reflects the change they are striving to realise – the ability to act with free agency. 'As long as one of us lives, we all live'.

This brief analysis of one film is not intended to provide support for Rost's theories of leadership or to prove that an aesthetic approach provides the definitive answer to the study of leadership, but simply to demonstrate how we are able to see our way more clearly through the labyrinth of material on leadership captured by the experiences and internal dialogue of protagonists within the story of a literary text.

Pondy *et al.* note that 'the unconscious modes of symbolism that permeate organization may well in the end prove to be one of the most challenging realms within which the organization theorist can work' (1983: 12). I think that the

study of literary texts, and specifically the exploration of fiction, can provide far more than 'a useful and accessible framework for the study of public organizations and policies and for analyzing the issues surrounding the practice of public administration' (Balfour and Mesaros 1994: 559). The study of texts is a hermeneutic endeavour and affords an entry point to understanding some of the deeply embedded symbolic aspects of social leadership action as played out in organisational life.

Literature, regardless of the genre, is able to reach into the experience of the reader or viewer and access the mythic elements to which we all respond at some level.

> In short, the study of organizational aesthetics and the aesthetic understanding of organizational life are indeed new areas of investigation for organizational analysis. But more than this, they question some of the fundamental theoretical assumptions of the most accredited organizational analyses.
>
> (Strati and Guillet de Monthoux 2002: 764–5)

Notes

1 This term is in parenthesis because I wish to stress that I use it to denote all forms of aesthetic work that use language as the primary mediator of meaning and will, throughout this chapter, use it interchangeably with the term 'aesthetic'.
2 The work of organisational theorists with a structural–functionalist frame of reference is sound and has added a valuable foundation to the body of literature exploring organisational theory. It is this search for predictability and order, however, with its emphasis on regulation and control, and its enticing promise of success (provided one manipulates the right set of variables), that has attracted many non-academic management pundits in the business world. Adopting the language and concepts without necessarily the accompanying assumptions, the latter have spawned a plethora of books on leadership and corporate culture that are fundamentally transactional in nature and for the most part neglect to locate their theories within any school of thought.
3 It is significant that he makes a deliberate choice not to look at art forms as he believes these cultural phenomena have had little direct influence on the study of management. It is this very concept I contest in this chapter.
4 There is no question that the theoretical choices I am making with regard to the contextual study of literary texts reflect my own underlying assumptions about reality. My constructivist worldview lies within the interpretive paradigm, within which the working assumption is that reality is only perceived within the meaning of the experience of the social grouping. Therefore, the approach I have taken is determined by basic epistemological assumptions about the nature of culture and leadership and how it can be studied.
5 While the cultural analysis of Schein (1992; 1996; 1999), would fall within a functionalist school of enquiry, he refers to culture as a tacit pattern of shared basic assumptions that has been learned, validated, and taught as the correct way to perceive, think and feel. This theory is consistent with a view that it is possible we have been socialised by film and literature to expect certain leadership characteristics within the workplace, and further that this belief system can be tacitly held as shared patterns of assumptions about leadership.

6   As an anthropologist, he speaks of the value that social anthropology brings to organisational studies as 'potentially revolutionary', particularly if we focus on the richness of qualitative participant accounts rather than quantitative surveys (Chapman 2001: 19–33).
7   Since 1995, the worldwide distribution of the 20 top grossing films ranged from $650 million to $1.8 billion in box office receipts. Assuming an average ticket price of $15 over that same period, this reflects between 43 and 120 million viewers per film, excluding subsequent television screenings (All time box office 2005).
8   Note, for example, Richard Olivier's (son of the Shakespearean actor, Sir Laurence Olivier) much lauded and highly successful speaking tour of the last few years where he explores leadership theory through a number of passages from Shakespearian and Jacobean texts.
9   This may be true regardless of how well or poorly a piece is written. Many a 'trash' novel has made its way to cinematic screenplay where it has affected millions, and harlequin romances influenced the expectations of many an impressionable young woman of my generation.

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10 Living aesthetically and the poetics of dailiness for leadership

Celeste Snowber

First sight

first sight
doe opens eyes
gentle break
into spring sky

seeing for the
very first time
as daily ritual
primavera
begs fresh
through the multiple
shades of green

to walk the path
as if it is the
first glance
each smell and sound
texture and hue
dances into
a chorus of alleluias

what do insight
and sight have
to do with each
other?

I walk the same
inlet path every
day for a decade
of delight.
Return to virgin
embrace of natural
world –
invitation to
inner world.

My aesthetic embrace of the outer world dances my eye to the heart. The act of walking daily among cedar and sky, ocean and birds, swamp grass and dogwood, marshes and heron give way to seeing and reseeing, hearing and rehearing the world around me. It is also the world within me that needs listening to that beckons me to its shore. The shore of the land and the shore of my heart and mind are intertwined. In walking, through motion, I am slowed down to let thoughts come and go, to let sight be transformed into insight. To let go of how I think things should go, and let things have me. To let thoughts have their way, and to let the notes of my life form the chord of a song.

Perception shifts and changes when we practise the art of letting go. But this is not an easy art; if it were, there would not be thousands of books and spiritual practices, which give maps to find ways to let go. I am more inclined to think of letting *be* than letting *go*. I suppose this chapter could be one more map, but it is more of an invitational reminder to allow the aesthetics of daily life form the habits of our lives. We are called to inhabit our lives, and often we do not even know which life we want to inhabit. This chapter presupposes that there is a connection between the textures of the heart and soul and the life of a leader. Recent scholarship within pockets of educational practice and research are finally addressing the relationships between teaching, leading, and the inner life (Denton and Ashton 2004; Miller *et al.* 2005).

Leadership can take many forms, whether in the educational, corporate, political, or artistic worlds. They are all worlds where the words of leaders are informed by actions of vision and passion. Necessary to vision is an acute hearing and listening, seeing and perceiving, not only of one's sense of direction, but what can be manifest from the imagination. The leader can be akin to the artist where he or she sees possibility and opens up the space for new beginnings. Far more is needed in a leader's growth to continue in both the act of visioning, but also seeing with fresh eyes. This chapter addresses the need for an artistic seeing and being throughout life, which in turn informs the act of leadership.

My practice of walking is both spiritual and physical, but it is also a place for me to be shaped, formed, and recreated in the beauty that meets me on the path. I behold beauty, but am also held in beauty. Being held in the beauty, which sits before me, there is no way I cannot be changed, where my dim sight becomes alert to the shapes and movements of the natural world, which are hauntingly beautiful. I agree with author and theologian John O'Donohue when he says, 'when we awaken to the call of beauty, we become aware of new ways of being in the world' (2004: 7). The lessons of beauty are not planned, but they are often the lessons I need to learn not only for living and being, but also for leading and teaching, writing and performing, and mothering and loving. Ultimately they are often the lessons that will sustain me as a leader more than any book or course. They come unannounced and my task is to listen. To slow down enough to listen and return to first sight.

For many of us in leadership, we have been schooled well in taking action, going ahead with a plan, implementing vision and manifesting it into reality. Timing can be everything, and it is not always an easy decision to determine the

right time. In enthusiasm and passion I have often gone ahead too quickly or not allowed the right time to emerge. I see leadership as an artist, and the listening process as very similar to how one watches when the words come in writing, or the movements in a dance. I have thus chosen to incorporate arts-based educational research methods in ways of writing this chapter. This chapter includes the poetic as not only a way to describe the act of leading, but also as a way of theorising. The arts become a place not only of writing up the research, but also a method for deepening and shifting the perceptions and understandings of the practices one engages in leadership. I have chosen methods of research that include the personal as integral to forms of qualitative research and draw on autobiographical inquiry, poetics and narrative inquiry. These approaches are incorporated within arts-based educational research methods and have received a growing interest among artists, educators, and researchers (Barone and Eisner 1997; Bagley and Cancienne 2002; Diamond and Mullen 1999; Fels 2004; Irwin and deCosson 2004; Leggo 2001; Nelson, Cole and Knowles 2001; Snowber 2002). I particularly look to poetics as a way of breaking into the dailiness of aesthetics and come to the door of being intimate with the ordinary. Here the ordinary is transformed to the extraordinary; as poet Tim Lilburn describes, poetry as the place we come to know the world as lover (1999: 17). The poetic leads one into the place where one can take reverie in beauty and linger in living aesthetically. It breaks one open to dreaming, as said so many years earlier by Gaston Bachelard in his classic work on the poetics of space, '... dream values communicate poetically from soul to soul. To read poetry is essentially to daydream' (1994: 17).

Lesson I: The blue heron and the art of waiting

One of the lessons that has been with me in the last year was learned by watching the blue herons near the shore of the Burrard Inlet in Port Moody, British Columbia, where I walk daily with my black lab. Sometimes the herons are in the water, or at the edge where salt and fresh water meet and sometimes flying, alone and together – always, they exude grace. I am learning another way from them, one where I may not be so impulsive, but lean into a timing that may not be so organic to my natural way of being. A timing that I need for both my professional and personal life.

Long inward glance

You feed at the edge
where fresh and salt
abide, trickling from
Noons Creek, falling
mountain water
to inlet sea.

You wait –
elegant stance
a flamenco turn
of blue grey head
one gesture changes –
three pronged foot
extends, subtle flex
in summer light

I watch
and learn the potency
of stilling the heart,
quieting the eye
the rest of rumination
I look
for your lessons
of patience
seasoning my nature
to subtlety
you look for food:
salmon, fish, delights.

I wonder
after watching you closely
solo or trinity
for a year's weather
I too, might grow
in the art of waiting,
wisdom in refrain,
discerning readiness.

I still walk
daily at the edge
of your seascape
marvel in your
ground and flight
and wait
to rest in one
long inward
glance.

I am learning wisdom in waiting from the heron. The heron waits for food and when the time is right, when the food is near, the heron goes after it. The heron is teaching me about timing and flow. And it is because of its arresting beauty that I am so captivated. I can do nothing but stop in my tracks, and literally watch and be wooed into learning there is a kind of timing where one exerts less

effort. The poet Rainer Maria Rilke echoes what the heron embodies in his thoughts on what it means to be an artist, and yet this also has huge ramifications for being a leader, a parent, a friend, a teacher, or just a human being:

> Being an artist means: not numbering and counting, but ripening like a tree, which doesn't force its sap and stands confidently in the storms of spring, not afraid that afterward summer may not come. It does come but it comes only to those who are patient, who are there as if eternity lay before them, so unconcernedly silent and vast. I learn it everyday of my life, learn it with pain. I am grateful for patience is everything.
>
> (Rilke 1984: 24–5)

My Armenian cultural background gave me the incredible gift of the ability to go forward with all the gusto one could have to accomplish any task or goal. Yet, there are also times when one must conserve energy and know when it is the right time to act. As I turn fifty I am much more aware of the importance of rhythm, and as I grow down more deeply into the inner life I am convinced that there is wisdom in the art of waiting and sometimes refraining. This is not something that comes easily to me. Someone else may organically be very good at waiting, and not good at risk-taking, which feels like second nature. To wait is truly to risk.

Risking comes easily to me, it is built into my life as an improvisational dancer, to follow the impulse of movement and works well in creating and performing dance and in teaching, but not always as well in leading. These, however, are life lessons and not a quick fix. It is a practice and challenge to grow and stretch in areas that will bring one into new ways of seeing and being, leading and visioning. Returning to first sight. Again and again.

Lesson II: The wild rose and leading outside the lines

There is a lot of talk these days about integrating other elements into leadership, including intuition (Hatch, Kostera and Kosminski 2005; Davis and Davis 2003). The corporate world has finally caught on, hiring artists and performers for professional development. As an artist, I understand that creativity and intuition do not run in straight lines. There is not always a chart to something that is being created, and it is the detour that may give brilliance or at least a new combination of colours, a resonant chord, or a sentence, that sings off the page. I would often like life to go according to a plan, and there are times when it does, particularly in teaching, but I have often spoken of what I have called 'body pedagogy' where one listens to the body as a place of knowing (Snowber 2002; 2005). We can never plan the factors that will contribute to teaching or leadership and it is up to the leader or teacher to know how to think on his/her feet, and rely on all the variety of intelligences that are available.

It is important for me to be re/minded and re/bodied to the reality that deep beauty can come in random order. I am often overcome by wild flowers growing

by the side of the road, shells and rocks randomly placed in the sand, or burgundy and orange leaves strewn over a driveway. It is in the surprise of composition that I once again see the regalia of shape, diagonals, colours, and intricacies that would go unnoticed in a garden of straight lines of begonia, geranium. The natural world teaches both the beauty of order and disorder, and even what is wild has an order.

My childhood was filled with the natural wildness of a New England coast – rocks and mussels, wild roses and dandelions, seaweed and clams. I was beckoned to a biology of beauty through the extravagance of sea flowers.

Wild rose child

Alizarin red
at the shore
of the inlet trail
spring overgrowth
fragrance of
flame reds.
I love how you
grow wild, like,
red pink dandelions
cluster on the side
of the path.

Wild roses
hung from earth
sand, growing up
near Short Beach
in Nahant, Massachusetts
They laced
the causeway
when one drove
onto the peninsula,
really a thrombola,
my island of home.
I am still a wild
rose child, a
beauty who flourishes
in wild places,
still contained
in the blue of sea,
haunt of grey
skies, the
season of red
after a long
winter.

I dared to pick
one, placed it
carefully in a
clear vase
on my bedroom
window sill.

It died the next
day. What is
born to be wild
cannot thrive
in domesticated
country.

I am born anew
by sea, and light,
stars and moon,
loves that don't
run in straight lines.

Our lives both professional and personal do not often, if ever, run in straight lines. They are filled with spirals and circles, curves and shapes, angles and corners, which surprise us at every turn. We need to see the beauty in what becomes the 'unplanned curriculum' or the twist in the road of our journey. It is what Ted Aoki calls 'living pedagogy – the site between representation and non-representational discourse' (Aoki 2003: 5).

Flexibility as a dancer is built by daily practice, not necessarily by something one is born into. To be flexible as a leader, one must be not only open, but also engage in the practice of seeing the aesthetics of curves and relishing the wild nature of a course to be followed. Here is the place for leading with joy, the joy that is discovered by the artist, and followed by the leader. It is a deep listening to the crevices where one can bring ingenuity, inspiration, and courage. Said so beautifully by O'Donohue, 'Beauty is not just a call to growth, it is a transforming presence wherein we unfold towards growth almost before we realize it. Our deepest self-knowledge unfolds as we are embraced by Beauty' (2004: 8). And in our embrace we are often set free to soar.

Bringing the soul to leadership

Integrating an aesthetics of the everyday into leadership is living as a lover of beauty in our daily life. Sometimes that beauty may be dissonant, but it is a keen sensitivity to what happens within and around us. It is cultivating the ability to live in what Maxine Greene would call a state of being 'wide awake', and what I would refer to as living aesthetically (Greene 1995). I think of the Indian poet Tagore who captures the *joissance* of life so profoundly in his poem, 'My Last Song'.

> Let the strains of joy mingle in my last song – the joy that makes the earth flow over in the riotous excess of the grass; the joy that sets the twin brothers, life and death, dancing over the wide world; the joy that sweeps in with the tempest, shaking and waking all life with laughter; the joy that sits still with its tears on the open, red lotus of pain; and the joy that throws everything it has upon the dust and knows not a word.
>
> (1997: 38)

There is a relationship between living an engaged life as a human being and how we enter the realm of leadership. If we teach who we are, as Parker Palmer says, we also lead as who we are (1998: 2). The invitation to live aesthetically is to practise an attention to aesthetics of dailiness in all we do. This is truly an ongoing practise in learning to see and resee each day.

Kindling first sight

In the busy-ness of living a multiple life, one could ask how one truly has the time or energy to live aesthetically. But I would question how one does not have the time to live aesthetically? We are bombarded by so many details every day, and between answering emails, planning suppers, getting children off to school, reorganising programmes, developing curricula, attending meetings, doing laundry, planning lunches, paying bills, and, of course, attending more meetings and remortgaging the house to survive, where is there time to smell the flowers, or drink in the sea, or drop into a kind of solitude that we re/member who we are, part of the earth and re/member that we are sensual creatures on this planet?

Childhood may offer us this time, but as adults, unless some of us are fortunate to take a holiday, or time away, it is not available to us. Thomas Merton reminds us that 'hurry ruins saints and artists ... and they cannot take time to be true to themselves' (1961: 98). I would suggest that hurry also ruins leaders and teachers, administrators and executives. It is not surprising that today there is a whole movement in 'slowness' with websites, support groups and literature arising from the need to slow down (Honore 2004). There is a cultivation of looking at time in another way, one that can go from chronos or to measured moments, to kairos or unmeasured moments, the time where we forget the time. And here we dream, inspire, imagine, and co-create new worlds.

No matter what, there is a need for time out of time, even if it is a few hours. Our minds work overtime, and there is not even a moment to drop into our bodies and senses, which are the sacred place, which will truly give the opportunity to be in rapture, to have a bodily aesthetic.

The unexpected pause

It truly is another kind of common sense – or a return to our senses – to cultivate a small 'time out of time', a rendering of the world which allows one to dwell in the aesthetics of daily life. Yet, an interruption is often needed to get one to the

place where one 'stops' 'listens' 'sees' and drinks in the beauty of the ripening fruit, or falling leaf, or the smile of an elderly woman or man. Yesterday I was halted from going through my regular morning routine because of a power outage and I was once again catapulted into taking in the wild roses. Here is an excerpt from my journal:

> There are wild rose petals strewn over the sidewalk as I drive by on the way to taking the kids to school and then proceed to the university. I wonder if anyone notices the beauty of dropped petals – announcing themselves as outrageous creation on concrete. The whole morning is disrupted as the power went off and the streets were in a state of chaos. I couldn't take my morning swim and delayed going to the university till the traffic wound down. I grabbed a coffee and wrote in a café near the window.
>
> I wanted to pick a wild rose this morning and put it in my hair, but the thorns deterred me and I put a yellow freesia from the vase in the bathroom as an alternative to the hair products so well used by three teenagers in the house. I'm on my way to a PhD defence, a culmination of years of study and I can't stop thinking of the image of hot pink fuchsia petals contrasted against slabs of grey. It is the unplanned that drives us crazy (like the power outage) and that which is unplanned that sustains and nourishes the heart. This is what I call *random beauty* or even more precisely – a random aesthetic. There was no plan for these petals to drop, they are just following the natural order: dropping, falling, and pirouetting to the ground. Their colour strikes the senses and transcends any chaos in the morning. Why aren't all the people in the suburbs coming out of their houses and howling at the beauty – an invitation to forget that their houses aren't properly painted, or that the moss is overgrowing their lawn, the bills aren't paid, their spouse is disappointing them, not to mention their children's struggle to live inside the rules.

What about the rules of random beauty? Beauty halts us. The aesthetic arrest, a stop. We need to be stopped as humans if not by the power going out, it should be beauty. It can be the place for the pause, the comma or semicolon in our lives which raises joy and brings one back to wonder. We need to be halted to wonder, or as the Jewish theologian Abraham Heschel has so beautifully said, that what we can't comprehend by analysis we comprehend by awe (1983). Where is the magic in our days and moments where inspiration is breathed in as wind, and colour is splattered as the fuchsia petals? Spirit meeting flesh. A breath of sorts. A falling in love with life and with our work.

My eldest son, now seventeen, writes an allegory the night before for his class and I read it, and at the end he says, 'one can never be sorry if he lets love rule his life' in terms of speaking of vocation. How anyone can have such wisdom at seventeen and yet have trouble getting his breakfast is beyond me. If I knew when I was a seventeen-year-old how my life would be different, and if I could only do this now at fifty, how it still would keep me on track. Love ruling your life is

noticing the petals falling, staying close to the heart in all we do. Breathing into the pause, whether it is an interruption or intentional, the pause becomes the breath to see and hear again with first sight.

One might wonder how I make such a leap from ruminating on wild roses to its relationship to leadership. It truly is a fragrant relationship, with a scent that lingers. It is clearly not a lesson as much as it is training to listen to the unexpected through beauty, see the miraculous in a difficult situation, and invite mystery to the dailiness of our professional lives. This always presupposes that the professional and personal are interrelated. We lead as who we are, and if we are wide awake in one area, we will tend to be in another. Frederich Buechner, author and theologian, has articulated this well, stating, 'the most basic lesson that all art teaches us is to stop, look, and listen to life on this planet, including our own lives, as a vastly richer, deeper, more mysterious business than most of the time it ever occurs to us to suspect as we bumble along from day to day on automatic pilot' (1992: 52).

An aesthetics of place for leadership

I was schooled at an early age by my artist mother to live life through the senses of aesthetics, which grabbed at the centre of everyday life. I was trained in a sensual knowing. Now many years later, after both my parents have passed on and I crave continuity to my original family, it is often the smells, textures, hues, shapes, and sounds of my daily life that provide a kind of entering and re-entering to the wonder of perceiving small acts of beauty. Beauty sustains and nourishes a love that lives on, long after those who have mentored, led, and shaped us have gone.

Beneath the skin of plum black

Plum black
the colour
of love marinated
in the drip of oil
tenderized in
the h/earth of kitchen
in New England day.

Star leaves at its
slender head
pear like in shape
smooth for fingers touch
endless dishes
meals of everyday
formed from this
vegetable, almost
sacred in its
nakedness.

Eggplant.
Jeweled with sautéed onions
adorned with red
pepper, or a hint
of green parsley,
a slice of lamb.
It was your colours
my mother was
in love with,
aromas seemed
to take second place
to the magnificent
hues of dark purple
blackened violet.

I've had to disguise
you eggplant
for my children's palette.
Mushed with olive oil
yoghurt, parsley and plenty of garlic
you transform into
babaganoosh, still
a far cry from

the 101 ways my
Armenian mother
would lovingly open
you up to your
pungent parts.

I had cooking lessons
at an early age, as if
it was a modern art class.

'Celeste, make sure the
colours are complimentary,
just as the painter puts blue
next to orange'
'Never leave the pan without
a hint of green.'
'Look how stunning the red
pepper accents the plum
of eggplant'

Artistic presentation was all,
but being in love with
the process of food
preparation was more.

What was in the pan
was living art,
no different than her
still life paintings, modern
flower arrangements.
It all happened in the
kitchen. Here is where
normality returned

from the aftermaths
of rage, the post-
genocide ripping the
feminine artistic soul.
Smells, textures, hues
were the heaven of the
new earth, and the
scent of the old land.

I'm the second generation
infused with colour
close to the bone.
Colour was the heart
of my home,
hidden in the eggplant
and hidden in a life.

My mother had an
eggplant soul
a beauty of both
dark and light
the yellow white flesh
of eggplant encased
with its purple hues
waits to be transformed
with a hint of cinnamon.
Much more was transformed
within my soul
the meeting of art and life
just beneath the
skin of plum black.

You may be wondering how eggplant can truly be connected to leadership. If it could be so simple as to buy eggplant, one would automatically have a transformative vision of aesthetics in leadership. But it is never the object that leads one into transformation, rather the kind of seeing and attending that transforms the object. Seeing again with fresh eyes and hearing with fresh ears is required for a

leader not only to birth vision, but to sustain the kind of vision that has been born from within. Vision is fuelled by the continuous act of living aesthetically, and in turn we birth new words to our worlds. If we take those eyes and ears to our lives as leaders, we can slowly get glimpses of the beauty that is unfolding before our eyes. Of course some of that beauty may have a dissonant character, but it will be a place where the depths can be revealed. And first sight begins.

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Part III

Critical applications to administration and leadership

11 The aesthetics of charisma

Architectural, theatrical, and literary dimensions

Eugenie A. Samier

My interest in analysing charisma from an aesthetic perspective began with work on Weber's comprehensive theory of charisma, that is, charismatic leadership, the characteristics of a charismatic administrative staff, and the nature of a charismatic organisation. It is apparent from Weber's discussion in *Economy and Society* (1968), and from biographical and organisational case studies, that in its purest form charisma is a highly creative force. This is particularly evident when one focuses not just on leadership traits, but also takes into account Weber's valuational approach to social action, oriented towards the acceptance of charismatic authority by its followership and the consequent construction of idiosyncratic organisational practices. And it is this feature that suggested an aesthetic analysis.

What appeared to be a useful way of tackling aesthetics was identifying modes or individual arts of charisma that are the expressive means by which charisma makes itself felt. This chapter explores a theoretical foundation for the aesthetics of charisma by examining three essential expressive features: the architectural, as the shaping of space and the construction of the artefactual; the theatrical, as the formation of interpersonal relations through the performative; and the literary, as the creation of rhetoric and poetics. All three are discussed as value-laden and symbolic of the particular features that distinguish charismatic leadership from other forms of authority and distinguish types or styles of charisma based on aesthetic categories in much the same way as one would categorise styles of art. This chapter also proposes a new way of evaluating the 'content' of charisma, and highlights some of the destructive potential of charisma – in other words lays the groundwork for an aesthetic critique.

The individual arts of charisma

Ottensmeyer argues that aesthetic values are ever-present – they are 'an undeniable part of the fabric of the organisation' regardless of how drab the institution or ugly the surroundings, stultifying the design, or non-artistic (boorish?) the managers (1996: 189). They therefore pertain not only to organisations that are beautiful, that is, have attained some form meeting predetermined ideal standards, but are taken to mean principles that govern the form of any

organisational kind, and what Gagliardi views as the original meaning of 'aesthetic' in Greek, 'sense experience,' covering forms of sensory knowledge, expressive (a mode of feeling) and impressive action (oriented to practical ends), and communication (1996: 566). It extends to both the processes that generate organisation as well as the 'artwork' produced.

The guiding principle for the sections that follow is that adopted from Lessing's principle of *Materialgerichtigkeit* (doing justice to the nature of the material) – treating the unique qualities of the material with respect and employing it to bring out its full potential rather than treating the aesthetic as incidental, in this case to charismatic leadership. Predating McLuhan by some 200 years, Lessing (1957 [1755]) maintained that the medium of the art influences the way subject matter is presented. For Gottschalk, too, creativity is an interaction between the artist and the material producing an imaginative reintegration of symbolic elements. He proposes four principles of artistic form equally suitable for the arts of charisma: 1) centrality, an overriding theme, element, figure or idea; 2) harmony or controlled recurrence, like repletion, thematic variation or parallelism; 3) balance, such as the play between opposites, or contrast; and 4) development, the progression of events that can be seen in an author's introduction of characters, plot complication, climax and unravelling (1962: 1–14).

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this book, recent organisational aesthetic theory has emerged partly from the organisational culture movement. Typical of the educational organisational culture approach, Deal (1995) suggests the potential symbolic role various artistic modes and genres can play in a school, such as poetry, stories, theatre, music and visual arts. However, they are dealt with as cultural artefacts rather than as explicit aesthetic properties of the social fabric organised conceptually into a set of coherent and comprehensive aesthetic principles. What is proposed here is an underlying critique of aesthetics in its three main expressive forms, the architectural, the theatrical, and the literary. Collectively, these arts can be viewed as a comprehensive social aesthetic in the Wagnerian sense of *Gesamtkunstwerk* (total work of art), creating social reality through encoded and embodied meanings and values. They are extensible in analysis to structures, functions, activities, and decision-making – in fact, all conventional ordering principles that are used to create an organisation.

Architectural/artefactual

The structuring of space and the construction of the artefactual as the architectural dimension of charisma is not a new idea, but draws upon an aesthetic tradition oriented towards social action. Benjamin, for example, regarded the architectural as the 'stage' for the performative:

> Porosity results not only from the indolence of the southern artisan, but also, above all, from the passion for improvisation, which demands that space and opportunity be at any price preserved. Buildings are used as a popular stage.

They are all divided into innumerable, simultaneously animated theatres. Balcony, courtyard, window, gateway, staircase, roof are at the same time stage and boxes.

(1979: 169)

The architectural has long had a close association with organisational form. Guillén (1997) has explored in some detail the effect of scientific management's values on European modernist architecture, the three values of 'unity, order, purity' governing design of buildings, furnishings and decoration. The resulting artistic movements – German Bauhaus, Italian Rationalism and Futurism, French Purism, and Soviet Constructivism – were also associated with democratic values, most importantly goals serving the interests of the working class by improving their conditions through urban planning, and home, office, and factory design. (However, as Guillén points out, architecture inspired by management science degenerated in North America to structures lacking any truly artistic value of form.) His work points to two macro levels on which the aesthetics of charisma can be viewed. The first is urban planning and building design reflecting an ethos or set of values embedded in leadership ideology. The second is horizontal and vertical location of significant structures indicating political regime values, or power relations, seen in the symbolic dimensions and positioning of major government buildings, and hierarchical location of executive level government officials' offices, often encased in protective support staff space.

Architectural representation of power and authority is as old as its need to compose and sustain itself – seen in the processional arcade leading to the Babylonian Ishtar Gate, the Egyptian pyramids, and the Roman Senate building. Grandiosity is just as common to modern charismatic leaders like Stalin's and Hitler's monumentalist conceptions of architecture, evidencing an 'Ozymandias syndrome', inevitably succumbing to the ravages of time and internal institutional pressures described in Percy Shelley's poem: '"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:/Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"/Nothing besides remains. Round the decay/of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare/The lone and level sands stretch far away'. Even democratic charismatic leaders, while not so often crassly embodying their identity in a personal monument, symbolically erect institutions identifiable with the essential values of their regime, like Kennedy's NASA or Reagan's 'Star Wars' programmes. It is not uncommon in universities, either, for a departing president to erect a fountain or some other equally symbolic structure to permanently embody their term in office.

In a short study of university campuses, Dutton and Grant argue that architecture is 'complicit in reproducing the dominant ideologies and social relations of society, undermining diversity and its critical possibilities' (1991: 37), reinforcing disciplinary divisions and hierarchies. For example, open space schools represent an attitude predisposed against bureaucratic power and authority, designed instead to overcome the conventional isolation and subjugation of teachers in separate classrooms inhibiting their politicisation. The

same principles are seen at play in Cairns's description of quintessential bureaucratic aesthetic:

> In the 1970s the agency moved into a new office development that had been designed as an example of 'bürolandschaft in excelsis' (Duffy 1992: xii), but within a governmental, bureaucratic context – large, free-form, open-plan office floors for the operational staff, and enclosed offices for management (top management was situated within a tower that sat above the main buildings). Within a short time, the 'organic' design had been replaced by regimented rows of administrative staff desks, with supervisors sitting at the heads of the rows – supervision by watching every move. Departmental boundaries became delineated and defined by 'Berlin walls' of storage cabinets – almost as impenetrable and, in the event, more permanent.
>
> (2002: 808–9)

What typifies the bureaucratic aesthetic is a low degree of workspace personalisation, enforced by architecture and furnishings that do not easily accommodate photographs, plants, paintings, and other decorative arts. Common areas like washrooms, coffee rooms, and hallways, too, are planned, dehumanised environments, where one's organisational persona is sanctioned, and preference is given to technological equipment. But the aesthetic analysis can be deeper than this. Buildings and their furnishings are never neutral, but carry social and political value, empowering some, silencing others. Strati's organisational aesthetic principle that 'artefacts are metaphors for the hierarchy of organizational levels' (1999: 37) can be seen his study of offices (1992) and chairs (1996) and Witkin's (1990) study of conference rooms, where presence and position is signalled by the functional form of furnishings, as well as the quality of design, materials and construction. Generally, the uglier and more uncomfortable the space, the lower one is on the totem pole of influence. Chairs, in particular, are significant artefacts as they carry a strong metaphorical political message indicating the apex of power (as in academic, administrative or governance chairs), complemented by resources committed to 'beautifying' executive space and boardrooms with sofas, paintings, and pottery. The chair of rulership is treated significantly in the form of thrones, or executive high-backed leather. Aspiring rulers often invest great attention aesthetically in the chair, like the former Shah of Iran's Peacock throne, or Saddam Hussein's recently displayed throne. However, kitsch overtakes good aesthetic judgement in apparent direct proportion to the insecurity and artificiality of their rule; the lack of artistic value ironically representing the lack of authenticity and legitimacy.

Additional features signalling power and privilege are the broad corridors and large front offices of secretarial guardians one finds in central agencies like the German Foreign Ministry, particularly the rear building that housed Honecker and his senior staff's offices. The quality of carpets (not metres of roll carpeting), wood panelling, porcelain and silver coffee service, all impose a still

atmosphere expressive of power, privilege, and the right to decision-making. It is this principle, too, that characterised the offices of the Central Committee *apparat* in Moscow, an ascetic style consisting of solid furnishings of wood panelling, green baize covered desks, and the 'Kremlin runner' carpeting imposing the steady silence of unhurried self-assured power (Dzhirkvelov 1987: 120–2). Executive space is also typically designed for the display of large or valuable art objects, in contrast to the majority of staff lower down on the hierarchical ladder who have only crammed shelves on which to house objects of non-functionalist value. In universities of the North American type, choice locations and larger offices are reserved not for scholars, but for the administrative elite contrasting strongly in practice with universities in some parts of Europe structured around a strong academic chair tradition. The committed use of space reflects a broad range of values, revealing the underlying true nature of organisational relationships despite rhetoric about belongingness, collegiality, and teamwork. The amount of apparent empty space one has available represents one's control of policy and privacy, for example through dedicated boardrooms in contrast to those lower down the hierarchy who carry out communication rituals in doorways, narrow (often ill-lit) corridors, and washrooms.

The charismatic creation of the architectural conveys symbolically the new values and meanings constructed. In many cases, old buildings are razed and new ones built in their place, as charismatic political movements are wont to do in eliminating the traces of former regimes. Heather Höpfl has termed this 'the cancellation of the space' and the memories and emotions attached to the site a melancholic aesthetic, metaphorically representing the power one carries to define the function and the meaning of a site (2000: 97, 98). However, some sites become sacred and protected by taboo, making them immune to an alternative use, particularly memorial sites like the Twin Towers in New York, or the extermination camp at Auschwitz. She extends her analysis to a critique of organisational allegories that define the boundaries of the organisation, its history and membership qualities. Where the allegory has been founded on loss, its role becomes a mortification – institutionalising and sanctioning melancholy. Its role can also be viewed as a saprophytic consumption of the dismembered attributes of organisational members, appropriated to work goals (2000: 99–100). On a smaller scale, space is reallocated or even altered through the installation or removal and redecoration of walls. New artefacts are installed, such as flags, monuments, statuary, landscaping, portraits, murals, and logos, all intended to establish a new relationship in power and control.

One recent example of the architectural used to both create and convey an intentional departure from conventional corporate practices is the design of Microsoft's campus during the early years, when the organisation was still small – in effect still a highly charismatic organisation structured and operated through charismatic values. All offices were relatively small, including Gates's, and furnishings relatively simple. Buildings were designed to maximise horizontal extension to allow for almost equal access to windows, with a central hub for

amenities and facilities. Not only is the corporate executive space still not signalled by a monumental entrance, marble floors, or furnished with luxurious carpeting, hardwoods, leather, tapestries or other 'expensive' art on the wall, it is difficult to distinguish on the Microsoft campus. Dress codes throughout most divisions are idiosyncratic, and individual offices can be completely transformed to create a highly personalised environment. The architectural features of the Microsoft campus both represent and embody the interactional styles regarded as peculiar to the company, at least in its earlier charismatic phases before entering its current routinisation – in which a high degree of structural fluidity, intensive work style, and a confrontational style of communication were signal traits. The expression of power is carried instead through proximity to Gates (see Andrews 2000; Wallace and Erickson 1992).

Klein and Diket (1999) describe in some detail the aesthetic means by which 'artful leadership' can positively affect a organisation's culture and climate, infusing trust and faith conducive to professional development and more humanised ways of working, particularly in educational environments. The creation of 'artful spaces' includes not only decorative elements but also the architectural design of light and space attending to all formal and sensory properties. These aesthetic principles allow for and influence the structuring and quality of social relations, reinforcing the underlying values governing moral and spiritual dimensions of collegial and teaching relationships.

Performative/theatrical

The performative consists of those theatrical elements that shape interpersonal relations: its roles, scripts, and styles of interaction. Organisation from this perspective is the site of imagery production and acceptance by its audience – it is the staging of organisational life. The importance of the performative was understood well by Machiavelli, described in *The Prince* as '… the Magnificence which is necessary for a Prince to rule his people' demanding conspicuous displays, lavish and costly garments, elaborate rituals, royal progresses and *joyeuses entrées* for rulership (see Book I Chapter xiv). Wollheim maintains that any medium can be a vehicle of art that is able to capture such 'critical categories or concepts as diverse as magic, irony, ambiguity, illusion, paradox, arbitrariness' (1971: 131–2), all of which are the stuff of charisma. Its theatrical aesthetic derives in part from Dilthey's (1989) phenomenology in which 'lived experience' was defined as a many-faceted yet coherent system involving the interaction and interpenetration of cognition, affect, and volition, culminating in traditions of *communitas* and *weltanschauungen*, built as much out of metaphoric and synecdochic processes as conceptual. Charisma rests upon the same assumptions: the aesthetic provides the means by which disparate elements are incorporated into a coherent meaningful symbolic system. This view of modern organisations is closer to that of performance ritual in traditional societies in which the creative and stylised interplay of space, time, performers, action and audience (Schechner 1977: 28) have not been differentiated from the rest of society.

If charisma is theatre, then it is possible to adapt schemes like Oskar Schlemmer's (1962) analysis of the composite elements of the theatrical to differentiate forms of charismatic expression. He introduces four: 1) the genre, which, in authority terms would entail the legal–rational, traditional, and charismatic; 2) type of place: the political arena, business and industry sector, religious organisations, educational and intellectual movements; 3) type of person: executive, administrative, management, support, and field staff; and 4) modes of expression such as speech, music, dance, gesture.

Gardner and Avolio (1998) suggest four dimensions to organisational dramaturgy that reflect a strong aesthetic perspective, and can be used as an analytical tool in examining performative aspects. The first is scripting that builds upon the frame, identifying and referring to the directions that define the scene, casting roles for organisational actors and outlining expected behaviours through a dramatis personae (consisting of antagonists, victims, protagonists, allies, supporting cast members, etc.),[1] and expected behaviours in dialogue through metaphor, analogue and stories (the content of the dialogue is developed in the next section) and non-verbal and emotional displays through use of the eyes, voice quality, animation, eye contact, gestures, touch, body posture, speaking rate, smiles as cues to the audience to participate. Second, framing is the communication that shapes followers' perspective and therefore the meaning of socially constructed reality in higher order policy or goal statements indicating the group or organisation's fundamental mission. Third, staging includes set design, props that serve organisational purpose, costumes, and lighting. And finally, styles of performance like exemplification (e.g. Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi who portrayed their integrity and moral worthiness through self-sacrifice), self-promotion (to bolster competence and power), ingratiation, intimidation, and supplication (Gardner and Avolio 1998: 46–7).

Performance skills have most often been investigated in charisma research. Katz suggests that charisma is appreciated by the audience when the unique ability of a 'natural' performance appears to flow out easily from within, rather than the nervous performance produced with great effort as a result of the hard work of practice (1972: 193), thus illuminating part of everyday aesthetics. For Bass, 'charismatic leaders are great actors. They are always "on stage"... [they have] the ability to build on [followers' needs, values, and hopes] through dramatic and persuasive words and actions' (1988: 47–8). In less theatrical, but no less performative, terms Conger and Kanungo (1988: 87) regard as a necessary condition of charisma expressive modes that encompass not only the verbal, but dress, appearance, and body language. Awamleh and Gardner (1999) explored performative qualities to distinguish charismatic leaders through qualities of eye contact, fluency, gestures, facial expressiveness, eloquence, energy, and voice tone variety. The importance of the content of the vision and strong style of delivery for charisma were investigated experimentally, and while they used a very narrow sample in a laboratory setting, the results are suggestive of the necessity of these features to create an organisational audience.

Goodman (1976: 246) attributes to art the social function of arousing emotions that are normally shunned in a form that can safely purge pent-up and hidden negative emotions in the politics of the organisation, such as fear, hatred and disgust. This palliative and therapeutic role of performance not only releases emotions in a controlled way, but can also then provide the links between creative and libidinal motivation in the authoritative roles allowed to charismatic leaders, and used to produce loyalty, obedience, and collective identity. Charisma's performative dimension structures normative patterns and roles (e.g. the heroic, the antagonistic), the rise and fall of systems of leadership and systems of legitimisation, and establishes identities and boundaries between status groups and these effect discipline. While more emphasis is placed on engaging followers and conveying a dramatic image to the external world (e.g. through advertising), it is also a style of conflict resolution and a way of overcoming organisational resistance.

As a social aesthetic, charisma is open to stylistic analysis suggested through common phenotypes describing organisational culture: the family, the machine, the cabaret, the war zone, the little shop of horrors, and the pathological personality. Drawing upon Wölfflin's analysis of style, one can posit two levels of aesthetic analysis: historical traditions that reflect the temper or *Geist* of an age through individual, national, and period styles – in leadership terms, fascist or authoritarian, humanistic, or co-operatist – and the formal characteristics that produce style, in this case, Wölfflin's (1950: 14–16) five pairs of representational concepts applicable to any art form, including the charismatic. It is painterly rather than linear, in that charismatic artefacts reflect a perception of the visual appearance in which stress is placed on the limitless quality of the objects as part of an apprehension of the world as shifting semblances, instead of bureaucratic artefacts that reflect the line acting as the path of vision resulting in a perception of an object by its tangible character in which is stressed the limits of things as isolated, solid bodies. It emphasises recession rather than plane, by stressing depth thereby discounting contour and plane, instead of a rationalist presentation of objects in a plane reduced to line and extending on one plane producing explicitness. The charismatic is also of an open rather than closed form, presenting objects contextually instead of as objects as part of finite wholes. It also emphasises multiplicity over unity, by viewing objects as a harmony of free parts, instead of as parts interrelated in a single theme. And, finally, the charismatic stresses a relative instead of absolute clarity, by representing things as they look and seem by their non-plastic qualities, instead of representing things singly as plastic using composition, light and colour to define form.

Literary

Language is a fundamental tool in creating the meanings and structures of organisational reality necessary to establishing and using power. It legitimates power relations, rationalises practices and traditions, and, most importantly, conveys

the valuational content of charisma, often referred to as the vision or mission. When wielded as stories and legends, forming patterns of meaning from the otherwise chaotic dynamics of social action, it takes on ritual status tied to the mythic foundations of organisational reality in either supportive or oppositional ways. Stories condition what is perceived to be real, possible, valuable, and moral. For example, creation myths for an organisation can be used both to establish a dramatic picture of the past emphasising the preservation of icons, including the iconographic attitude toward established models, methods, and texts, and as an interpretation of history to guide change (Verrey and Henley 1983: 76). On an individual level, conformity is achieved through what Bergson (1935: 194–7) refers to as 'closed' morality – a symbolic way of expressing socially approved attitudes to strengthen ties of mutual obligation. The pressure of social obligation combines with *la fonction fabulatrice* in which the mythmaking function counteracts the possibly dissolvent or 'deconstructive' effects of the growth of individual critical intelligence.

Edelman views reality as we understand and define it as linguistically constructed: 'Language does not mirror an objective "reality," but rather creates it by organizing meaningful perceptions abstracted from a complex, bewildering world' (1971: 66). He further notes that the symbolising ability used to construct organisational reality allows one to reconstruct the past, perceive present conditions, and anticipate future events, characteristics of Conger and Kanungo's three-stage process in charismatic behaviour (1988):

> ... through symbols that abstract, screen, condense, distort, displace, and even create what the senses bring to his attention. The ability to manipulate sense perceptions symbolically permits complex reasoning and planning and consequent efficacious action. It also facilitates firm attachments to illusions, misperceptions, and myths and consequent misguided or self-defeating action.
> (Edelman 1971: 2)

The evocative power of charismatic language exemplifies Gombrich's (1969: 11) view of the potency of symbols in the realms of language and writing, and is especially powerful in allegorical form in the creation of meaning, provision of coherence, and imposition of order (Heather Höpfl 2000: 108). An example of this in recent charismatic leadership is captured in Bass's description of Kennedy's construction of leadership:

> John F. Kennedy ushered in a new Camelot complete with his Queen Guinevere and knights ready to do battle in Cuba, Berlin, and Vietnam with the villainous foes of freedom, the Cuban devils and Soviet dragons. The depth of the public depression resulting from Kennedy's assassination can only be explained by the strong, emotional idolization of the image of Kennedy as dragon slayer, savior, and creator of a new life on earth for the disadvantaged.
> (Bass 1985: 56)

For many charisma theorists, like Bass, eloquence is a requisite quality, consisting of 'colourful, incisive, inspiring speeches' (1988: 49). House (1977), too, regards the nature and content of the messages communicated to followers as critical in capturing their ideals, arousing needs, and motivating them to action. However, he stops short of a poetics of charismatic text. Rhetorical and poetic force requires using words that engage the senses, as does good literature, in evoking central themes of human experience and capturing the ideals of charisma. Preliminary work in the charisma field has provided empirical evidence to this effect. Harro Höpfl explores the power of rhetoric in organisational creation in a study of the Jesuits: 'the conscious and explicit use of rhetoric in marketing the products and images of organizations, the construction of statements, strategies and structures designed to achieve organizational objectives and the deliberate use of mythopoeic imagery and narratives to support the construction of organizational histories' (2000: 209). Gardner and Avolio (1998) have examined the use of metaphor, analogy and stories by charismatics like Mary Kay Ash (the central motif of the bumblebee was used for motivation and identity construction). Conger (1991) has examined the features of rhythm, repetition, balance, and alliteration used by Martin Luther King in the potent phrases serving as guiding metaphors in two of his most famous and stirring speeches, 'Let freedom ring' and 'I have a dream.' In a study of US Presidential inaugural speeches, Emrich *et al.* (2001) found that those who used image rather than concept-based terms were judged to be more charismatic. Most recently commentators have described George W. Bush's use of religious rhetoric of divine national and international desires in fusing politics and religion as positioning him as a prophet which seems to affect a significant proportion of the American electorate charismatically. Distinctively, charisma of all the forms of authority is idealistic in nature and content, requiring the formal properties associated with literary form in capturing and conveying ideals in embodied form – that is, in a form that resonates emotionally and spiritually, and that can be enacted.

But eloquence of charismatic language for aesthetic analysis needs to be examined according to formal literary properties. This includes style, syntactic and rhetorical features (repetition, accumulation, hyperbole, climax, etc.), poetic devices (meter, rhythm, euphony, imagery and metaphor), semantic density (a high level of implicit meaning), and other features like ambiguity, paradox, tension and irony. It can also be identified by genre, like romantic or historical, and by form – narrative, poetic, and dramatic.

The literary content of the charismatic serves also to assist in its routinisation. Heroic tales recounting dramatic innovation in the founding or reforming of an organisation serve to sanction further innovation, but also to impose organisational conservatism by granting sacred status to the organisational creation and its maintenance. As charisma routinises, there is a shift away from the initiating charismatic leader as the popular symbol, towards other leaders, martyrs, revolutionary organisations and achievements, as Fagen (1965) demonstrates in the case of Cuba. The 'literary' record of charisma legitimises the existing polity and its policies, mitigating against risk-taking and contributing to retrenchment in

'groupthink' in the face of criticism. Outsiders who criticise are viewed as 'confused, immoral, or not to be taken seriously for other reasons' and loyalty to the group becomes 'the highest form of morality' (Edelman 1977: 91, 94). The recounting of 'war stories' not only suggests how situations are to be interpreted and confers prestige and power, but also establishes moral standards. In literary terms, a genre and style have been established, and, as in any literary period, genre and style have hegemonic force.

Conclusion

Aesthetics is a form of organisational knowledge that provides a means of describing and understanding the dynamics, roles, and patterns of work life through underlying principles of formation. Its primary media of expression, the material culture, social action and the presentation of ideas, serve three basic aesthetic functions of creating meaning, satisfying emotional, existential and rational needs (see Sandelands and Bruckner 1989 on the aesthetic as an avenue to work feelings), and bringing to light more tacit, informal, and covert aspects of organisational life, for example ethics, power and politics: what Strati refers to as the 'unique, ephemeral, and ambiguous' (1992: 577). Its social functions include: structuring organisational form and content; masking or denying unpleasant realities by inducing, sustaining and rewarding compliance or submission; structuring, conveying and sustaining meaningful social action; and establishing and conveying ethical norms. Carter and Jackson note, for example, that one must distinguish between the corporate image that is 'beautiful, orderly, humane, eminently positive' and the underlying aesthetic processes that construct the organisation and its public image, since it may involve the denial of 'disorder, indifference to welfare, "organized chaos" and asymmetry' inherent in the general normal experience of organisational life (2000: 191). It helps establish the degree to which organisational reality is constructed and interpretable by focusing on the spatial, performative, and narrative as they allow one to create, manage, and change, the most potent effect of charisma. The aesthetic serves as an alternative lens to structural–functional and systems theories, recasting the 'structural' in experiential and expressive terms accessible to various interpretive research methods, including the phenomenological, historiographical, biographical, narrative, hermeneutic, and ethnographic.

   Aesthetic analysis offers a means to distinguish among forms of authority, one of the most underdeveloped areas of administration and leadership studies where considerable conceptual slippage occurs – most frequently in confusing managerial, administrative and leadership roles. Leadership, essentially an organisational role infused with charisma, is analytically typified by its grounding in affective and higher order or transcendent values carried through and embodied in expressive media (see Weber 1968 for the distinguishing characteristics of leadership and charisma).

   The aesthetic also provides a means by which to distinguish types of charisma. For example, Bass (1989: 44) distinguishes what he called the 'two faces' of

charisma, 'prosocial' and 'self-centred', the former characterised by a concern for the good of the group, the latter, concern for his own power, esteem and status; although in social relation terms, these are interdependent in the construction of charisma. Boal and Bryson (1988) distinguish between 'crisis charismatics' and 'visionary charismatics', the former typified by those who begin with solutions to crises and then develop justifications, where the latter begin with an ideological fervour then move to action. In both cases, these forms are distinguishable by differences in the creative shaping of the material environment, performative capacities, and the 'text'. Finer categories can be constructed to reflect broader stylistic ranges of the 'arts' of charisma.

Finally, aesthetics provides an avenue for examining ethics, particularly the 'dark side' of charisma, largely a function of the abuse of inherent power derived from conscious and unconscious motivations and belief systems or ideologies. One can see how the aesthetic analysis reveals moral problems in the bureaucratic aesthetic. This, Cairns argues, excludes not only diversity and ambiguity, but also principles of social democracy, since it is grounded in a Nietzschean-style will to power, a 'hierarchical abuse of power' and a will to unity through unitary physical space (2002: 814, 816), suppress divergent beliefs and values. Charisma potentially exceeds any other authority type, the traditional and legal–rational or bureaucratic, in its personal effect through emotional intensity, inspirational capacity, and sacrificial character – all of which are creative processes taking recognisable and analysable expressive form.

Taylor argues that conducting research into this field is difficult because staff are aesthetically mute – aesthetic discourse is not present in most organisations (2002: 822) apart from superficial language for decoration, in spite of the recent popularity of organisational culture. Organisational researchers, themselves, have been mute, since their training in the field is predicated upon contrary intellectual ideologies and a dominating practice-oriented mentality serving these interests.

Note

1   Explored in more social than aesthetic terms in Deal and Kennedy (1982).

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12 Aesthetics and art

Their place in the theory and practice of leadership in education

Peter Ribbins

Henri Poincare, who did much to enable the interested lay person to appreciate the significance of science and the meaning of mathematics, argues that the 'scientist does not study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it, and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful it would not be worth knowing and life would not be worth living' (White 2001: 14). It is striking to find a great scientist, in describing what he does and why he does it, emphasising 'beauty' and the 'beautiful', concepts commonly seen as distinctive to the province of the aesthetic. In doing so he is not alone. The literature of science and the language of scientists are rich in references to the beautiful, elegant, and sublime and to the ugly, clumsy, and bizarre. What is seen as appropriate for this most rigorous of human endeavours should surely also be so for the study of leadership in general and leadership in education in particular.

There is reason to doubt if such a conception of the field is widely accepted. Rather in many countries it has, in recent times, been characterised by a narrow and utilitarian vision of purpose and practice. Given this, it is not surprising that:

> ... the knowledge claims that have tended to dominate the field over the last 30 years have tended to focus on delivering and measuring the impact of headship as generic leadership derived from a combination of theories and methods drawn substantially from business management and popular psychology. All too often this has led to a privileging of the instrumental and the evaluative against other forms of knowing.
>
> (Gunter and Ribbins 2003b: 131)

While we would accept that much of value has come of this, Helen Gunter and I, in a series of texts (Gunter 2005; Gunter and Ribbins 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Ribbins and Gunter 2002; Ribbins 2003), have made a case for a more inclusive approach to knowledge and knowledge production. In what follows, assisted by a framework of six inter-related typologies, I will outline key features of our approach. Following this, drawing for illustrative purposes on studies of leaders and leadership in education in which I have been involved, I will consider the contribution that ideas from art and aesthetics can make to enabling understanding and improving practice.

Knowledge and knowledge production

Starratt, reflecting on the contemporary literature on leadership, questions if it 'had to be a prisoner of such a limited number of conceptual and metaphorical frameworks ... on human life'. In place of this impoverished vision, he seeks an alternative 'unified framework', one that 'could describe a new understanding of leadership especially to an audience of practitioners ...' (1993: 17) and advocates the merits of drama as a metaphor. As such, being a leader today:

> ... involves one in a drama whose outcomes are largely unknown. Leaders have to improvise on available plots and scripts and, in many cases, rewrite the script as the drama unfolds. Leadership means being a playwright, a lead actor, a stage director, a drama critic and a director all in one.
>
> (1993: 17)

In undertaking and reporting on research into leadership, I am attracted by Starratt's plea for the development of conceptual and metaphorical frameworks that challenge the prevailing orthodoxy as I, and he, have described it. The search for this has led to a study of the nature of knowledge and the characteristics of knowledge production in leadership in education, and it is to this I now turn.

The field of educational leadership as theory and practice is multi-sited, in which those who study leaders and engage in leadership are positioned within elaborate networks connecting across many settings. Described briefly, the approach I have been developing with Gunter, which is still evolving, seeks for ways that make it possible to understand how knowledge is produced, who produces it, what is produced, why they produce it, and where it is produced. This can be labelled as a study of *mappers* (who), *mapping* (how, why and where), and *maps* (what). Why the stress on maps? A number of answers would be possible, but for the purposes of this chapter a justification advanced by the geologist Fortey must suffice:

> It is one thing to take samples; it is quite another to make a map. Yet understanding is often rooted in a map. Problems often need to be anatomized first, before they can be tamed by explanation. The circulation of the blood was inferred in part from anatomical charts of veins and arteries. Elucidation of the principles of stratigraphy accompanied the first geological maps.
>
> (2004: 87)

Our thinking can be represented in a framework of six typologies of knowledge production (see Table 12.1).

While these typologies can be used to describe and to explain knowledge production, they can also be used to:

... support professional practice across all sites of educational activity. More specifically, they can enable questions and activity surrounding research, theory, policy and practice to be scoped and the choices that are made, along with orientations towards them, to be opened to scrutiny.

(Gunter and Ribbins 2003b: 255)

The notions of 'knowledge' and of 'knowledge province' are at the heart of this framework of typologies. *Knowledge* means 'the knowledge claims that have been created, established and challenged over time ...' (Gunter and Ribbins 2003b: 131). In our most recent work we identify eight knowledge provinces (see Table 12.2).

Table 12. 1 Knowers, knowing and knowledge in the field of educational leadership

Producers	The people and their roles (e.g. practitioner, researcher) who are knowers through using and producing what is known.
Positions	The places (e.g. training sessions, staff meetings) where knowers use and produce what is known.
Provinces	Claims to the truth or knowledge regarding how leadership is conceptualised and engaged in.
Practices	The practice in real time/life contexts of leaders, leading and leadership.
Processes	The research processes (e.g. observations and interviews) used to generate and legitimate what is knowledge and knowing and the knowers.
Perspectives	Descriptions and understandings revealed and created as processes and products (e.g. teaching, disciplines, books) through the inter play between producers, positions, provinces, practices, and processes.

Source: Gunter and Ribbins 2003a: 131

Table 12.2 Knowledge provinces in the field of educational leadership

Conceptual	Concerned with issues of ontology and epistemology, and with conceptual clarification with regard to leaders and leadership in education.
Descriptive	Concerned with providing a factual report, often in some detail, of one or more aspects of, or factors relating to leaders, leading and leadership.
Humanistic	Concerned with gathering and theorising from the experiences and biographies of those who are leaders and those who are led.
Aesthetic	Concerned with theorising from ideas on aspects of beauty or ugliness from nature or the arts in order better to appreciate leading and leadership.
Axiological	Concerned with the clarification of values and value conflicts and so to determining and pressing for what is right and good with regard to leading and leadership.
Critical	Concerned with emancipating those who are led by revealing injustice and challenging the oppression of established structures of power.
Evaluative	Concerned with measuring the impact of leadership and its effectiveness at micro, meso, and macro levels of interaction.
Instrumental	Concerned with providing leaders and others with effective strategies and tactics designed to deliver organisational and system level goals.

These provinces have been identified from an extensive and detailed reading of field outputs combined with an engagement in field activities dating back over many years. What makes a knowledge province distinctive is what is being asserted as constituting the truth underpinning the intention behind any leadership activity. The typology is based on a continuum underpinning the provinces as set out in Table 12.2 and this symbolises praxis. All eight provinces may be seen as places where theory and practice are central to field activity but the emphasis and disclosure of purpose varies. For example, those towards the top of the continuum tend to put more emphasis on understanding doing, while those towards the bottom are apt to be more concerned with types of doing. The framework as a whole and its constituent typologies represent work that is evolving. Thus it is only relatively recently, and partly as a response to comments from the field, that we have added first the axiological and then the aesthetic provinces. It is to this last, that I now turn.

Towards a definition of 'aesthetic' and 'art'

There is a vast literature on the 'aesthetic' dating back at least to Plato. Scruton argues that, despite this apparent embarrassment of riches, it is 'a field that is difficult to enter, since we have no philosophical map of it' (1994: 439). This notwithstanding, he suggests it can 'be vaguely defined as the philosophical study of beauty and taste', but he also claims that 'to define its subject matter more precisely is … immensely difficult (1993: 9). This has not stopped others from trying. Most dictionary definitions are brief and unproblematic. Collins, for example, describes it as 'relating to the appreciation of beauty or art' (1987: 23). The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* is more ambitions in identifying three key usages: a) 'received by the senses'; b) 'of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful'; and, c) 'having or showing refined taste' (1972: 30). It then defines the 'aesthete' as 'one who professes a superior appreciation of what is beautiful, and endeavours to carry out his ideas in practice'.

There are problems with each usage. First, it is not immediately obvious why many things received by the senses, for example my tax bill, are on that account alone aesthetic. Second, there is little agreement as to how such aesthetic terms as the beautiful, or the ugly, can be classified, or even identified. Third, much the same criticisms might be made of the notion of taste. As for the description of the aesthete noted above, unless it is possible to say something definitive about the beautiful and how this is to be recognised, it is hard to see what meaning can be given to having a superior appreciation of it. What is less disputable is the idea, implied above, that once an aesthetic judgement is made, those who make it will care deeply about it. But although those who make such judgements will feel they are right and those who take a different view are wrong, they will also know that they can rarely win an argument on such matters – especially if 'winning' entails the willing acknowledgement of error by former opponents. For such reasons aesthetic discourse tends to be nasty, brutish, short, or at least repetitive, and painful, and therefore, and wherever possible, best avoided. But, is this possible?

Kant believes not. Rather he is committed to the view that aesthetic judgement is a part of practical reason, and our truest guide to the environment. It is by aesthetic judgement that we adapt the world to ourselves and ourselves to the world. Take it away, and we will be homeless. Schiller went further, arguing that the 'aesthetic education' of man is his one true preparation for rational life, and the foundation for any ordered politics (Scruton 1994: 449).

In taking this view, Kant does so because he holds:

> (1) that only rational beings have aesthetic experiences; (2) that every rational being needs aesthetic experiences and is incomplete without it; and (3) that aesthetic experience stands in fundamental proximity to moral judgement and is integral to our nature as moral beings.
>
> (Scruton 1993: 10)

It is for such reasons that Gunter and I have added the aesthetic to our knowledge provinces. I will return shortly to the issue of how far an interest in the aesthetic informs the literature and how important it is to leaders in education. But before doing so I will consider the concept of 'art', its relationship with notions drawn from aesthetics, and its role in the theory and practice of leadership in education.

Scruton argues that:

> ... modern philosophers have had little to say about the nature of the aesthetic interest, almost nothing to say about its relation to moral, religious and scientific interests. The concentration has been on the philosophy of art, and in particular on puzzles created by boring impostors like Ducghamp: is this signed urinal a work of art? etc. This makes for an exceedingly dull literature, devoted to questions which can be answered in any way while leaving everything important exactly as it was.
>
> (1994: 589)

Leaders and the aesthetic

In many years of talking to leaders in education about their lives and careers as leaders, aesthetic issues have not often been raised. There are two possible explanations for this. First, I have not often raised such issues myself. Second, they do not figure greatly in the interests of those I have interviewed and observed. In thinking about the second possibility I can say only that this is so in the many interviews I have undertaken with a wide range of leaders in education. Three examples illustrate the point.

The first related to a primary school in a deprived inner city area. When I visited it I found its quite small grounds were full of colour, based on strong architectural features, with many interesting play areas for the children. It was evident that much thought and effort had been given to making them as attractive possible. When I commented on how active and enthusiastic the children seemed to be, the headteacher told me:

> We used to have many behavioural and other problems. Many of our children are from deprived backgrounds and do not get to experience much that is beautiful. We wanted to give them the chance to do so. At first the buildings and grounds did not seem promising, but we have worked on this. I managed to get hold of small amounts of money, and crucially got to know a local architect who was willing to help us. He came and visited several times, talked to people, and came up with lots of imaginative ideas which, with the help of the staff and parents and some local builders, we have managed to put in place. There is now almost no vandalism, and we used to get a lot of this, and far fewer behavioural problems. It has worked as you have seen on your visits.

The second related to the headteacher's office in one of the largest comprehensive schools in the county. This was small, dark, poorly furnished and decorated, and plain to the point of ugly. The headteacher readily acknowledged that the effect was aesthetically displeasing but defended it on grounds similar to those I had heard in the primary school described above. Its headteacher believed making the school as beautiful as possible gave a desirable message to pupils, parents and the local community, and had beneficial consequences. Similarly, the second headteacher believed keeping his office 'ugly' gave a desirable message to the community of the school and had desirable consequences. As he put it:

> I know it [his office] is not very attractive, but it does for me and I would begrudge spending money on it that would be better spent elsewhere. On this nobody who visits it could [not] believe that I put my own needs before those of others. I think this helps to sustain the kind of commitment to the school that I hope you will find amongst pupils and staff on your visits.

The third case is different. Its key features can be identified in extracts taken from a long conversation I had with Valerie Bragg, at the time headteacher of Kingshurst, the first City Technology College. More than any other leader I have spoken to, her talk was full of references to the aesthetic:

> I feel strongly about the environment of the school, but it does not have to be very expensive. It costs no more to paint a wall pink than white. It is about giving care and attention to these things. My room was not expensive. If you look around, the table might look expensive but it was made on site from a piece of wood stained black. A bit of flair and creativity can make a huge difference. I would like to be an interior designer and really enjoy planning all this. I did much the same at Stourport [her first headship]. I remember walking around the corridors and saying this blue and that yellow. They had never seen anything like that before ... It may sound strange but I strongly believe the quality of the environment does affect the quality and style of your educational provision ... [At Kingshurst] we had to deliver the curriculum in a tall four-storey block that consisted of many small, dark

rooms and lots of narrow corridors. We created an environment which put a premium on lots of light and space, and knocked down every possible wall ... I produced corridors with uplighters to create a quite restful atmosphere, large social areas and individual work areas ... getting the environment right was crucial.

(Ribbins and Marland 1994: 66–73)

Unlike the headteachers quoted above, Bragg believes that seeking the beautiful is justified in its own right; the fact that this might also have beneficial consequences is a quite separate consideration. These types of attitude, and the intermediary positions between them, have been the subject of much debate on what has been termed the autonomy of the aesthetic (and artistic) interest. As such, the debate is, as Scruton describes it, 'part of a much larger problem'. In one form it can be seen 'in terms of the relationship between aesthetic and everyday experience' (1993: 18), in another it can be regarded as having to do with theories of the value of art. On these themes it is possible to distinguish two main positions which might be labelled as the extrinsic and the intrinsic:

The first regards art and the appreciation of art as means to some recognised moral good, while the second regards them as valuable not instrumentally but as objects unto themselves. It is characteristic of extrinsic theories to locate the value of art in its effects ... [In the second] philosophers have constantly sought for a value in aesthetic experience that is unique to it, and that therefore could not be obtained from any other source ... Such thinkers and writers believe that art is not only an end in itself but also a sufficient justification for itself.

(1993: 18)

Regarded as a continuum, while Bragg's attitude to the aesthetic leans toward the intrinsic, that of the other headteachers inclines to the extrinsic.

It would be difficult to locate most of the educational leaders I have studied on this continuum since few have raised aesthetic issues. When I have done so, they have usually responded briefly, and have often seemed reluctant to consider such matters. As one put it to me 'I don't have the luxury to spend much time thinking about such things, as long as the grounds and the buildings are safe, clean, and functional that is what matters'. I believe that his view better represents the views of the majority than does that of Valerie Bragg. It is to this issue that I now turn.

Leadership 'in the arts'

In their writings on leadership in education, it has become increasingly commonplace for authors to make references to the 'arts'; sometimes to the 'fine' arts (such as painting and sculpture), occasionally to music, but most usually to literature both fictional and non-fictional. The latter, even biographies and

autobiographies, should perhaps not be included in a discussion focusing on the arts but as exemplars of the humanities province. Even so it is noteworthy that some experienced school leaders, including John Rae, once headmaster of Westminster School, believe that autobiographies or biographies of headship rarely 'tell you much about what it is really like to do the job' (Ribbins 2003: 11). In his view 'fiction has been more successful in entering the headmaster's mind ...' (Rae 1993: 11). He lists several novelists who have attempted this including Thomas Hughes, Anthony Trollop, Samuel Butler, and Hugh Walpole. Even this list is not exhaustive and might have included many others such as Ralph Delderfield and James Hilton, whose books later became highly successful films. More recently a growing number of tales of headship, more often than not located within state comprehensive schools, have been the subject of television drama (e.g. *Coronation Street*, *Hope and Glory*, and *Grange Hill*).

Commentators such as Rae tend to assume that it is possible to learn useful things about the nature of headship from stories about the lives of fictional headteachers, but rarely consider at a deeper level how and why this is worth attempting and what the possibilities and limitations of such an approach might be. A few pioneers have explored how ideas from the arts, and from aesthetics, might inform the study and practice of leadership in education. Carol Harris, for example, in an examination of 'The aesthetic of Thomas Greenfield' suggests that he incorporates 'the arts in organisational theory successfully in two ways – first, as the aesthetic shock that propels the reader to cast aside everyday assumptions in order to see things anew and, second, as ways of knowing apart from and in addition to propositional reasoning' (1996: 490). In doing so, she claims his messages, 'frequently presented in artistic terms, often resemble more closely a novel, a poem, or a painting than a thesis and sequentially argued explanation' (Harris 2003: 118).

Before turning to Greenfield's own view of his position, it should be noted that the idea that the arts can be used to make better persons, politics, and societies, has some powerful critics including Plato, Confucius, and Lao Tzu. Plato recognised the importance of aesthetics, and like most Greek thinkers of his time he acknowledged the place of the arts in social and political life. Even so in his republic, especially in the education of the young, the work of poets, painters and musicians was to be heavily censured. Confucius, like Plato, believed the arts could as well contribute to bad as good behaviour and discord as well as harmony. Given this he also wished to restrict the activities of artists. Lao Tzu's views were even more extreme:

> Colours blind the eye.
> Sounds deafen the ear.
> Flavours numb the taste.
>
> (2000: 12)

Had he ruled, he would have banned all art.

In recent times perhaps the most trenchant critic of the idea that the arts are a moral force for the good is Harold Bloom. He reminds us that:

> If we read the Western Canon in order to form our social, political, or personal moral values, I firmly believe we will become monsters of selfishness and exploitation ... the reception of aesthetic power enables us to learn how to talk to ourselves ... The true use of Shakespeare, or of Cervantes, or ... is to augment one's growing inner self. Reading deeply in the Canon will not make one a better or worse person, a more useful or more harmful citizen. The mind's dialogue with itself is not primarily a social reality.
>
> (1996: 29–30)

This notwithstanding, Greenfield resorts extensively to the literary canon. He explained why in a long conversation I had with him. This included an extensive discussion of *A House for Mr Biswas*: 'It tells us things about education which, narrowly conceived, the social sciences can't begin to approach. It helps you to understand what education means, and what a painful process it is, if it works in a deep and fundamental sense'. Asked what this told us about leadership, he answered, 'it is more than an individual phenomenon; it is a cultural thing, it's embedded in whole lives, whole lives within cultures' (Greenfield and Ribbins 1993: 254, 255). From this, he stressed the need to ask what represents the world and allows us to understand it? His own response to this was characteristically uncompromising:

> What I (have come) to realise is that other modes of representing the world are not just a supplement, as some people would see it, to the stronger objective and powerful understandings of science, they are true alternatives to it... You look at *Mr Biswas* and it doesn't tell you what to do, it doesn't tell you which variables are to be manipulated, but it does give you an understanding ... It gives you what Sir Geoffrey Vickers calls 'appreciation'.
>
> (1993: 256)

For him *Mr Biswas* is representative of bodies 'of knowledge that are relevant and may be powerful' (1993: 257). But he also warns that:

> They are not just supplements to what social science lets us understand; they are unique insights in their own right ... we should (not) see art as another kind of social science ... cast into the role of a lower level support ... to serve by adding convincing evidence to support what such science has already established ... the arts speak to questions of how to live a life ... In this view of the arts, they are not simply a parallel vision of scientific truth. Theirs is a starkly different vision, one in which moral questions are to the fore.
>
> (1993: 257)

Having taken this view, Greenfield was consistent. In tutoring those who wished to improve their practice and/or understanding of educational leadership, he drew on a wide variety of literary and dramatic sources. In doing so he was carrying out what Dewey claimed should be a key purpose of aesthetic philosophy: 'to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognised to constitute experience' (1934: 3).

There are other ways in which this can be achieved. These include utilisation of the metaphor(s) of drama to enable new forms of understanding, the employment of role play in leadership development, and the use of dramatic texts written and enacted specifically for the purpose of enabling leadership education. What this entails is described by Matthew Mayer. He asks a series of questions: 'Is leadership an art form? Is the training of a leader an artistic–aesthetic discipline such as the training of a painter or a musician? ... Can art and leadership be fused into a learning pedagogy for future administrative leaders?' (2001: 441). A more fundamental question still would be in what sense, if any, must leadership have an aesthetic dimension? A growing numbers of writers claim it does (Brown 1977; DePree 1989; Duke 1989). On this, Shakotko and Walker distinguish an interactive trinity of operations in human beings made up of the *will* (acting and ethics), the *intellect* (knowing and noetics) and the *imagination* (making and poietics). Applied to leadership they claim that:

> ... leaders create a moral clearing or common arena within which individuals can come together to discover and create meaning. The relationship between art and leadership is not simply metaphorical; rather, leadership is a productive (poietic) enterprise, which parallels the artistic process ... leadership is art.
>
> (1999: 202)

But as Martin Barlosky has pointed out, 'We seldom place artists and administrators in the same category. There seems something inherently antithetical in the two activities. One is thought to be concerned with the liberating process of self expression, while the other is thought to be preoccupied with agendas of control and predictability' (1994: 1). Even so, his portrait of the artist Garry Kennedy, long serving President of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, describes 'an individual who combines the life of artist and administrator, and who is provocative and successful in each' (1994: 1). For Barlosky, Kennedy in each role 'demonstrated a suspicion of authority, a penchant to deconstruct the seemingly ordinary, and a marked predilection for ambiguity ... As resident and artist he ... demonstrated a peculiar and discomfiting ability to re-open ... what others considered self-evident and closed' (1994: 1). Despite appearances there was a fit between his administrative and aesthetic work: they were two sides of the same coin. As such, he 'demonstrated that administration and aesthetics need not remain discontinuous solitudes' (1994: 12). He might be unique but it is hard to see why. As James March has argued: 'Life is not just choice. It is also poetry. We

live by the interpretations that we make, becoming better or worse through the meanings we impute to events and institutions. Our lives change when our beliefs change' (1984: 288). As such 'organisations and their administration involve nothing less complex than the poietics of human experience' (Barlosky 1994: 12).

To believe otherwise is to fall into the trap of managerialism which Barlosky has depicted as 'an emblematic moral fiction dependent upon a bogus notion of effectiveness which presumes to predict and control the indeterminacies of human affairs' (1994: 12). Or as MacIntyre has put it, we shall:

> ... have to conclude that another moral fiction – and perhaps the most culturally powerful of them all – is embodied in the claims to effectiveness and hence to authority made by the central character of the modern social drama, the bureaucratic manager. To a disturbing extent our morality will be disclosed as a theatre of illusions.
>
> (1984: 76–7)

If then, as has been argued above, leadership is art, and if imagination is one of its key elements, there would seem to be a strong case in developing leaders to draw on an approach to learning that is in part aesthetic. Mayer (1998; 2001) uses a scripted play, developed for the purpose, as a learning tool and 'theatre as a viable pedagogy for training administrators' (2001: 443). He concludes that this enables those who take part to 'become working leadership artists-in-training' (2001: 449). So much for leadership in art, what of the art of leadership?

The art of leadership

The production of books, articles, and courses on the art of leadership in education is expanding at an exponential rate. Visits to the web exposed an internet book broker, Alibirs, which appeared, mistakenly as it turned out, to offer access to 40 million books on this theme and also revealed numerous courses and conferences on the art of leadership in education, especially in the USA. Two seemed especially interesting. First, a conference on 'Improving schools: the art of leadership' to be held in Principals' Centre, Harvard University. Curiously, the publicity material makes no mention of the notion of 'art' although it is claimed the programme 'will enable participants to identify the priorities, values and commitments that will sustain their all-important *craft*' (my italics). The second publicised the Christine Donnell School of the Arts in Idaho – a prospective magnet school offering parents and students 'an educational opportunity infused with the arts'. Among the claims made is that 'performance in the arts is ... a way to build leadership skills'.

My own thinking on the art of leadership, especially headship, has been informed by studies of the art of war by Sun Tzu (1998), Machiavelli (1965), and Clausewitz (1968). Rapoport, in his introduction to *On War* compares Clausewitz with Machiavelli because in their 'works these authors sought to

impart not merely knowledge of what they thought to be the case, but also an understanding of what underlies it; that is an understanding of a philosophy' (1968: 11). Furthermore, their accounts exhibit a profound understanding of human motive and action and are presented with extraordinary clarity.

Sun Tzu, in the opening lines of text, stresses that war 'is a matter of vital importance to the state ... the road to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly' (1998: 21). As such, it was vital 'that the state had an efficient army, well commanded' (Wilkinson 1998: 15). On this, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz thought alike, both believing that if this was to be achieved a standing professional army, maintained in peace and war alike, was necessary. Machiavelli took a very different view, having General Fabrizio, talk of the dangers of the permanent:

> ... existence of men who employ the practice of soldiering as their own profession ... War makes robbers, and peace hangs them? For those who do not know how to live by another practice, and not finding anyone who will support them in that ... are forced by necessity to roam the streets, and justice is forced to extinguish them.
>
> (1965: 63)

In this respect, Machiavelli's view is less relevant to education and headship than are those of Sun Tzu or Clausewitz. This claim would be contested by advocates of the home schooling movement, but since this involves only 1 per cent of the UK primary and secondary pupil population – institutionalised schooling and professionalised teaching are by far the most common means for the education of children. Indeed, if in reflecting on what they say, 'war' were to be replaced with 'education' and 'army' with 'schools', I suggest that their relevance would hardly be diminished. This is so in part because of the intrinsic importance of education, its complexity and difficulty, and given the moral, political, intellectual and technical demands it makes on those charged with its management. A brief discussion of why these three authors talk of the 'art' of war, rather than, for example, the 'science' of war or even the 'craft' of war might be illuminating.

Neither Sun Tzu's nor Machiavelli's reasons for using 'art' are made explicit, although it is not difficult to deduce these from what the former, if not the latter, has to say. In contrast, Clausewitz devotes his third chapter to such issues. He concludes that while 'Art and Science can never be completely separated from each other ... it is (nevertheless) more fitting to say Art of War than Science of War' (1968: 202). Accordingly art has to do with doing and science with knowing. War, like education, is an active and judgemental activity. It may require the knowing that comes from a science or the sciences but cannot be reduced to this. Clausewitz entertains briefly the idea that war might best be described as a 'craft'. This he dismisses on the grounds that a craft 'is only an inferior art, and as such is subject to definite and rigid laws' (1968: 202) and that although this may have been true in the past, war by the time he was writing had become too complex to be reducible in such a way. Although writing more than 2000 years earlier, this

was something Sun Tzu also believed, arguing that 'because every war is different, no specific rules of strategy or tactics can be formulated such that following them will always produce victory. Only the flexible, adaptable and inventive will win' (Wilkinson 1998: 17). So much for the views of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, what of Machiavelli?

Fabrizio stresses the need to be flexible, adaptable and inventive in war, but a great deal of what he has to say suggests that much that could be learnt from the ancient Romans and Greeks remained as relevant. As such, his conversation is full of detailed advice about what to do and what not to do in a wide variety of circumstances. While he does not claim that to follow the precepts he sets out will guarantee success, he believes they will maximise its possibility. He also takes the view that for a leader not to know what should be known is to be grossly culpable. He is scathing about the idle, avaricious, and ignorant Italian princes of his day 'who have not produced any good army', and even says to Cosimo de Medici: 'you have complained of your organisation (the army), I tell you, if you had organised it as we discussed above, and it did not give a good account for itself, then you have reason to complain: but if it is not organised and trained as I have said, it can have reason to complain of you, who have made an abortion, and not a perfect organisation' (1965: 13). The language may be colourful, but there do seem lessons here for educational leaders.

Sun Tzu notes five factors and seven elements: politics, weather, terrain, the commander, and doctrine (1998: 21). Applied to schools and headteachers, the factors can be reinterpreted as follows. Politics is 'the thing that causes the people to be in harmony with their ruler'. In this he differentiates between 'rulers' (school governors) and 'commanders' (headteachers). Weather is the interaction of all the natural, social and economic conditions, resources and forces that are available to a school and its headteacher. Terrain is about what needs to be achieved given the context. It has regard to the circumstances of a school and its head, as factors determining how easy or difficult all this is likely to be. The commander can be interpreted to stand for the qualities and capabilities of the headteacher. Doctrine may be understood as the organisation of the (school) in terms of the distribution of responsibilities and powers, the systems that have been put in place, the rules and regulations that apply and how well all this works in practice. The elements determining the effectiveness of schools can be stated as a series of questions: How wise is the ruler? How talented is the commander? How suitable are the resources that are available? How appropriate is the organisational structure? How capable are the staff? How well trained are its leaders and other staff? How apt are the rewards and punishments that apply?

In illustrating the relevance of the ideas discussed above, I will focus on the army commander and school headteacher. To justify this, I would stress the significance that all three authors attach to the role of the commander in explaining the success of an army and the growing importance that much of the literature on educational effectiveness gives to the role of the headteacher in determining levels of school and pupil achievement.

Clausewitz identifies the knowledge required of a successful commander, much of which would apply to an effective headteacher:

> He must ... be able to judge correctly of traditional tendencies, interests at stake ... immediate questions at issue ... He must know the character, feelings, habits, faults and inclinations of those he is to command .... These are matters the knowledge of which cannot be forced out by a ... scientific formula ... they are only to be gained by the exercise of an accurate judgement in the observation of things and men, aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both.
>
> (1968: 198)

He goes on to argue 'there never has been a great and distinguished commander of contracted mind' and concludes with a warning that has resonances for those who would be headteachers 'but very numerous are the instances of men who, after serving with the greatest distinction in inferior positions, remained below mediocrity in the highest, from insufficiency of intellectual capacity' (1968: 199).

Like Clausewitz, Machiavelli and Sun Tzu expect a great deal of those who would be successful leaders. But while all three emphasise they must be clever men, Sun Tzu demands they be good men. So too, rather surprisingly, does Machiavelli. Thus he has Fabrizio argue that 'Pompey and Caesar acquired fame as valiant men, not as good men: but those who had lived before them acquired glory as valiant and good men' (Machiavelli 1965: 44). For his part, Sun Tzu describes his ideal commander 'in language of a kind one would not find in a western text' (Wilkinson 1998: 16). He stands for 'qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness' (Sun Tzu 1998: 22); but must also be 'subtle and insubstantial', 'leave no trace', be 'divinely mysterious' (31), 'serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled', and 'capable of making unfathomable plans' (47). Wilkinson concludes, 'the ideal commander must have the qualities of a Taoist adept (*sheng*). Only such a one can respond appropriately to the unpredictable and infinitely variable situations that obtain in war ... Only the flexible, adaptable and innovative will win' (1998: 17). Were Sun Tzu to write of headteachers and schools today his views would likely be much the same.

However it is one thing to specify what an effective leader would be like, another to propose how to become one. On this, Sun Tzu is typically bracing:

> Know the enemy and know yourself...you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are sure to be defeated.
>
> (1998: 26)

If this is to be achieved then those who hope to become effective leaders must possess the abilities, aptitudes and dispositions ('personal characteristics') that are identified above.

For Sun Tzu and Clausewitz these characteristics are seen as necessary condi-
tions for effective leadership in the sense that those who aspire to lead armies
(or schools) who do not possess them at the level required will fail. The notion
of 'level required' is an important distinction. For Clausewitz it is commonplace
to be an effective leader in a junior position but to fail to be so at a higher level.
This is so because what is entailed 'increases in difficulty with increase of rank,
and in the highest position, that of the Commander-in-Chief is to be reckoned
among the most difficult there is for the human mind' (Clausewitz 1968: 198).
However, if possessing these characteristics at an appropriate level is a necessary
condition for effective leadership, they are not sufficient. For this, as Clausewitz,
Machiavelli and Sun Tzu all agree, those who aspire to be artful leaders must
engage in rigorous and extensive preparation involving a mixture of personal
education, occupational experience, and vocational training ('preparational
characteristics'). This would be as true of leaders in education as it is in leaders
in war.

Conclusion

Building on my work with Gunter on knowledge and knowledge production and
with Zhang on the life and work of headteachers in China (Ribbins and Zhang
2003), I have sought to outline a role for ideas drawn from aesthetics and the arts
as core elements of a new and inclusive approach to enhancing understanding
and improving practice in leadership in education. While acknowledging that
developing this sketch into a comprehensive theory will be a demanding and
problematic enterprise, I also believe that the attempt to achieve this is long
overdue and worthwhile. I hope in this chapter I have said enough to encourage
others to take this as an invitation to join the dance.

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13 Aesthetics, heroism and the cult of 'the leader'

Peter Gronn

> And you, my brothers, must be redeemed by greater men than any Redeemer
> has been, if you would find the way to freedom!
>
> (Friedrich Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*)

The idea of the hero has been perhaps the culturally most pervasive and histori-
cally most enduring influence on leadership. This was and continues to be the case
for a range of popular information sources, including print and visual media report-
ing, television and film imagery, school texts and readers, children's literature,
comics, sports and computer games. It has also been substantially true of the devel-
opment of leadership as a domain of knowledge, although it is noteworthy here
that formal acknowledgement of heroics has been much more subdued, with heroes
and heroism often accorded an implied, rather than an explicit, status. Indeed,
terms such as 'hero' and 'heroic' have been eschewed in favour of 'great' and a
'greatness', supposedly evident in the spectacular achievements of (overwhelm-
ingly male) individuals, and which translated into (what turned out to be) a futile
search by students of leadership for measurable personal traits. On the other hand,
the word with the most popular scholarly uptake in the contemporary search for
alternative perspectives on leadership is 'hero' rather than 'great', as in the
labelling of a current oppositional stance as a post-'hero paradigm'. In this instance,
hero is intended by critics as a term of deprecation rather than endearment, with
the implication being that the 'new' leadership of the 1980s and 1990s masked an
implausible version of individual exceptionalism which at times bordered on the
titanic, and that has recently been discredited as a bogus representation of reality.

'Hero', then, or 'great'? It matters not. For all practical purposes, distinctions
between these words are trifling and of little account. Definition of terms is the
last bastion of the shoddy academic. Indeed, writers with a preference for either
term often slide back and forth between the two. Thomas Carlyle, famous for his
paean to the great and the good, *On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in
History*, is a pertinent illustration. In this often-cited passage of purple prose from
the first of his six lectures, Carlyle claimed that civilisations and their capacity to
endure depended almost exclusively on a legacy of outstanding men:

> Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world,
> is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were

the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realisation and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may be justly considered, were the history of these.

(Carlyle 1983 [1840]: 1–2)

Other instances of these kinds of sentiments can be multiplied many times over. Taken literally as an account of historical causality, Carlyle's claim may be dismissed as crude and absurd, a criticism captured rather neatly by Arendt:

The popular belief in a 'strong man' who, isolated against others, owes his strength to his being alone is either sheer superstition, based on the delusion that we can 'make' something in the realm of human affairs – 'make' institutions or laws, for instance, as we make tables and chairs, or make men 'better' or 'worse' – or it is conscious despair of all action, political and non-political, coupled with the utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other 'material'.

(1998: 188)

In truth, says Arendt, history is littered with examples of 'the impotence of the strong and superior man who does not know how to enlist the help, the co-acting of his fellow men' (1998: 189).

Co-action, as she calls it, is surely the point. What is clear from her account of human action is that interdependence between one who began an action and those who completed it (in the terms of her explanation) was implicated in the ancient Greek and Latin languages, but that over time this co-dependent sense of agency became gradually split into locutions and relations associated with specialised command and execution roles (Arendt 1998: 189). Yet what is not clear from her account is why and how this subsequent differentiation occurred. Moreover, because vocabulary alone 'cannot by itself be used to distinguish semi- from proto-states' (Runciman 1982: 357), an explanation along Darwinian evolutionary lines is required to reveal how selective pressures on archaic social formations (e.g. nomadic hunter–gatherer societies) conduced to the accumulation and consolidation of power (later stratified in structures of authority) in one or a few hands (within, for example, geographically sedentary population units) as a means of survival and domination amid circumstances of emerging environmental complexity. Thus, in eighth century BCE Greece, a combination of increased reliance on agriculture, the legitimacy afforded by patron deity worship and improved military technology (amid conquest-free and favourable trade-related exogenous circumstances) helped to trigger a consolidation and rapid diffusion of territorially defined states (e.g. Athens, Sparta) headed either by individual dictatorial or collegial magistracies (Runciman 1982: 364–70).

Arendt's notion of co-action is also important from another angle, for it provides a clue why assertions about the demonstrable absurdity of Carlyle's claims do not quite hit the mark. The real point of significance in what Carlyle was asserting is less his lack of theoretical robustness, than the clue which his remarks offer to the seductive appeal of heroism as an antidote to complexity (a theme developed in the discussion section below). Not quite 30 years after the publication of Carlyle's book, in an essay that waxed lyrical about the aesthetic virtues of royalty, Walter Bagehot made a very similar point. 'The characteristic of the English Monarchy', Bagehot wrote (1963 [1867]: 33–4), was that it 'retains the feelings by which the heroic kings governed their rude age, and has added the feelings by which the constitutions of later Greece ruled in more refined ages'. Queen Victoria's realm, however, comprised 'whole classes unable to comprehend the idea of a constitution' or to feel any attachment to impersonal laws, for which reason they 'like their minds to dwell more upon her than upon anything else, and therefore she is inestimable'. Moving forward in time another six or seven decades after Bagehot, but still with our attention on Europe, it is this concentrating of the mass of minds on the person of a leader or ruler, and systematic attempts to engineer it, which is the subject of this chapter.

It scarcely needs emphasising that relations between the queen–empress Victoria and her subjects, and those of the three dictators and the peoples whom their regimes subjugated that are considered below (Adolf Hitler, Josif Stalin, and Benito Mussolini), were by no means equivalent, for constitutionalism (which had gradually replaced monarchical despotism, absolutism and arbitrariness), on the one hand, was a vastly different beast than calculated menace and systematic terrorisation, on the other. Equally, however, should we refuse to grant that the principles in which the dynamics of these contrasting sets of relations are grounded are substantially the same, then we delude ourselves, for one of the foundations on which all of these elite–mass relations rest is the idea of manufactured exposure (see below).

Dictators without clothes

In order to capture something of the magnitude of the phenomenon with which we are dealing, like Overy (2004: 98–9), I begin with the end; not with the chronological emergence and impact of three heroes, but with their demise, an occasion for leaders of heightened visibility and an acute sense of nakedness.

Here are descriptions of the deaths of three twentieth century tyrants, each of whom fostered, and was legitimated in part by, an official cult of leadership, in which aesthetic considerations (in two cases, particularly) played a defining role. The first death, for which the perpetrators at the time strove for maximum publicity and exposure on terms of their making, depicts leadership at its most inglorious. Late on the afternoon of 27 April 1945, in the far north of Italy, a German convoy began to move off when an Italian partisan of the 52nd Garibaldi brigade noticed what appeared to be a man lying motionless in the back of a truck. When the vehicle was halted, and the man's blanket and helmet were removed,

the partisans realised rather unexpectedly that they had apprehended Benito Mussolini. Although the exact circumstances of the assassination of *Il Duce* at the hands of his captors became clouded in a 'rather tasteless controversy', it is known that the assassins' guns misfired at the first attempt and that the dictator quaked in fear before he fell, his body 'riddled with bullets' (Bosworth 2002: 33). The following day, the corpses of Mussolini, his mistress Claretta Petacci, and three fascist associates were transported to Milan and unceremoniously dumped from a truck in the Piazzale Loreto (where, in the previous August, 15 partisans had been publicly shot in reprisal for Allied bombings and resistance raids). A crowd soon gathered. People began hurling abuse at their former leader. He was spat upon and some women even urinated over him. Then, strewn with detritus, his body was strung upside down by the ankles on a rope adjacent to a petrol bowser:

> Brain matter seeped out from wounds which were especially deep on the right hand side of Mussolini's head. Next to the *Duce* swung the corpse of Claretta Petacci, devoted in her naïve conventionality to her 'Ben' until beyond the end. A 'man of respect', or according to some, a charitable priest, had tied up her skirts so that, as she swung upside down, she did not expose too much of her charms to the raucous and unforgiving public.
>
> (Bosworth 2002: 411–2)

Shortly afterwards, American military authorities (adamant that Mussolini was syphilitic and that this condition had induced madness) conducted an autopsy and removed brain tissue from the dictator's skull for subsequent examination in the USA. Perhaps surprisingly (given Mussolini's reputation for predatory sex: furtively brief intimate relations every day, with a different woman, according to his batman), syphilis was not confirmed. In 1966, these last remnants of her husband's brain were returned to Rachele, his widow, in a box that was humiliatingly mislabelled 'Mussolinni' (Bosworth 2002: 413).

The same day as the corpse of *Il Duce* was being publicly desecrated, hundreds of miles to the north in Berlin, another beleaguered dictator, Adolf Hitler, was entrenched with his entourage in a massive, heavily fortified underground concrete bunker. For the previous two days, Russian troops had been bombing the Chancellery and were less than a mile away. When news arrived of the unedifying spectacle to the south, Hitler was already preparing for his death although, unlike his fellow Axis dictator, he preferred to do so as invisibly as was possible on terms and in circumstances of his own choosing – although not the timing, for his hand had been forced by the arrival of the Russians.[1] The following day, after eating lunch and farewelling his staff, Hitler – *Führer* for a mere 12 years of a projected 1,000-year German Reich – accompanied by Eva Braun (his wife of just one day and his former mistress), retired to their suite:

> Those waiting outside heard a single shot. When they opened the door they found Hitler lying dead on the sofa shot through the temple. His wife lay beside him, also dead; she had taken poison.
>
> (Bullock 1998: 976)

Hitler's staff then carried their bodies upstairs to be laid beside one another in the garden above the bunker where, in accordance with the orders of the *Führer*, the bodies were doused with petrol and set alight:

> As the flames blazed up, the little group of mourners in the porch stood to attention and gave the Hitler salute. Later the charred remains were swept into a canvas bag and covered over with earth.
>
> (Bullock 1998: 976)

The SS guards got drunk on the remaining Chancellery alcohol (Overy 2004: 99). About a week later (the details were not confirmed officially until 1968), five Soviet doctors conducted an autopsy on the remains. Relying on dental records, they identified the bodies as those of Hitler and Frau Hitler. 'The doctors' report also confirmed that Hitler had only one testicle and suffered from the condition known as monorchism' (Bullock 1998: 977). In 1970, what was left of the two bodies was burned, ground to ash and then scattered into a tributary of the River Elbe. Finally, in 1995, parts of a skull (believed to be that of Hitler) with a bullet hole were discovered in a trophy archive in the Kremlin in Moscow (Bullock 1998: 978).

Unlike the hideousness of the first death, and the rather set-piece nature of the second, the circumstances of the passing of the third leader were entirely different. Here, the timing of death was unexpected and a mere handful of intimates were privy to the moment. On 5 March 1953, Josif Stalin (born Josif Dzhugashvili) died at his Kuntsevo dacha near Moscow. A couple of days earlier, after watching films late into the night at the Kremlin, followed by drinking and talking until around 4 a.m. (as had long been his custom), Stalin had not woken at the usual time (about noon). Indeed, it was not until 7 p.m. that he was discovered by guards. Stalin had suffered a stroke and he lay paralysed for the ensuing three days, after which he died. Those who witnessed his death included (among others) Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria, and daughter Svetlana. Bullock (1998: 1065, quoting Khrushchev) reports that, at one point during the bedside vigil, when Stalin had exhibited signs of regaining consciousness, Beria (fellow Georgian and architect since 1938 of Stalin's apparatus of state terror) fell on his knees and kissed Stalin's hand. But then when Stalin lapsed back into unconsciousness, Beria had stood up and begun denouncing him. Svetlana Alliluyeva described her father as choking slowly and horribly while the group looked on. For a fleeting moment, Stalin had opened his eyes, glanced at everyone and raised his left hand in a sinister way (seemingly issuing a curse on them all), whereupon the life slipped out of him. As if frozen to the spot (and also, perhaps, to convince themselves that he was genuinely dead), the group remained standing for a time until finally the Politburo members rushed out of the room. 'The shadow of fear was lifted, they had survived and had a future to fight over.' As news of Stalin's death gradually became known, the Russian people 'were stunned and fearful. When he was buried, many wept in the streets. After more than twenty years, they could not imagine a future without him' (Bullock 1998: 1066). A few hours after his death, Stalin's body was embalmed and laid to rest beside that of V.I. Lenin ('father' of the revolution) in the House of Trade

Unions, where 'vast crowds, with ashen, tear-stained faces, gathered', and where outside hundreds of mourners were asphyxiated or crushed to death under the hooves of police horses. 'What shall we do now that Comrade Stalin is dead? What shall we do?' one contemporary was recorded asking sorrowfully (Overy 2004: 98, 99). Some months later, 'as soon as they could summon up their courage' (Bullock 1998: 1047), the other Politburo members arrested the much hated Beria and had him shot.

Dictators with clothes

How and why was it, one wonders, that the lives of these heroic figures could end with humiliation and ignominy in the first two instances, and with such banality in the third? More pointedly, perhaps, what can be learned from each grisly outcome about the way exploitation of heroic leader prototypes impedes meaningful public engagement with the complexities of political and social reality?

There is a clue to what these cases have in common, in regard to how heroic leadership works in practice, in *The Prince*, authored by Machiavelli, one of the earliest thinkers to emphasise a highly precious resource at the disposal of princes: distance. In a passage that is no doubt as well-known as Carlyle's, the Florentine philosopher wrote that 'men [sic] in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands', and that 'because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come into close contact with you'. He then issued the following warning about public opinion as the final court of appeal for rulers: 'Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are ... The common people are always impressed by appearances and results' (Machiavelli 1961 [1532]: 101).

The point of these passages is not that the three dictators may have read Machiavelli (although Mussolini certainly claimed to have done so, while Stalin was known to have annotated his copy of Napoleon's writings) and exploited his ideas for their own ends. It is that this duality of appearance–reality operates in every relationship in which at least one of the parties to that relationship is attributed by the others with leadership. How, then, did the process of heroic attribution-making operate in central and eastern Europe between the two world wars, and what part did aesthetic considerations play in constructing these three sets of leader attributions?

Leader personality cultism

For Neumann (1957: 233), dictatorship means 'the rule of a person or group of persons who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in the state, exercising it without restraint'. The three regimes that fit this description solved Machiavelli's dilemma of how to manage to their advantage the distance between themselves and their mass bases by devising leader cults.

In both Italy and Germany, where fascist political parties came to power by democratic means, there were two key challenges. First, these parties had to win office by maximising their electoral support. Second, once in power they had to

be able to satisfy an emerging mass hunger for 'personality' in public life in which there was a focus on the self – in contrast to a traditional elite emphasis on character, in which the self was denied rather than indulged (Susman 1984: 281) – and a simultaneous urge for closer proximity to public figures (Benjamin 1977 [1936]: 389). On the first of these impulses, a few pages after the quotation that heads this chapter, Nietzsche had written: 'Ah, my friends! That *your* Self be in the action, as the mother is in the child: let that be *your* maxim of virtue!' (2003 [1883]: 120, emphasis in original). What made realisation of the second impulse possible, according to Walter Benjamin, were the technological triumphs of the machine age. By the 1930s, there existed an unprecedented capacity to reproduce copies of previously rare and priceless artistic objects (thanks, mainly, to photographic imagery) and to facilitate widespread accessibility to them. The price paid for this mass consumption of previously mysterious and out of reach artefacts, however, was the loss of any sense of uniqueness (or aura) that may have attached to the originals. Similar imperatives were also beginning to alter the rhythms of public life. Thus, as mass political parties sought to capitalise on these new possibilities of commodification (through enhanced perception and visibility), politicians strove to project their own sense of aura (or public persona) by stage-managing political engagement in mass collective experiences that required displays of emotional identification with leaders. By these means, says Benjamin, fascism aestheticised politics and communism politicised art.

In reality, beneath this facade of artifice, these fascist regimes 'were neither monolithic nor static' because 'no dictator rules by himself'. Rather, 'he must obtain the co-operation, or at least the acquiescence, of the decisive agencies of rule – the military, the police, the judiciary, senior civil servants – and of powerful social and economic forces' (Paxton 2004: 119). As a result of this need for co-action, both the Italian and German species of fascism bred a system of second guessing, with Nazi officials, departments and agencies at all levels 'working towards the Führer' (Kershaw 1997: 104), by trying to anticipate Hitler's will, while across the Brenner pass, where fascist penetration and re-fashioning of the social fabric was nowhere near as successful, the reverse situation applied, and Mussolini 'worked towards the Italians' (Bosworth 2002: 11). In the USSR, by contrast, where collective party leadership had operated since 1917, it was not until late 1929 that Stalin had begun to align himself with the deified image of Lenin and to appropriate this for his own purposes, until eventually he managed to supplant his fellow revolutionary altogether. Unlike the movements headed by both Hitler and Mussolini, then, which each had to create a revolutionary order, Stalin's challenge was to sustain the momentum already established by an existing revolution, by steering its course and super-imposing on it his dictatorial will, and only then making himself the object of mass adoration. Unlike Hitler and Mussolini, Stalin was uncomfortable (at least at first) with personal adulation, but he exploited the leader cult mainly because it 'secured his role as the chief legatee of Lenin's revolution' while simultaneously satisfying 'popular yearning for a strong central figure' (Overy 2004: 103), the latter, in turn, became part of the legacy of centuries of popular Russian devotion to the father-like figure of the Tsars.

Bodily politics for the body politic

One way or another, adorned or unadorned, in life or in death, the body, and images of the body and its various parts, expressed the cultic presence of leadership, particularly in Italy and Germany.

Virility, and all that it denoted (including appeals to warrior virtues and the official condoning of violence) was one of the keynotes of Italian fascism under Mussolini. Apart from the ubiquitous image of the helmeted head of *Il Duce*, complete with its thrusting jaw, on millions of wall posters, postcards, calendars, swimsuits and even children's epiphany gift packages, Italians were regaled with a photographic diet of a superhuman Mussolini as a fearless sportsman and aviator, and even an intrepid lion tamer (Falasca-Zamponi 1997: 68). Moreover, in these manly guises – as many as 30 million pictures in 2,500 different poses, according to one estimate (Bosworth 2002: 211) – the dictator was even displayed as publicly extruding his bodily fluids (such as perspiration) and exposing his semi-nakedness (hairy and bare-chested during harvest time), all of which muscularity, of course, belied the reality of his niggling and worsening health problems (Bosworth 2002: 385–9). Consistent with this iconographic construction of a *duce*, in his public oratory, for which he was renowned, Mussolini thought of the crowds that he boldly harangued and the populace more generally as akin to his view of a woman: dependent, and needing to be dominated by the will and strength of a male leader (Falasca-Zamponi 1997: 24).

Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, Stalin shrank from the public gaze. He was a physically unprepossessing and short man, and 'every photographer had to take account of his touchiness on this point' (Bullock 1998: 414). Indeed, the less he was seen by the Russian people, 'the easier it would be to create an image of himself, remote and all-seeing, which he wanted to project'. This changed after the war. On the fourth anniversary of Hitler's attack on the USSR, for example, Stalin stood atop the Lenin Mausoleum as the Red Army saluted him and threw the banners and standards at his feet, in tribute, just as Kutuzov's soldiers had done for Tsar Alexander with those of Napoleon's defeated *Grande Armée* (Bullock 1998: 399, 994). With the growing success of the Red Army, Stalin had publicly identified himself with it and thereafter (having promoted himself to marshal) was always careful to be seen in a marshal's uniform (Bullock 1998: 993). His public image was avuncular: pipe-smoking, simple dress, a man of the people, and a slow and deliberate mode of speech. Initially, his visage had accompanied that of Lenin in posters and photographs, with Lenin slightly to the front, then later at the back, smiling on his successor, and then replaced solely by Stalin. There were regular poster print runs of Stalin up to 200,000, but only 30,000 of Lenin (Overy 2004: 111–14). Likewise in films and in newspapers, the iconography of Stalin implied 'a myth of omniscience and infallibility' (Overy 2004: 115).

In Germany, where the leader cult is known as the Hitler myth, the level of political artistry focused on the *Führer* as the personification of the German race attained previously unsurpassed heights of grandeur or even grandiloquence. Indeed, it may be said that with Hitler, himself an aesthete (or at least a painter)

manqué, 'power and art merged' (Spotts 2003: 11). Ever the incessant talker, Hitler had perfected his public speaking through an extensive rehearsal of words and gestures (in front of mirrors). He 'ravished' his audiences and achieved his emotional impact by delivering a verbal torrent, that began slowly, but then reached a crescendo through his contrived use of 'posture, movements, demeanour and facial expressions'. A consummate actor, 'nothing was spontaneous' or left to chance (Spotts, 2003: 46, 47). In common with Mussolini, Hitler also regarded and treated his audience as 'a feminine organism' (Spotts 2003: 49). Indeed, Fest refers to 'the copulative character' of the atmosphere before he began his public addresses (1999: 40). On a more prosaic note, Hitler was notoriously long-sighted, yet he refused to wear or be photographed wearing glasses in public (Overy 2004: 110). Like Stalin, he lacked physical presence (apart from his mesmerising eyes) and his complexion was pallid. At one point, Count Ciano (Mussolini's son-in-law and Minister for Foreign Affairs) was convinced during one of Hitler's visits to Italy that the face of the *Führer* had been touched up with rouge (Bosworth 2002: 332).

The main instruments of the construction and dissemination of the Hitler myth were the vast machinery of party propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels and the spectacular pageantry devised by the enigmatic and narcissistic young architect, Albert Speer, a man with whom Hitler maintained a surrogate father–son relationship until the very end. In the manufacture of 'our Hitler', the Nazis very skilfully capitalised on a long-standing Right-wing German nationalist faith in and receptivity to the authority of a 'strong man' (Kershaw 2001: 13). The nineteenth century figure of the 'iron chancellor', Otto von Bismarck, had embodied the prototype. The apotheosis of cultism revealed itself in the vast party parades at Nuremburg where, for example, the powerful imagery of the 1934 rally reveals Hitler walking solemnly and reverently, to the sound of a funeral march, to the Heroes' Memorial. Speer convinced Hitler to transfer as many events as possible to the evening. This gave him the opportunity to achieve the spectacular effects created by 150 huge columns of light projecting miles into the night sky. Combined with the concentration of thousands of uniformed men, the observer experienced a 'deeper truth' about the regime: 'a sense of being threatened, which kept reality at bay with intoxicating displays of pomp and circumstance, and which nurtured its aggressions behind impressive stage sets' (Fest 1999: 51). But it was with the new Reich Chancellery, completed in 1938, that Speer excelled himself in expressing the grandiosity of leadership: Hitler's study, set to the side of a vast quarter of a mile long gallery of mirrors, was nearly 4,500 sq. ft. in area. On entering the room through double doors, a visitor had to walk about sixty feet to Hitler's desk. While the experience of the gallery was enough to fill a visitor with awe, that same visitor would 'finally be reduced to a kind of paralyzing despondency' in approaching the *Führer* (Fest 1999: 104).

Living with the will of the leaders

While it may have been artifice, 'through the construction and communication of the [leader] cult', that gave these dictatorships their distinctiveness as forms of

authoritarian rule (Overy 2004: 100), it is difficult to know with complete assurance just how rusted on ordinary Italians, Germans and Russians were. The historiography of the period attests to the ever-present sense of menace and fear that impressed themselves on the thinking and actions of ordinary people, and it has been well-documented that the psychology of elite–mass, leader–audience relations plays itself out in exceedingly complex ways as part of the battle for the mass of hearts and minds. At one point in 'The Downfall', when all hope of saving the Reich appears lost, and yet innocent Berliners are still being murdered for alleged desertion, and the starving, ill and infirm have been all but abandoned to their own fate by the regime, Hirschbiegel has Goebbels express his contempt for Germany. Deep in the bunker, Goebbels sneers at a *Wehrmacht* general that the Nazis had never forced their programme on the country, because the German people had chosen to go where the Nazis had wanted to take them. But, since they had proven so inadequate to the challenge, he now felt no sympathy for them and said they deserved to perish (or words to that effect). This bleak verdict implies that responsibility for leader personality cults and everything that flowed from them rested almost entirely with those who afforded them legitimacy.

There is strong support for the claim that much of a people's fate is in its own hands. Bullock (1998: 386) is unequivocal: Hitler projected reassurance and hope, and his own self-image was confirmed in return. The myth of Hitler 'was as much a creation of his followers' as it was imposed from above. No less an authority than Weber (1978: 1112–3, emphasis in original) is equally adamant: 'If those to whom [a charismatic leader] feels sent do not recognize him, his claim collapses; if they recognize it, he is their master as long as he "proves" himself ... it is their *duty* to recognize his charisma.' Kershaw's sole caveat is that the notions of followers and a followership are confined to the 'immediate bodyguard, disciples or agents of the leader' – his paladins – and do not necessarily include ordinary people (2001: 9). Yet, it was precisely against this 'population at large' that Sebastian Haffner, a defiant eye-witness of Nazism until he left Germany in 1933, claimed (perhaps optimistically, in retrospect) dictators were powerless, in the face of this group's 'simultaneous mass decisions taken individually and almost unconsciously' (2002 [1939]: 142, 143). The vicissitudes of the small study circle of six intellectuals (including Right and Left sympathisers, and one Jew) of which Haffner (2002 [1939]: 169) was a member in 1932–3 reveal the depth to which social mobilisation around a leader and his movement's values had penetrated, for this triggered the group's disintegration. The last straw came after the death of a Social Democrat at the hands of the Nazis. Haffner's friend Holz (later a party official), when niggled by Haffner about his legalistic reaction to the incident, let fly with 'people of your ilk represent a latent danger to the state' which had 'the right and the duty to act accordingly'. Haffner then challenged his friend: 'Do you intend to denounce me to the Gestapo?' whereupon he was met with: 'I admit that for some time I have been wondering whether that is my duty'.

Evidence of cult impact is reasonably well-documented for Germany and Italy but has been harder to obtain for the USSR. As was the case with Stalin, whose biography and writings became required reading for Soviet citizens, portraits of

Hitler hung in most German homes. There were some refusniks who did not endorse hero worship of Stalin, especially in literary circles, but Soviet censors were ever vigilant in ferreting out even 'the slightest hint of irreverence' (Overy 2004: 129). In Germany, internal reports compiled by government, party and other officials, in conjunction with the testimonies of exiled Germans revealed levels of commitment to Hitler and Nazism that ebbed and flowed in the 1930s. Although it wobbled for a time during the Sudeten crisis (September 1938), in general terms, adulation for Hitler rose with each successive foreign policy coup until attaining its apogee in 1938–40 (Kershaw 2001: 80). The disastrous battle of Stalingrad (February 1943) marked the point at which this euphoria for the *Führer* began to erode (Kershaw 2001: 192), a decline exacerbated by Hitler's diminishing and infrequent appearances in public, and his own physical decay (starkly visible in his increasingly tremulous left hand). In Italy, despite the official propaganda throughout the Mussolini period, Bosworth's verdict is that 'Catholicism, the family, the *paese* [village] and region, patron–client networks, gender attitudes and many another lingering structure of the Italies actually distracted the populace from too fervent a Fascist religiosity' (2002: 242). As the war dragged on, open expressions of patriotic dissent began to increase, particularly in the industrial north around Turin, and by late 1942 Mussolini was even being parodied within his immediate entourage as *Provolone* (Cheeseball), due to his shiny bald head (Bosworth 2002: 385).

Learning from heroic leader cults

All human interaction occurs in information environments. In this respect, leadership relations are unexceptional. Information environments are potentially open-ended and infinite. And because access to and possession of information provide a basis for individual and collective knowing, there is a strong incentive to try to regulate the relational space in which all forms of information (cognitive, affective, aesthetic etc.) are transacted and exchanged.

Within these broad dynamics, three lessons of heroic leader cultism stand out. First, leadership had (and has) a 'face'. Following Goffman, face is the value attached to the accessible information (visible and presumed) which various social units and formations (individuals, social groups, entire societies etc.) utilise as the cognitive foundations of their understandings and evaluations of leaders (1967: 5–7). In the 1970s and 1980s, face figured prominently among critiques of behavioural accounts of institutional power and a range of faces was posited according to number and type (i.e. two faces, hidden, latent and manifest faces, and public and private faces). But divisibility, lines and boundaries in information environments make little sense. This means that uniformity of face is impossible, for face is relative to the standpoint and circumstances of every observer, so that in respect of particular leaders there exists an overall aggregation of varying degrees of awareness and knowledge.

Notwithstanding this elusiveness of face, these regimes tried hard to construct preferred faces of three leaders. Their variable success in doing so leads to the

second general point, which is that while perceptions of leaders may be shaped in part by restrictions on the diffusion of knowledge, effective manipulation of perceptions is more likely to be afforded by the codification of information and control of leadership 'awareness contexts'. The dictators' deaths described earlier provide evidence of three different awareness contexts. For Glaser and Strauss (1964: 670), an awareness context is the totality of the information available to individuals in a situation about their own and others' identities. In Glaser and Strauss's terms, leader cultism represents a closed awareness context, as most people have available to them a restricted range of sources of knowledge of a leader's identity and of the actual workings of a regime. Both the structuring and controlling of awareness contexts, then, go a considerable way to facilitating the assimilation of preferred leader imagery.

Imagery leads to the third point, which is concerned with prototyping. With respect to the Hitler cult, Kershaw (2001: 80) claims that Nazi 'propaganda was only effective where a gullible readiness to trust and believe in untrammelled political leadership had already been cultivated and was widespread'. The significance of this observation is that the available face of leadership comprises not only what seeps into public consciousness through filtered awareness contexts, but also that the information has to connect with pre-existing understandings. Such is the cognitive phenomenon of prototypical fit or match. Prototyping is as a kind of schematic analogue of satisficing in conditions of bounded rationality in decision-making: that is, in open-ended information environments, individuals and groups cognitively economise on their experiences of complexity by reducing the properties of data to a known range of recognisable patterns, so that 'leaders who conform to leadership schemas are likely to be perceived as leaders, thus expanding their latitude of discretion and power' (Lord and Mayer 1991: 152). Where the aesthetically grounded cults of the 1930s were especially successful (until, that is, the pressures created by external war-related circumstances became overwhelming) was in inducing mass convergence on a mere handful of legitimate schematic types. One consequence of doing so was the typical awareness discrepancies noticed in reports from local officials, and the accompanying unsullied phenomenon of 'if Hitler only knew': i.e. the population's ignorance of actual events in Germany and the belief that if anything untoward was in fact occurring then this was because Hitler was being deliberately kept in the dark by his underlings and party bosses (Kershaw 2001: 83–104). In this way, the charisma of their leader retained its unblemished status above the fray.

Conclusion

Writing in late 1939, just after the declaration of war, Sebastian Haffner bemoaned the fact that the names of the day on everyone's lips – 'Hitler, Mussolini, Chiang Kai-Shek, Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Daladier' – left the impression of the history of the decade as a 'kind of chess game' between them alone, with everyone else as pawns moved around at will (2002 [1939]: 142). In the sense that history is more than the deeds of a few, Haffner's regret is understandable. On

the other hand, the justification for the focus of the preceding discussion on the heroic leadership of the 1930s was two-fold. First, while the functioning of each of the regimes headed by Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini was consistent with a tradition of dictatorship known as Caesarism (not considered here due to space limitations) at least in two instances they were also brutally totalitarian in practice in ways that were historically unprecedented. Subsequently and tragically, the systematic refinement of the techniques of terror and genocide that they pioneered on a mass scale, provided prototypical models for future psychopathological leaders hell-bent on abominable abuses of power such as ethnic cleansing. Second, this particular decade is also important because of the refinements undergone by heroic leadership. As Overy (2004: 109) points out, spin and image-making have become standard fare for contemporary leaders, but in the 1930s the idea of leader cults was 'a novelty'. What is now taken for granted in public life, in the management of appearances and reality, was rehearsed and pioneered in that decade.

For these reasons, then, I attempted to begin the kind of systematic analysis of Hitlerism and similar comparative leader cults sought by Kershaw (2001: 10). Not only did heroic leadership and the charisma that was central to it undergo refinement in the pre-war years, but it would be further refined later on. By no means are all heroes despots and it was during the war that Sidney Hook, in his book *The Hero in History* (1955), introduced an important distinction between event-making and eventful leaders to make this very point, in an attempt to reconcile heroism with leadership in democracies. Event-making types were those leaders who deliberately and single-mindedly pursued greatness (as in the examples discussed above) while the eventfuls consisted of those who might be thought of as having had greatness thrust upon them. With the translation of Weber's writings into English shortly after the war, the phenomenon of charisma became more widely known, until eventually it too underwent 'domestication' (see House 1977) as something suitable for refinement and adoption by organisation-based heroes in their pursuit of competitive firm advantage in democratic economies, and as the basis of a subsequent template for the top–down driven transformation of schools and other sectoral agencies. In their elucidation of leadership around an essentialist core of preferred conceptual attributes, the present generation of apologists for heroic organisational leadership is engaged in a similar kind of endeavour as the proponents of the leader cults who preceded them. One can only marvel at how this parallel intellectual activity results in an equally unhelpful outcome: narrowly convergent prescriptive representations of how organisations might supposedly be changed by super leader figures on a mission, which yield the same deadening effect of over simplifying a complex reality.

Note

1   The more graphic details of what happened next form part of the plot for *Der Untergang* (The Downfall), a film directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel.

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14 Towards an aesthetics for educational administration

Richard J. Bates

Just as Weber's explication of the characteristics of bureaucracy has dominated much of the discourse in organisational and administrative theory for the past century, his explication of charisma has dominated the field of leadership. The paradox inherent in demanding charismatic leadership within increasingly rationalised organisations would not be lost on Weber. The 'enchantment' inherent in charismatic performance sits oddly with the 'disenchantment' of Weber's hyper-rationalised world of strategic and routinised organisations.

In current texts educational leaders are, like other leaders, exhorted to exercise charismatic leadership: to 'envision' the mission of their organisation; to 'celebrate' its culture; to 'symbolise' and 'perform' its purpose. The 'art' of leadership is at once strategic – as in the 'art' of war (Ribbins and Zhang 2003a; 2003b); moral – as in the 'ethic' of administration (Hodgkinson 1991); and aesthetic – as in the 'performance' of culture (Starratt 1990; 1993). The ideal leader is indeed an aesthetic accomplishment of the self. There are echoes here (though somewhat remote) of the Greek ideal of *kalos kagathos* – the man (always and only a man) both beautiful and good (or perhaps more precisely, the man both beautiful and noble).

The embodiment of virtue and the aesthetic performance of the self are both caught up in recent plethora of texts on school culture. Deal and Peterson's text *Shaping School Culture: The Heart of Leadership* (1999), typifies this genre in its emphasis on the importance of symbolic leadership in the shaping of school culture. Arguing that their analysis is rooted in an anthropological understanding of culture, Deal and Peterson suggest eight key roles for educational leaders as they perform their cultural work: historian, anthropological sleuth, visionary, symbolist, potter, poet, actor and healer (1999: 87–8). Clearly many of these roles are essentially aesthetic in that they involve imagination (visionary), representation (symbolist), production (potter), celebration (poet) and performance (actor). Aesthetics is seen as a crucial component in the building of a 'strong school culture', one underpinned by 'informal folkways and traditions that infuse work with meaning, passion and purpose' (1999: 1).

Such texts argue that aesthetic activities are *instrumental*, then, in building motivation and commitment: aesthetics have a *moral* purpose. Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks, is quoted as an exemplar of such cultural leadership:

> The key is heart. I pour my heart into every cup of coffee, and so do my partners at Starbucks. When customers sense that, they respond in kind. If you pour your heart into your work, or into any worthy enterprise, you can achieve dreams others may think impossible.
>
> (Schultz and Yang 1997 in Deal and Peterson 1999: 1)

Deal and Peterson translate the message into the world of education:

> The need for some leaders to step forward and take the necessary risks to build positive school cultures has never been greater. If Starbucks' CEO can pour his heart into a cup of coffee, so too can school leaders pour their hearts into student learning.
>
> (Deal and Peterson 1999: 11)

The same message is put even more forcefully by Saphier and King in their assertion that 'Good seeds grow in strong cultures' (1985).

Such a position is both blatant and naïve. It is blatant in its abandonment of the *descriptive* intention of anthropological approaches to culture and its appropriation of culture for managerial purposes (see Bates 1981; 1983; 1987; Angus 1993). It is naïve in its assumption that strong cultures articulated through powerful aesthetics are necessarily moral or 'good'. It is also a position quite uninformed by debates over such issues in the field of aesthetics or more recent discussions of cultural studies, for both of these fields have been concerned with what might be called the politics of culture.

As is made clear elsewhere in this volume, there is a significant tradition in aesthetics that follows the Greek ideal of harmony, where the man both beautiful and good epitomises the moral and aesthetic aspirations of a 'harmonious' culture. As O'Leary suggests, within this model:

> ... there is a coalescence of aesthetics and ethics, with the result that every aesthetic judgement – that something is beautiful, or harmonious – necessarily implies an ethical judgement – that that thing is good, or praiseworthy. According to this model, there is no doubt that if one's life and one's behaviour have a beautiful form, then they will also be good.
>
> (O'Leary 1999: 161)

Such a (Greek) ideal of harmony was, however, pursued within a culture where there were significant distinctions between enslaved and free, male and female, citizen and non-citizen. It was, therefore, an ideal open only to a free, male, citizen elite such as that represented in the hierarchy of Plato's republic.

It is, of course, possible to build a model of school culture that expresses such ideals of harmony and hierarchy. Indeed, the English 'public' school in many ways appealed to just such a rationale with its emphasis on physical prowess and beauty and its ethical/aesthetic/political hierarchies.

The difficulty with such a position is, however, its tendency towards authoritarian manipulation. The most obvious example of the dangers of ethical aestheticism lie not in the Greek and Roman examples, nor in the case of the English public school, but in the frightening images of the 'perfectibility' of man inherent in the Nazi and fascist states during the first half of the twentieth century.

In examining such regimes Walter Benjamin (1973) argued that while traditionally art was bound up with (largely religious) ritual and was, in that sense, 'authentic' in its representation of a shared culture, in the contemporary age where art can be 'mechanically' reproduced, it becomes instead a tool of politics. That is, art becomes a means of propaganda and manipulation, substituting and imposing an artificial unity of purpose and ideals while repressing and marginalising other aesthetic representations of politics and ethics, particularly those concerned with changing the status quo. O'Leary shows how Benjamin's thesis works:

> Benjamin elaborates this point by showing how fascism organises the newly formed masses while simultaneously maintaining existing property structures. It achieves this by giving its subjects merely 'a chance to express themselves' (Benjamin, 1973 p. 243). In newsreel footage of parades and rallies, for example, the masses are brought 'face to face with themselves' (p. 253) and they are given the opportunity to *portray* themselves. What this means for Benjamin, is that the principle of aesthetic expression and the beautiful illusion (the *schöner schein*) takes precedence over the principle of political rights ... Fascism 'violates' the masses in the same way that it violates the apparatus of film in order to make it produce 'ritual values' (p. 243). It proceeds by a successive aestheticisation (and hence ritualisation) of political life; it institutes the Fuhrer cult, it glorifies war, it confers upon the people, the blood, the soil the magical properties of the auratic cult object.
>
> (1999: 155)

The result is an aestheticised politics through which a mass hysteria is engendered and in which cult-like rituals persuade people to celebrate even their own destruction. As Caygill puts it, such an aestheticised politics persuades people to:

> ... participate avidly in their own history while spectating it as someone else's history; they participate in political action and view it from a distance; they participate in their own destruction and enjoy the spectacle.
>
> (1994: 28)

A similar destructive aestheticisation of politics was articulated in Italy by Marinetti whose work attempted to replace the centrality of 'woman' and 'beauty' in traditional aesthetics with a monstrous invocation of the mechanical: '... the wholly mastered, definitive Future aesthetic of great locomotives, twisting tunnels, armoured cars, torpedo boats, monoplanes and racing cars' on which the

'young modern male' will focus his attention as objects that '... glow with plea-sure beneath his ardent caress' (in Flint 1971: 81, 90).

While Marinetti was writing in 1909, his aesthetic was incorporated into both Italian and German Fascism. Junger, for instance, echoed Marinetti in celebrat-ing the unifying aesthetic of the machine:

> Today we are writing poems of steel, and we are fighting for power in battles that unfold with the precision of machines. There is a beauty in it which we can already sense: in these battles on land, on sea and in the air in which the hot will of our blood controls itself and finds expression in the mastery of the technical miracle machines of power.
>
> (Junger in Berman 1989: 78)

The purpose of all this aestheticised power was not the liberation of the self and its construction according to personal conceptions of the beautiful and the good, nor even a construction of the self which conformed to a particular harmonious cultural tradition, but rather the coercion of individuals into a unified, national-istic conception of the self that at once celebrated and was subordinated to a particular image of the nation engineered by the artist/statesman. As O'Leary suggests:

> If there is something characteristic about the fascist aestheticisation of poli-tics then, it must be sought in this insistence upon the ideal of a non-fractured subject which finds itself reassuringly reflected in a non-frac-tured, uniform public space. When thought of in these terms, it becomes possible to understand and explain the fascist theme of the politician as the plastic artist who moulds the people to his will, and gives them a harmonious and beautiful form.
>
> (1999: 158–9)

Education was, of course, a major instrument in the creation of a 'Volk', a people who were motivated and committed to a particular vision of their personal and political future (Sunker and Otto 1996). Educational administrators/leaders were themselves required to be both the personification of the vision and the man-agers of its implementation through an aesthetic of education that carried both cultural and political ideals.

This particular juxtaposition of aesthetics, ethics and politics is surely not what Deal and Peterson have in mind. But, as their only goal in the shaping of a strong school culture is a somewhat generalised encouragement of learning within a shared, common vision, such a result is not discounted by their view of culture, aesthetics, ethics and the practice of educational leadership (1999).

There is, of course, an alternative tradition stemming from Kant that sees aes-thetics as an autonomous activity with purposes and criteria of its own independent of religious/political/cultural concerns. As this is articulated in other papers in this volume it will not be dealt with at length here. In passing,

however, it is interesting to note that the reaction of many artists to the totalitarianisms of fascism and communism – of the right and the left – was to assert the 'independence' of art and the need of the artist for 'free expression'. As representational art was inescapably descriptive and therefore caught up in the brutality of contemporary life, the only possible solution was the creation of 'abstract' art. Abstract expressionism was, indeed, an assertion of the autonomy of art. It was:

> ... for many, the expression of freedom: the freedom to create controversial works of art, the freedom symbolized by action painting, by the unbridled expressionism of artists completely without fetters.
>
> (Guilbaut 1983: 201)

However, even in this case, politics caught up with art. As Guilbaut observes, abstract expressionism itself became a weapon in the ideological battles of the Cold War. It was interpreted within a highly politicised context.

In the first place it was argued that:

> The brutality of the modern world can wear down the individual. Against this brutality the artist was supposed to be a shining example of the individual will set against the dull uniformity of totalitarian society.
>
> (Guilbaut 1983: 200)

Within this context:

> Freedom was the symbol most actively and vigorously promoted by the new liberalism in the Cold War period. Expressionism stood for the difference between a free society and a totalitarian one. Art was able to package the virtues of liberal society and lay down a challenge to its enemies: it aroused polemic without courting danger.
>
> (Guilbaut 1983: 201)

So even the ideal of the autonomy of aesthetics was appropriated politically in the cultural battles of the Cold War.

To others, of course, aesthetics and politics are historically linked in many jurisdictions – not simply in Fascist states. Eagleton (1990), in his *Ideology of the Aesthetic*, argues that Kant's assertion of the autonomy of the aesthetic realm provides a necessary disguise for the cultural and political assertion of bourgeois hegemony. In other words Eagleton argues that:

> ... Kant's aesthetic has to account for, or display, bourgeois ideology, bourgeois morality and bourgeois commodity in homologous relationship. The ruling order ... needs Kant's epistemology: it needs a persuasive account of freedom which masks the manoeuvres of the ideology of private capital.
>
> (Armstrong 2000: 34)

The result is the modern aestheticised state where the first mechanism of repression is an appeal to the aesthetic: the cultural/political combination of desire and morality that construct the motivation for a particular way of life, a particular way of being. Once again, education is a significant mechanism for the production and distribution of such an aesthetic and educational administrators/leaders are instrumental in the articulation (enforcement?) of both vision and practice.

The aestheticised state need not, of course, be totalitarian in its control of cultural agencies. It may simply support the articulation of cultural agencies in a particular form. In many contemporary societies the form is that of capitalism. Indeed it is the theoretical analysis of the structures of power and finance inherent in capitalism that provide the model for Bourdieu's models of *cultural* and *symbolic* capital.

In his most fully worked out explications of the importance of cultural capital Bourdieu (1984; 1993) argues that just as *financial* capital is accumulated through family contacts, business networks, associations, class relations, economic institutions and political power, *cultural* capital is accumulated through family training, education, class location and associated cultural codes which facilitate access to and the accumulation of prestige. Much of this prestige is dependent upon the accumulation of *symbolic* capital that is constituted as a hierarchy of privileged knowledge through which aesthetic and social value is produced. Individuals and their families are positioned in social space by their possession of particular kinds of symbolic capital. Their cultural relations are identified and determined by their location in that space. While analogous to the distribution and articulation of financial capital, symbolic capital is somewhat independent of the structures of financial capital. Indeed, its main justification in the conferring of prestige or 'distinction' is the claim of aesthetics or 'taste' to be an autonomous sphere and its promotion of 'the charismatic image of artistic activity as pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist' (Bourdieu 1993: 34).

Symbolic capital and its distribution is articulated through a network of institutions such as art galleries and museums, cultural agencies, theatres, publishing houses, and foundations which constitute the infrastructure for the 'management' of symbolic capital. While the claim is made that the art produced and regulated by these institutions is autonomous and 'disinterested', Bourdieu insists that they function to legitimate the hierarchies of symbolic power upon which the possession of symbolic capital depends. They are sites of continuous struggle over what is to constitute 'art' and articulate the rules of inclusion and exclusion, regulation, access and value which consecrate the value of symbolic capital, distinction and prestige. Cultural wars are fought within and between such institutions with a Darwinian intensity in order to 'impose a legitimate definition of art and literature' (Bourdieu 1993: 41).

What constitutes legitimate art and literature at any one time is necessarily related to the struggles going on between classes and, perhaps most especially, within the dominant class:

> The struggle in the field of cultural production over the imposition of the legitimate mode of cultural production is inseparable from the struggle within the dominant class ... to impose the dominant principle of domination (that is to say – ultimately – the definition of human accomplishment).
>
> (Bourdieu 1993: 41)

Definitions of human accomplishment are, of course, crucial to education both in terms of the content of the curriculum (what constitutes appropriate knowledge) and the pedagogy (what constitutes appropriate behaviour and relations) within educational institutions. Educational administrators/leaders are crucial figures in the definition and policing of accomplishment, both through their articulation (visioning?) of a particular aesthetic and through their disciplining of deviance. They tend, as do most intellectuals, to take conservative positions in the cultural wars over curriculum and pedagogy, those educational carriers of symbolic capital. As Bourdieu points out:

> All the evidence suggests that, at a given level of autonomy, intellectuals are, other things being equal, proportionately more responsive to the seduction of the powers that be ...
>
> (1993: 41)

Moreover, educational administrators typically not only articulate the vision of the powers that be, but also preside over educational institutions that confirm both rank and distinction through the legitimation of particular (conservative) definitions of cultural capital and the 'consecration' of those, and only those, who can be considered to possess such capital. In this respect 'the school institution performs a truly magical operation, the paradigm of which is the separation between the sacred and the profane' (Bourdieu 1998: 21).

As is the claim in the realm of aesthetics, the school also claims autonomy from existing structures of financial and cultural capital, suggesting that talent and effort are the sole requirements for success. In fact, suggests Bourdieu, far from challenging the inherited distribution of symbolic capital, the school typically confirms it. The school simply:

> ... maintains the preexisting order, that is, the gap between pupils endowed with unequal amounts of cultural capital. More precisely, by a series of selection operations, the system separates the holders of inherited cultural capital from those who lack it. Differences of aptitude being inseparable from social differences according to inherited capital, the system thus tends to maintain preexisting social differences.
>
> (1998: 20)

The articulation of a particular vision by educational administrators and the classification of teachers and pupils in terms of their conformity with that vision as successful or unsuccessful, can, therefore, be seen as a mechanism through which

individuals are located in social, cultural or symbolic space and defined more or less permanently by that location – notwithstanding the school's embrace of the ideology of promotion by merit. This is an aesthetic as well as a functional classification, one that marks the difference between 'purity' and 'danger' (Douglas 1970; Durkheim 1971). Bourdieu discusses this distinction in similar terms, contrasting the school's role in protecting the purity of the ordained social order against the danger of those unconsecrated by such noble affiliation:

> The act of scholastic classification is always ... an act of *ordination* ... It institutes a social difference of rank, a *permanent relation of order*: the elect are marked, for their whole lives, by their affiliation ...; they are members of an *order*, in the medieval sense of the word, and of a noble order, that is, a clearly delimited set (one either belongs or one doesn't) of people who are separated from the common run of mortals by a difference of essence and, therefore, legitimately licensed to dominate. This is why the separation achieved by the school is also an act of ordination in the sense of *consecration*, enthronement in a sacred category, a nobility.
>
> (Bourdieu 1998: 21)

The work of educational administrators is, therefore, aesthetic, not only in terms of their vision of school culture and their embodiment of that vision in the aesthetic performance of the self, but also in the act of consecration of a particular aesthetic distinction between purity and danger, between the noble and the mundane and their classification of individuals according to such categories.

Such classification is crucial to the maintenance of social distinction. As T. S. Eliot argued in his *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, Culture, with a capital C, was necessarily regarded as a minority pursuit:

> To aim to make ... the 'uneducated' mass of the population ... share in the appreciation of the fruits of the most conscious part of culture is to adulterate and cheapen what you give, for it is an essential condition of the preservation of the quality of the culture of the minority that it should continue to be a minority culture.
>
> (1948: 32)

Eliot's concern was the maintenance of high culture and its defence against the emergence of the masses. Here Eliot was in the company of others such as Leavis, who articulated such a view at greater length in his *Mass Civilization and Minority Culture* (1933) and his attempted codification of the canons of high culture in poetry (*Revaluation* 1936) and the English novel (*The Great Tradition* 1962). More recently and controversially Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) provided another attempt to defend high culture against the depredations of working class, minority, ethnic and feminist cultures. Adorno (1984; 1991) had a similar view of *The Culture Industry* and its 'administration of culture'.

Here, of course, is a perfect example of the attempt to maintain privileged definitions of culture and to articulate them in social, cultural or aesthetic 'space' in ways that define and legitimate hierarchies of aesthetic, cultural and social power. Eliot, Leavis, Bloom, and a legion of others were attempting to defend such a notion of elite culture against the emergence of mass culture articulated, for instance, through cinema, popular music, 'gutter' journalism, radio and television. In twentieth century England, of course, this argument was carried through into the visible separation of the grammar (elite culture) and secondary modern (mass culture) schools: a structural, symbolic and classed system of the most impermeable kind.

Nonetheless, despite the boundaries created by such a system, some working class boys did manage to cross over from working class to elite educational systems. Among the first generation of working class boys to do so in England were the founders of the 'cultural studies' movement, Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall in particular. Working at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham they were among the first writers to suggest that cultural criticism could be constructed from a working class perspective. Williams, in particular, argued that it was possible, through disciplined study, to learn about other cultures and to understand their perspectives – their canons and criteria of evaluation, their aesthetic, and the ways in which their cultural identity was formed (see Gorak 1988; Williams 1958; 1961; 1980). The cultural studies group mounted a major challenge to the position articulated by Eliot and Leavis.

They did so by redefining the notion of culture and opposing the 'literary' notion of high culture with a:

> ... 'social' definition of culture, in which culture is a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values, not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour.
>
> (Williams 1961: 57)

Such a turn was quite consistent with another tradition derived from anthropology, which, in its study of primitive cultures, adopted a similar view but which was only just beginning to apply the same techniques of cultural analysis to contemporary societies.

Coupled with a neo-Marxist understanding of social relations, this school of thought developed quickly an analysis of cultural relations, cultural production and cultural reproduction which showed how culture was segmented and hierachised and how it was reproduced in the institutions and practices of everyday life. Aesthetic differentiation was seen as a mechanism of the reproduction of cultural and social difference: it served a structural and an ideological purpose:

> The reproduction of the social relations of production requires, in class societies, the continual production of specifically classed and gendered individuals within an ideological field that naturalizes existing classes and

genders. In the broadest sense, the work of ideologies is to represent histori-
cal contradictions as *natural*: as immutable *differences* (between man and
women, blacks and whites, 'them' and 'us', the 'successful' and the 'idle'); as
rich or amusing *variety* ('it takes all sorts', *vive la difference"*); as mutual
dependency ('different but equal', social contract, a share of the profits); or
as mere appearances subsumed in a larger *unity* (the family, the British peo-
ple, 'we're all human beings'). All these and many other forms of
naturalization are at work in developed social formations, not only in those
institutions of the superstructure (school, church, family) that directly 'man-
ufacture' ideology, but also in the most intimate interstices and very
atmospheres of public and private life.

(Hall 1980: 261–2)

At first, the idea of reproduction and the ideological domination by elites of cul-
tural institutions was a focus of study. More recently, however, the study of
culture as a 'way of life' has mutated into the study of the *cultural practices* of par-
ticular groups and their interactions. Simultaneously, as Paul Ricoeur (1986)
suggests, the method of social science has shifted from the structural to the *con-
versational*, where the meaning of social life is to be understood through the
analysis of the standpoint of its participants expressed in talk in small settings.

   Such a position leads to a rather different view of society: one that is articu-
lated not through structure, but through negotiation between cultural practices
of enormous diversity. Society is a series of multiple realities each of which strug-
gles to articulate its interests and understandings through struggle and
negotiation with other 'realities'. Meaning itself is produced through struggle and
articulated through the aesthetics of language, symbolism, performance and arti-
fice:

   ... culture no longer refers to *shared meanings* that reflect people's way of life.
   Instead, cultural practices refer to the many institutions, classes, and groups
   that compete in the articulation of the social meaning of things, to the many
   sites and positions from which knowledges and ideas are developed, and to
   the conflicts arising out of the struggle to stage performances and to affect
   audiences.

(McCarthy 1996: 26)

Such a view suggests a certain relativism in the conception of culture and the
aesthetic practices through which it is negotiated. Such a plurality brings the
very notion of meaning into question: the status of various claims as 'fact', 'opin-
ion', 'knowledge' or 'ideology' are constantly disputed as are the motivations
behind certain dispositions:

   For these reasons and others, the study of cultural practices makes evident
   the problem of the politics of meaning. It raises questions about how partic-
   ular cultural meanings came to be produced, why, and by whom. It forces

upon us the realization that the same cultural ideas, words and images often mean different things to different groups. And furthermore, the meaning of something is continually subject to change both because social objects are multi-coded and because there are a multiplicity of 'languages'. The cultural order becomes the outcome of historically diverse and conflicting groups.

(McCarthy 1996: 26)

Such an anarchy of cultures is far from the ideal celebrated by Matthew Arnold in his advocacy of bringing the 'best that has been thought and said in the world' to the unruly masses thus insuring against revolution through the civilising effect of elite culture (1960: 27).

But contemporary societies are marked by such an anarchy of cultures, some developed from within, others the result of cultural contact and migration. The central issue in such a multifarious, post-modern world becomes that of how to communicate across cultural boundaries (Touraine 2000) and how to construct 'common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist' (Gray 2000: 6). In essence this project is an aesthetic project as it involves the exercise of imagination, presentation, performance, interpretation, and identification. The point here is that rationality or logic may well not be a sufficient vehicle for cross-cultural communication as the paradigms of different cultures may be incommensurable (McKee 2005).

This does not mean that different cultures cannot talk with one another, but that the mechanisms for doing so may depend upon translation, empathy and creativity:

> The key skills for this kind of public debate are no longer training in formal or informal academic logic, but real life resources, such as our abilities to be creative and our willingness to keep trying to communicate with people whose language of argument we might not at first understand.
>
> (McKee 2005: 161)

Charles Taylor puts the same point in a somewhat different way:

> ... for a culture sufficiently different from our own, we may have only the foggiest idea...of in what its valuable contribution might consist. Because, for a sufficiently different culture, the very understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us. To approach, say, a raga with the presumptions of value implicit in the well-tempered clavier would be forever to miss the point. What has to happen is ... a 'fusion of horizons.' We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The 'fusion of horizons' operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison.
>
> (Taylor 1992: 67)

Dewey, of course, saw this imaginative process as fundamental to the aesthetic experience as well as to the process of education. In his *Art and Experience* he argued the centrality of imagination in coming to terms with the new and incorporating it into the construction of the self: the capacity to look at things as if they could be otherwise. This capacity, he suggests, is:

> ... a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes into contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination.
>
> (Dewey 1980: 267)

Imagination, as a central component of aesthetic awareness and as a central process in the incorporation of the new and strange into our consciousness is, therefore, fundamental in negotiations between 'cultures'. It is also fundamental in the process of education. Indeed, it can be seen as the everyday experience of children from various backgrounds in their attempts to come to terms with the strangeness of the curricular, pedagogical and evaluative structures of schools.

And, indeed, just as imagination is needed in our negotiation and interpretation of other cultures and the incorporation of such understanding into the curriculum of schools, so does our pedagogy need to be informed by such imagination in our attempts to understand our students. Maxine Greene puts this necessity quite forcefully:

> Those of us who 'do' aesthetic education, those of us who try to find spaces for it in problematic schools, are sensitive to the multiple life stories young people are carrying with them into our classrooms. We are sensitive to the multiple voices that need to be heard, the multiple vantage points from which the young look at an often uncaring world. At once, we are aware of what are thought of as multiple intelligences, as diverse symbol systems and languages for interpreting what presents itself as reality. And we are particularly conscious of the importance of imagination, so often omitted from education reports: imagination that allows us to open windows in the actual and disclose visions of what might be.
>
> (1988: 110)

So here is an argument for the fundamental importance of the aesthetic in negotiating difference through imagination: for the incorporation of the other in the experience of education (see also Greene 2001). Such a vision is particularly apt for education in a world of difference where the dangers of the authoritarian imposition of an elite culture or an aesthetically engineered politics of unity are present and real. It is also apt in a world where the retreat into gated communities within

which a shared and exclusionary vision provides an alternative authoritarianism and repression (Bates 2005; Peshkin 1986; Touraine 2000).

But the purpose of education is not simply to encourage people to understand the world they live in, in all its complexity and confusion, but also to empower students to act within it. The importance of the aesthetic is not simply, therefore, the encouragement of a somewhat passive connoisseurship, but the encouragement of agency. As Herbert Read argued:

> Education is the fostering of growth, but apart from physical maturation, growth is only made apparent in expression – audible or visual signs and symbols. Education may therefore be defined as the cultivation of modes of expression – it is teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, movements, tools and utensils. A man who can make such things well is a well educated man. If he can make good sounds, he is a good speaker: if he can make good images, he is a good painter or sculptor; if good movements, a good dancer or labourer; if good utensils, a good craftsman. All faculties, of thought, memory, sensibility and intellect are involved in such processes. And they are all processes which involve art, for art is nothing but the good making of sounds, images, etc. The aim of education is therefore the creation of artists – of people efficient in the various modes of expression.
>
> (1958: 11)

The purpose of such expression, of such aesthetic capacity was, for Read, the capacity for self-expression within a democratic framework, one where the agency of individuals was acknowledged and valued. It followed that 'a democratic education is the only guarantee of a democratic revolution: indeed, to introduce a democratic method of education is the only necessary revolution' (Read 1958: 304). Here are echoes of Dewey's argument of the close relationship between aesthetics, civilisation and democracy (Dewey 1931; 1966; 1980).

The role of the aesthetic in the encouragement of agency is a concern of contemporary educators such as Maxine Greene:

> It may be our interest in imagination, as much as our interest in active learning, that makes us so eager to encourage a sense of agency among those with whom we work. By that I mean consciousness of the power to choose and to act upon what is chosen. I mean a willingness to take initiatives, to pose critical questions, to play an authentic part in ongoing dialogues – to embark, whenever opportunities arise, on new beginnings. This means that we desire, through aesthetic education, not only to foster continually deepening understanding of the several arts, but to empower teachers, students, parents – all those involved with the care and nurture of the young – to act upon their freedom in the world they share with others. That means resisting determinism, apathy, indifference, carelessness, and the numbness and anaesthesia that seems to affect so many people's lives. Dewey once said that the opposite of 'aesthetic' is indeed 'anaesthetic'. In relation to that we

might think of aesthetic education as education for wide-awakeness – for a more active, responsible, ardent mode of pursuing our human quests.

(1988: 110–11)

Here, then is an aesthetic vision that couples imagination with agency and regards the function of the aesthetic as the appreciation of difference and the appropriation and negotiation of such difference as sources of the self. It is a compelling vision and one in keeping with our times. The question is, is it capable of providing a powerful foundation for an aesthetic for educational administration? Eisner, for one, has his doubts:

> One might hope that schools of education that prepare school administrators would provide the kind of professional education that would enable them to think critically about the virtues toward which education aims. One might hope that such people would be encouraged to think deeply about the aims of education and to provide leadership and educational services to the community on whose support the schools depend. Unfortunately, as schools become more industrialized, the training programs for administrators focus more and more on the development of skills of labour negotiation and on courses offered in business schools, departments of economics, and the like. Such courses might have utility for some aspects of educational administration, but they are essentially technical studies. Embedded within technique are implicit visions of what is important, and these visions are seldom appraised by criteria emanating from a conception of education itself.
>
> (1979: 14)

Conclusion

It has been the argument of this chapter that a vision of educational administration derived from a conception of education that is indeed truly aesthetic might well be possible and might well form the basis for an educational administration that is more than simply an administrative exercise for, as Touraine points out, 'a school that is no more than an administrative service is unacceptable' (2000: 167).

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